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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem and Main Results
Recent developments vividly illustrate the importance of financial markets and
financial institutions to a well-functioning modern economy. A seemingly small
disruption in the sub-prime mortgage market has spread out to other financial
markets and led to a severe crisis in the banking sector. Moreover, even the real
sector of the economy is heavily impacted.
A central part of financial institutions, the banking sector, is heavily regulated and
interventions in the banking sector undoubtedly have an impact on the economy far
beyond the regulated banking institution or even the banking sector itself. Thus,
the central question arises of whether regulation indeed supports financial stability
or not?
The building block of the current banking regulation are risk-sensitive capital
requirements, which are based upon the Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a measure for risk.
This measure can be easily understood and it is proposed by many institutions such
as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the SEC, the G30, the ISDA, and
the Derivatives Group. Moreover, it is implemented by risk management systems
such as RiskMetrics and it is widely accepted in the industry.
2 1 Introduction
In this thesis we do not question whether banks should be regulated or not1,
nor whether VaR is the optimal choice for a risk measure2 to base regulation3
on. Instead, we take the common banking regulation with VaR based capital
requirements as given and analyze the impact of regulation on the stability of the
banking sector.
First, we discuss how regulation affects the investment decision of the representative
bank. The main results are the following. Banks are restricted if their nominal debt
volume exceeds a certain threshold, and, if so, provide more equity capital to cover
possible negative outcomes. There are two direct consequences. The representative
bank is less able to maintain high nominal debt volumes. Moreover, debt holders
are better protected in case of defaults due to regulation and charge a lower credit
yield spread relative to an unregulated economy.
However, the indirect consequence of regulation is a higher probability of distress of
the banking system and higher losses in case of defaults. This result can be traced
back to the dynamic trading strategy, which replicates the change in the optimal
profile that is directly attributable to regulation. This change consists of transferring
wealth into all regulated states of the economy; the transfer is paid by the cheapest,
unregulated states, namely the most extreme (negative) outcomes. The regulation-
induced change in the trading strategy can be represented as a static derivatives
position; hence, the optimal investment decision under regulation may serve as one
explanation for the highly innovative derivatives market and the shifting of risk into
the tails of the distribution by banks before the current crisis emerged.
Second, the impact of regulation on endogenous market prices of assets, debt, and
equity as well as their dynamic structure is analyzed. Under endogenous prices,
qualitatively the same results can be deduced as in the above discussed case with
fixed prices. However, the increased demand by the trading strategy which replicates
the adaption to regulation, shifts prices in a way that the implementation of the same
1See e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) or Freixas and Rochet (1999)
2See e.g. Artzner et al. (1999)
3See e.g. Danielsson et al. (2001)
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trading strategy is more expensive. Consequently, the probability of distress soars
even more in equilibrium and, if there is a crisis, the aggregate wealth of the economy
is less than in a corresponding economy with an unregulated financial system.
In equilibrium, wealth is transferred between different states in order to fulfill the
regulatory requirements. Yet, there exists a second transfer of wealth between the
agents of the economy specific to the equilibrium formulation. Not only debt holders
profit from the equity capital provisions of banks, but also the unrestricted investor
since asset prices also move in favor of investors.
The volatility of assets is reduced due to regulation in most cases. Nevertheless, es-
pecially as the economic situation deteriorates, volatility is increasing substantially.
Depending on the tightness of regulation, the volatility can be much higher than in
an economy with unregulated financial intermediaries. Moreover, volatility is highly
sensitive to a change in the underlying economic development, i.e. volatility changes
quickly from low to high and back in adverse economic situations.
Third, we shed light onto the problem of how to improve the banking regulation, if
banks actively manage both, assets and liabilities. The additional degree of freedom
that arises if banks simultaneously manage their assets and liabilities, enables banks
to mitigate the burden of regulation to some extent. This, in turn, results in a
higher danger of defaults in the banking sector.
Since the central bank is able to control, at least in parts, the overall leverage of the
economy and thereby the probability of distress, we propose to include the central
bank into the set of regulatory authorities. We show, that in order to cope with the
indirect incentives implied by the risk-sensitive capital requirements, leverage has
to be decreased when a stricter regulatory regime is applied to the economy and
the probability of distress is kept constant. This approach to regulation reduces the
value of aggressively ’gaming’ the VaR restriction.
Finally, one has to keep in mind that, if VaR-based capital requirements - which
are imposed today - are not accompanied by state contingent costs - which arise
after uncertainty has been resolved - regulation looses its power. To reach the
same objectives with lower default costs, regulation must be much tighter. Hence,
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credibly incorporating parts of systemic costs in case of distress is essential for a
well-functioning regulatory regime.
In the following the organization of the thesis is outlined.
Chapter 2 introduces the general economic setting and the pricing of contingent
claims in complete markets under no-arbitrage considerations. Then it reviews the
well-known consumption-investment problem for an unrestricted investor as well as
for a VaR restricted investor. Finally, the valuation of assets in a pure exchange
equilibrium is discussed for an economy with both types of investors.
In Chapter 3 the optimal asset choice of the banking sector is analyzed by
introducing banks into the setting of the previous chapter. The banking sector
is characterized by having debt outstanding and, in order to capture the regulatory
impact, a restriction by a VaR constraint. The banking sector is modelled in
aggregate terms by specifying a pay-off structure dependent on the total assets at
maturity. Assets are allocated using the first priority rule. However, if a bank fails,
default costs accrue. Afterwards, the endogenous decision in terms of the optimal
terminal wealth of the banking system under exogenously given prices is derived and
analyzed. Furthermore, the resulting dynamic asset selection is discussed.
In Chapter 4, a competitive pure exchange equilibrium is formulated. This allows us
to study the impact of the VaR regulation on market prices and their evolution over
time. By comparing the regulated banking sector with (a) an otherwise identical
unrestricted financial intermediary and (b) the banking sector under fixed prices,
the wealth transfer consequences of regulation are deduced.
In contrast to previous chapters, where a fixed nominal debt volume was assumed,
Chapter 5 studies the impact of the combined asset liability decision of the banking
sector. It is first illustrated that the additional degree of freedom in the choice of
their capital structure enables banks to mitigate regulatory constraints. Thereby,
the banking system is even more susceptible to a financial crisis.
Based on the last results, a holistic regulatory approach is proposed. It includes the
central bank in the regulatory authorities. The objective with regard to regulation
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is to control the probability of distress; as an instrument the central bank utilizes
the capability to restrict the overall leverage as a price-leading agent.
Chapter 6 summarizes the results, discusses the robustness of the results, and
concludes with policy implications derived from the presented model.
1.2 Review of the Related Literature
Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974) were the first to apply a (mean-variance)
portfolio selection approach to banks, while Kahane (1977) and Koehn and
Santomero (1980) included capital constraints. They showed that a higher capital
requirement may lead to a more risky portfolio selection in terms of the amount
invested into risky assets. As there may exist some banks that are more risky and
some that are less, the impact on the systemic risk is unclear. To remedy the
problem of riskier investments due to regulation, they suggest risk-sensitive capital
weights; Kim and Santomero (1988) find that this approach is indeed reducing risk,
but only if the risk weights are set optimally. Alexander and Baptista (2004, 2006)
refine those approaches, but still conclude that regulation in some circumstances
increases fragility in the financial system.
Even though we are using a dynamic framework, we also recover similar results with
respect to the portfolio selection problem. However, we are able to characterize the
results more precise than in the static frameworks. In most economic situations,
portfolios are indeed less risky than the ones of an unregulated economy. However,
especially when the economic development deteriorates, regulation fails with respect
to the portfolio decision, as banks substantially increase risk by investing more into
risky assets. Moreover, the magnitude of this adverse portfolio decision is heavily
dependent on the VaR horizon and on the tightness of regulation.
The importance of a dynamic model is illustrated by Blum (1999) in a two-period
model. There exist four different cases, depending in which period regulation is
binding; two of them are of special interest: If the capital constraint is active in
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the first period, whereas not in the second, there exists a risk reducing effect of
regulation. However, if the case is reversed, i.e. the capital constraint is binding in
the second period, whereas not in the first period, the bank increases its risk profile in
the first period, in order to lessen the impact of the restriction in the second period
by an increased capital basis, if the investment turns out to be successful. This
simple argument in Blum’s article shows that incorporating dynamic aspects into
the analysis substantially adds to a better understanding of the effects of banking
regulation. In the following we mainly focus on continuous time models.
Bodie et al. (2007) and Gray and Malone (2008) decompose the balance sheets of
the main aggregated sectors of the economy into a set of derivatives in the style of
Merton (1974) for the balance sheet of a levered firm. Lehar (2005) uses a similar
approach to discuss empirically the probability of systemic crisis and the expected
shortfall in a crisis.
Our approach has in common the modelling of the aggregate sectors, albeit less
detailed than theirs. However, their modelling approach is not applicable to the
question whether banking regulation contributes to financial stability, as there is
no room for agents to adjust their portfolio decisions optimally due to the imposed
restrictions, such as a VaR restriction. Banks do not actively manage their asset or
liability side.
Basak and Shapiro (2001) introduced a VaR restriction into the optimization
problem of an otherwise unrestricted investor in a complete market setting. They
find that the VaR restriction induces gambling for resurrection, while the wealth of
the VaR restricted agent is in the proximity of the VaR boundary. Leippold et al.
(2006) set up a model with a VaR restriction in an incomplete market. The implicit
incentive of a VaR restriction is an increased risk exposure in high volatility states.
Kaplanski and Levy (2007) extend the analysis of Basak and Shapiro (2001) by
additionally introducing a minimum capital requirement at the VaR horizon, which
has to be fulfilled in any state. If regulation could in fact impose such a restriction
to individual banks, systemic risk could be banned, as there never exist substantial
defaults in the banking system. Obviously, this is in fact not the case.
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We follow these models in explicitly considering a VaR restriction similar to theirs.
However, since these models only contain individual investors without debt, they do
not capture a central characteristic of financial intermediaries and/or banks.
In contrast, Basak and Shapiro (2005) present a structural model, incorporating
the investment decision of a levered investor. They analyze the impact of costly
default on credit spreads. Cuoco and Liu (2006) adopt insured debt in the form of a
riskless zero bond and a VaR restriction. They focus on the impact of a simultaneous
reporting and investment strategy with VaR. Since constantly reporting too low VaR
values will increase the capital requirement, VaR in conjunction with a back-testing
procedure reduces portfolio risk. Essential for deriving the results are the implicit
costs associated with a violation of the reported VaR, namely an increased capital
requirement in the next period.
We extend the model of Basak and Shapiro and include both, risky debt and a VaR-
based capital requirement. In contrast to their focus on a single investor, we apply
the results presented in Eisenberg and Noe (2001); they derive the payment vector
(clearing vector) in a financial system, when firms default, obeying priority of debt
claims and limited liability of equity. Their results allow us to model the banking
sector on an aggregated level. A natural benchmark for comparison of the regulated
banking sector with unregulated financial intermediaries can be easily obtained by
relaxing the VaR restriction.
Decamps et al. (2004) and Dangl and Lehar (2004) discuss the impact of regulation
with capital requirements under the endogenous decisions to deliberately violate the
regulation. They conclude that there is (in most cases) no risk shifting due to capital
requirements.
This strand of literature is of less interest to our work for three reasons. First, their
focus is on problems of moral hazard in conjunction with regulation. Second, the
structure of their modelling approach involves significant technical problems, when
a VaR restriction with an inherently finite horizon is factored in. Third, and most
important, deriving endogenous prices for assets can be hardly achieved in their
setup.
8 1 Introduction
Building on the pure exchange equilibrium formulation as in Cox and Huang (1991)
and Karatzas et al. (1990), Basak and Shapiro (2001) derive the feedback effect of
a VaR restricted investors on market prices and volatility. The excess demand,
induced by portfolio decision of the VaR restricted investors, has a substantial
impact on prices; in prosperous times and under very adverse situations, the value
of assets is decreased, while in intermediate states assets are worth more. In
equilibrium, the gambling for resurrection type of portfolio decision will increase
the volatility of markets. Danielsson et al. (2004) deploy a similar setting in discrete
time. They construct the solution by a sequence of myopic general equilibrium
economies. They also find that there will be feedback effects of trading decisions
which increase volatility and exacerbate financial stability. Leippold et al. (2006)
apply an incomplete market framework. While the VaR restriction results in
riskier portfolios, when the exogenous volatility is high, in equilibrium, effects are
ambiguous.
We extend the model with fixed price dynamics to a pure exchange equilibrium using
similar techniques as Basak and Shapiro. Thereby, we are able to analyze the impact
of regulation on endogenous prices of an economy with a regulated banking sector.
The core difference to their paper is the combination of the levered investment and
the VaR-based capital requirements.
Finally, there are other strands of the literature discussing the problem that banks
are not only able to choose their asset portfolio, but can also manage their liabilities,
especially their deposit volume. Blum (1999), Calem and Rob (1999), Hellmann
et al. (2000), Estrella (2004), and Repullo and Sua´rez (2004) analyze the impact
of an endogenous deposit volume decision on a bank’s stability under different
assumptions. Their general conclusion is that capital requirements are (in many
cases) effective in reducing the risk of failure, since a high leverage today induces
large indirect costs tomorrow if, under adverse economic developments, regulatory
constraint have to be fulfilled by substantially reducing the credit volume.
We undertake a first step of how to address the endogeneity of the liability side of the
aggregate banking sector’s balance sheet. Since the central bank is able to control,
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at least in parts, the overall nominal debt level, we introduce the central bank as
another regulatory authority. Its only goal is to keep the probability of distress in
the financial system at a certain level. We abstract, thereby, from other objectives
such as inflation targeting. The banking sector and the central bank form a market,
where the central bank acts as a price-leading agent. While at the asset side of the
banking sector, there still is a dynamic competitive equilibrium, the market for debt
is open only once at the beginning.
10 1 Introduction
Chapter 2
Individual Decision
and Valuation in Equilibrium
This thesis is based upon an economy with two essential properties: first, the state
variables describing the economy are diffusion processes. This includes both time as
well as the driving economic variables. The second assumption concerns the security
markets: only complete markets are considered. This restriction is important, as it
enables agents in the economy to contract on any state of the world.
In this chapter we first review the standard framework. A complete security market
is described and the fundamental equivalence between the concept of a representative
agent, the notion of no-arbitrage, stochastic discount factors, and an equivalent
martingale measure is introduced.
In the following part, the individual consumption and investment decisions of an
unrestricted investor and of an investor who faces a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint
are presented.
In the last section, a pure exchange equilibrium is defined and the conditions for its
existence are specified. As a tool for solving equilibrium, a representative agent is
introduced. Finally, using the optimal decisions of investors, asset prices are derived
in economies with and without Value-at-Risk restrictions.
Most of the results in this chapter are well known, see for example Karatzas
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and Shreve (1998). The optimal consumption-investment decision under a VaR
restriction, i.e. Section 1.2.3, is non-standard, but was derived by Basak and Shapiro
(2001). The pure exchange equilibrium with agents that face a VaR restriction, i.e.
Section 1.3.2, was in two ways modified relative to the one presented in Basak and
Shapiro (2001). One modification was introduced in order to circumvent a jump
of asset prices at maturity; the other one allows for a general utility function with
constant relative risk aversion.
The formal setup is close to Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Chapters 1, 3, and 4; we
also refer to Duffie (2001), Korn (1997), Bjoerk (2009), and Pliska (1997) for further
reading.
However, we use some more restrictive assumptions than in the general framework
of Karatzas and Shreve (1998) in order to keep the technical level as simple as
possible without loosing economically relevant results. As a primer we state the
main assumption used throughout the thesis:
• As only complete markets are of interest, we restrict, without loss of generality,
the number of securities N to the number of risk sources D, i.e. N = D.
Furthermore, these securities are independent in the sense, that the covariance
matrix Σ has full rank and is, hence, invertible.
Additionally, there are no frictions on financial markets such as short selling.
Even though these two assumption are idealizing the world possibly too much,
we first need to address the problem of how banking regulation impacts
financial stability under perfect conditions. The question of how frictions or
the incompleteness of markets affect financial stability is clearly of importance,
but subject of future research.
• All stochastic variables and processes are measurable and adapted with respect
to the filtration F , if not specified otherwise.
• Furthermore, we assume that the processes for the interest rate r, the return
rate µ, and the covariance matrix Σ as well as its inverse Σ−1 are bounded.
Relaxing boundedness is not difficult, but introduces a series of additional
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regularity conditions without adding to the economic content in our case. By
this assumption, as an example, we exclude standard models for the interest
rate process like the one of Cox et al. (1985b). Nevertheless, this poses no
problem in our framework, since the dynamics of the riskless interest rate is
not the focus of the thesis; in many cases it is for simplicity set to a constant
or turns out to be in equilibrium constant.
The consumption process c and the portfolio process pi satisfy the square-
integrability conditions E[
∫ T
0
c2tdt] < ∞ and E[
∫ T
0
pi2t dt] < ∞; the wealth at
the horizon WT satisfies E[W
2
T ] < ∞. Thereby, arbitrage opportunities are
dismissed (see Harrison and Pliska (1981)). In the pure exchange equilibria of
later sections, these conditions are endogenously fulfilled.
• The security market will turn out to be a particular case of the standard
financial market in the sense of Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Definitions (1.1.3)
and (1.5.1).
• All agents optimize their decision using expected utility; they share the some
coefficient of constant relative risk aversion CRRA.
2.1 Valuation of Securities under No-Arbitrage
Underlying the economy is a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) and the time
period [0, T ]. The set of states of the nature is denoted Ω, F a σ-Algebra on Ω, and
P the real world probability measure defined on Ω.
A D-dimensional standard Brownian motion w = (w1, · · · , wD)> is defined on
(Ω,F ,P), which drives the uncertainty within the economy. (·)> denotes the
transposed vector. Let Ft be the continuous filtration generated by the Brownian
motion ws∈[0,t] up to time t, augmented by all null subsets. This filtration represents
the information available to agents in the economy.
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Securities and their Dynamics
The security market consists of a money market account with dynamics
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1 , (2.1)
where r is the locally risk-free rate.
In addition, there are N = D risky assets with price dynamics
dP Y,nt = dP
n
t + δ
n
t dt = P
n
t (µ
n
t dt+ σ
n
t dwt) , (n = 1, . . . , N) . (2.2)
P n is the ex dividend price of the risky asset, whereas P Y,n is the price that includes
the accumulated yield from the dividend stream δn. The measurable and bounded
processes for the interest rate r, the instantaneous expected return vector µ, and the
volatility matrix Σ = {(σ1d, . . . , σNd ) d = 1, . . . , D} are adapted to the filtration F
and fulfil regularity conditions, such that the stochastic differential equations (2.1)
and (2.2) is well defined.
Most important for modelling a complete market is that there exists (almost surely)
a unique solution vector κ to the equation
µt − rt1 = Σtκt ,
which is true given the standing assumptions, as Σ is invertible. The unique market
price of risk is given by
κt = Σ
−1
t (µt − rt1) . (2.3)
1 denotes the unit vector (1, 1, . . . , 1)> of dimension N . The solution of the asset
price dynamics (2.2) is
P Y,nt = P
n
0 exp
(∫ t
0
(
µns −
1
2
‖ σns ‖2
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σns dws
)
, (2.4)
where the initial condition P Y,n0 = P
n
0 is used and ‖x‖ =
(∑D
i=1 x
2
i
) 1
2
.
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Trading Strategies
Each agent has a (possibly state- and time-dependent) non-negative consumption
process c and a (possibly state- and time-dependent) trading strategy, pi =
(pi1, · · · , piN)>, where pin is the dollar amount held in the risky asset n. When
investing in asset n at timte t and holding the asset over the next infinitesimal
period, one has to pay the ex price P nt in order to obtain the capital gain dP
n
t as
well as the cahs flow δnt dt. Thus, the total return can be written as
dRnt =
dP Y,nt
P nt
, (n = 1, . . . , N) .
Let W pi denote the wealth of an agent given a trading strategy pi and including
dividends as inflow. The requirement that there is no outflow beside consumption
over time t ∈ (0, T ] makes the portfolio strategy self-financing. Consequently, the
amount (W pi − pi>1) is risklessly invested in the money market with instantaneous
return r. Hence, the wealth process follows
dW pit =
(
W pit − pi>t 1
)
rtdt+ pi
>
t dRt − ctdt
= (W pit rt − ct) dt+ pi>t (µt − rt1) dt+ pi>t Σtdwt
=
(
W θt rt +W
θ
t θ
>
t (µt − rt1)− ct
)
dt+W θt θ
>
t Σtdwt .
θ is the same portfolio strategy as pi, however, expressed as the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky assets, i.e. pi = W piθ and W pi = W θ.
To ensure the existence of a solution we need standard regularity conditions in order
to have a well-defined solution.
However, this is not enough. In addition we have to exclude cases where
∫ T
0
pi>t Σtdwt
looses the martingale property. This restriction is necessary as, with a portfolio
violating this restriction, an investor will be able to profit from investing in a fair
game, e.g. by doubling the bet every time on credit. One possible constraint to
ensure that portfolio strategies with exploding variance such as a doubling strategies
are not feasible, is to keep V[
∫ T
0
pi>t Σtdwt] under control by the square integrability
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constraint
E
[(∫ T
0
‖pis‖2ds
)]
<∞ .
Another possibility to tame the portfolios is to restrict the ability to go short risky
assets by a credit constraint.
Stochastic Discount Factors and Arbitrage
When using a self-financing portfolio strategy it is obvious that there also exists a
self financing trading strategy in some other numeraire. More generally, when there
exists a self-financing trading strategy for the price process P = (P 1, · · · , PN)>,
there also exists a self-financing trading strategy for a deflated price process ξP ,
when the deflator is strictly positive, ξ > 0. As a deflator may serve any one-
dimensional and adapted process. Following Cox and Huang (1989), Cox and Huang
(1991), Harrison and Kreps (1979), Karatzas et al. (1987), and Pliska (1986), the
stochastic discount process is defined by
ξt = ξ0 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(rs +
1
2
‖ κs ‖2)ds−
∫
0
κ>s dws
)
(ξ0 > 0) . (2.5)
By construction, ξ > 0. Applying Ito’s lemma, the dynamics of the stochastic
discount factor is
dξt = −ξt(rtdt+ κ>t dwt). (2.6)
Without any risk (w = 0) or when risk is not priced (κ = 0), ξ is the price of a zero
bond. When priced risks are involved, the stochastic discount factor ξ adjusts in
addition by the market price of risk κ.
From Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Theorem (1.4.2), we know that there exists no
arbitrage, if and only if the market price of risk κ is well defined by
(µt − rt1) = Σtκt (2.7)
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and fulfils the requirements
∫ T
0
‖κs‖2ds <∞ ,
E
[
exp
(
−1
2
∫ T
0
‖κs‖2ds−
∫ T
0
κ>s dws
)]
= 1 . (2.8)
When the standing assumptions on page 12 are applied to the theorem, the market
price of risk κ exists by assumption. Moreover, as µ, r, Σ, and Σ−1 are bounded, κ
itself is bounded as well, which is sufficient to fulfil the stated requirements. Since
κ is unique by assumption (2.3), the stochastic discount factor is as well.
As the ’only if’ part is true as well, we can also state that, if there exists a deflator
under which security prices are martingales, than there exists no arbitrage; see also
the Corollary in Duffie (2001) on page 110.
Market Completeness
If the solution to the market price of risk κ in equation (2.7) is unique, the market
is complete, see Karatzas and Shreve (1998) Theorem (1.6.6) or Corollary (1.6.8).
This property is essential for the following reason: in a complete market, every
contingent claim XT that is a FT measurable random variable with finite variance
can be replicated by a self-financing trading strategy pi with a specific initial wealth
x0, see Karatzas and Shreve (1998), definition (1.6.1).
Furthermore, by no-arbitrage, the unique price at time t is, see also Remark (1.6.3),
Xt = Et
[
ξT
ξt
XT
]
,
where Et[XT ] = E[XT |Ft] denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the
filtration Ft. If t = 0, we refrain from indexing expectations (and variances).
If an exogenous cash-flow stream c is added, then the value Xt of the contingent
claim XT is, under the previous assumptions and no-arbitrage,
Xt = Et
[∫ T
t
ξs
ξt
csds+
ξT
ξt
XT
]
. (2.9)
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Remark. Relation between Stochstic Discount Factors and the Equiva-
lent Martingale Measure (EMM)
Given some contingent claim XT , the value at some time t can be written in different
forms
Xt = E
P
t
[
ξT
ξt
XT
]
Def. (2.5)
= EPt
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
(rs +
1
2
‖ κs ‖2)ds−
∫ T
t
κ>s dws
)
XT
]
= EPt
[
exp(−
∫ T
t
rsds) exp
(
−
∫ T
t
1
2
‖ κs ‖2 ds−
∫ T
t
κ>s dws
)
XT
]
= EQt
[
exp(−
∫ T
t
rsds)XT
]
= EQt
[
Bt
BT
XT
]
The last equation represents the well-known risk-neutral pricing approach with a
change of measure
dQ
dP
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
1
2
‖ κs ‖2 ds−
∫ T
0
κ>s dws
)
.
The martingale requirement in equation (2.8) guarantees that Q is in fact an
equivalent martingale measure. Again, when the market price risk is unique, there
is a unique state price and, consequently, a unique equivalent martingale measure.
Risky Asset Prices
With result (2.9) at hand we can derive the price of risky assets
P nt = Et
[
ξT
ξt
P nT +
∫ T
t
ξs
ξt
δns ds
]
(n = 1, · · · , N). (2.10)
= EQt
[
Bt
BT
P nT +
∫ T
t
Bt
Bs
δns ds
]
The proof can be found in Cox and Huang (1989), Lemma 2.4.
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2.2 Optimal Consumption
and Optimal Terminal Wealth
Investors trade securities in order to optimize their expected utility over consumption
and terminal wealth. To study this optimization problem we first consider an
investor whose portfolio strategy is not restricted by regulation. We refer to
a method introduced into the finance literature by Cox and Huang (1989) and
independently by Karatzas et al. (1987).
Merton (1969, 1971) derives the dynamic portfolio strategy by deducing the non-
linear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equation which more often than
not can be attacked numerically only. The second difficulty adheres to the
verification problem, if standard theorems are not applicable.
The advantage of the Cox and Huang approach is that it is much more flexible in
the choice of processes and the handling of additional constraints. The optimization
problem is first rewritten in a static variational form. Afterwards, one can further
disintegrate it to separate state-wise problems which can be solved using standard
deterministic optimization tools. The main drawback relative to the HJB approach
is that it necessarily needs complete markets to achieve the first step of converting
it to a static problem. However, as our setup is in a complete market setting, the
Cox and Huang approach is better suited for our problem.
2.2.1 The Non-Regulated Investor
The unrestricted investor maximizes his expected utility by choosing an appropriate
consumption process cu > 0 and a self-financing trading strategy θu with initial
wealth W u0 > 0, which leads to a terminal wealth W
u
T . In addition, he can spend
only his initial wealth W u0 on setting up the trading strategy, that is, θ
u must be
(budget) feasible.
Remark. In this subsection, that is from page 19 to 29, we refrain from using the
u-indexed variables, as only the unrestricted investor is of interest.
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The optimization problem of the unrestricted investor is
sup
{ct,θt}t∈[0,T ]
U(c,W ) = E
[∫ T
0
u(ct) dt+ u(WT )
]
(2.11)
s.t.

θ>t Pt + (1− θ>t 1)Bt
= W0 +
∫ t
0
θ>s dP
Y
s +
+
∫ t
0
(1− θ>s 1)dBt
− ∫ t
0
csds ≥ 0 ∀t
θ>T PT + (1− θ>T 1)BT
= WT ≥ 0
.
The solutions for the unconstrained investor are derived in Cox and Huang (1989);
Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) deduct the solution in an even more general
framework than the former authors used.
Utility Function
Each investor in the economy maximizes his decisions with respect to the expected
utility (representation) E[u(W )], where the (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944))
utility function u(·) of wealth W and/or consumption c fulfils the following
properties. For analytical tractability, the utility function is three times continuously
differentiable. In addition, agents are always non-satiated, i.e. more is better, all
other things being equal. Consequently, we require u′ > 0. This property is essential
when no-arbitrage arguments are put forward. When there is satiation, there may
be an arbitrage opportunity, but when all agents are satiated, no one will use this
opportunity, because it decreases their utility level.
Furthermore, agents are required to be risk averse. This translates to a concave
utility function, i.e. u′′ < 0. Relative risk aversion is defined as (see e.g. Pratt
(1964))
R(W ) = −u
′′(W )W
u′(W )
.
If R′(W ) > 0, the agent has increasing relative risk aversion; decreasing relative risk
aversion is defined analogously.
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Essentially we restrict our analysis to the case of constant relative risk aversion
R(W ) = γ > 0. Integrating the previous equation twice results in the well-known
utility function,
u(W ) =
 11−γW 1−γ if γ ∈ (0,∞)\{1}lnW if γ = 1 . (2.12)
In the case of one risky and one riskless asset, this type of utility function exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion −u′′
u′ ; hence, the demand for the risky asset is
normal, i.e. increasing with wealth, see Arrow (1970) or Pratt (1964). On the other
hand, due to constant relative risk aversion, the fraction of wealth invested in the
risky assets is independent of wealth.
Furthermore, in the case with N securities and one period, two fund separation
holds, since this type of utility function belongs to the HARA class, see Cass and
Stiglitz (1970); for a similar result in the case of multiple securities in a continuous
time financial market, see also Chamberlain (1988) or Schachermayer et al. (2009).
The utility is equipped with the regularity conditions
lim
W→0
u′(W ) =∞
lim
W→∞
u′(W ) = 0 ,
consequently the utility function fulfils the Inada (1963) conditions. To shorten the
notation,
I(·) = (u′)−1(·) : (0,∞)→ (0,∞) (2.13)
is the inverse function of marginal utility. Together with the previous assumption,
I(·) is continuous and strict monotonously decreasing over its domain.
Finally, we assume that all agents share the same utility function, in particular the
same coefficient of relative risk aversion γ.
Remark. The HARA class consists of utility functions, where the coefficient of risk
tolerance − u′
u′′ is of the form am + bmW , satisfying the necessary conditions, such
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that a utility function is indeed defined; see Merton (1990).
Most results of this thesis can also be obtained by using a subset of utility functions
of the HARA class, where investors wish to maintain at least some investor-specific
minimum terminal wealth Km ≥ 0, but share the same coefficient b. Additionally,
the adapted Inada conditions have to be fulfilled. In particular, these utility functions
are of the form
u(W ) =
 11−γ (W −Km)1−γ if γ ∈ (0,∞)\{1}ln(W −Km) if γ = 1 .
The requirement bm = b translates into γm = γ, ∀m, in the case of the CRRA utility
function. This subset of HARA functions implies that the aggregation property in
the sense of Rubinstein (1974) holds.
The Growth Optimal Portfolio: A Special Case
Before we discuss the general problem (2.11) we consider the special case where all
investors are equipped with the log utility (γ = 1) and maximize terminal wealth
only (ct = 0,∀t). We discuss the case separately, because this portfolio enables us
in later sections to reduce dynamic trading strategies to much simpler static option
portfolios with a scaled growth optimal portfolio as an underlying.
Integrating the dynamic budget equation (2.5) we obtain the following
representation of terminal wealth for log utility
WT = W0 exp
(∫ T
0
rs + θ
>
s (µs − rs1)−
1
2
θ>s σs ds+
∫ T
0
θ>s Σsdws
)
.
Inserting into expected utility, we obtain
E[ln(WT )] = ln(W0) + E
[∫ T
0
rs + θ
>
s (µs − rs1)−
1
2
‖θ>s Σs‖2 ds
]
.
The optimization of the expected log utility is equivalent to maximizing the expected
growth rate of wealth (expressed as percentage return p.a.) E
[
ln
WT
W0
T
]
.
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The optimal portfolio can be determined by maximizing pointwise
θ>t (µt − rt1)−
1
2
‖θ>t Σt‖2 .
There exists a unique solution, since Σ is invertible by assumption. After
substituting the market price of risk in equation (2.3), the optimal portfolio is
θGOPt = Σ
−1
t κt . (2.14)
Latane (1959) and Hakansson (1971) call this specific portfolio the growth optimal
portfolio (GOP). The value dynamics of the GOP, G = P>θGOP , is
dGt
Gt
= (rt+ ‖ κt ‖2)dt+ κ>t dwt . (2.15)
Comparing the dynamics of the GOP (2.15) and the dynamics of the stochastic
discount factor (2.6), one can deduce the relation
Gt
G0
=
ξ0
ξt
,
that is, deflating prices with ξ, i.e. ξP , can be interpreted as discounting with the
mutual fund G, i.e. P
G
, whose portfolio policy is the growth optimal portfolio.
Revisiting the connection between the stochastic discount factor and the equivalent
martingale measure (EMM), we obtain for any given contingent claim XT , the initial
value
X0 = E
P
[
ξT
ξ0
XT
]
= EP
[
G0
GT
XT
]
= EQ
[
e(
∫ T
0 rsds)XT
]
= EQ
[
B0
BT
XT
]
,
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i.e., as Q is the EMM with respect to the money market account as a numeraire,
whereas the numeraire that makes P an EMM is the growth optimal portfolio G.
Solving the Optimization of the Unregulated Investor
By virtue of definition, complete markets ensure that any consumption process ct, t ∈
[0, T ], and terminal wealth WT can be attained by a self-financing trading strategy
with a given (unique) initial value. Instead of searching for a optimal consumption-
trading strategy (ct, θt), t ∈ [0, T ], it is, therefore, sufficient to search for an optimal
consumption ct, t ∈ [0, T ], an terminal wealth WT for a given static budget equation.
On the other hand, every trading strategy has a certain pay-off profile. This one-
to-one correspondence between pay-off and trading strategies are difficult to proof
in a continuous time and continuous state framework (see Cox and Huang (1989));
however, they are intuitive in the standard binomial tree approach of Cox et al.
(1979), as the connection between the state contingent pay-offs and the trading
strategy is a linear system of equations with a unique solution.
The budget dynamics in equation (2.5) can be transformed into a static budget
equation by (2.9). After theses changes the optimization problems is
sup
{ct,WT }t∈[0,T ]
U(c,W ) = E
[∫ T
0
u(ct) dt+ u(WT )
]
(2.16)
s.t. E
[∫ T
0
ξtct dt+ ξTWT
]
≤ ξ0W0
ct ≥ 0 ∀t
WT ≥ 0 .
Hence, it is in some cases more convenient to split the solution of the problem into
two parts.
1. Find an optimal (ct, t ∈ [0, T ],WT ) pair that can be financed with initial
wealth W0. This is a static problem, since the solution to the process c can be
achieved by pointwise solving the problem.
2. If needed, recover the unique self-financing portfolio strategy θ using the
market completeness. This is the representation problem.
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The two-step procedure will be discussed now in detail:
Step 1: Solving the Static Problem
From the previous analysis, the budget feasibility of the dynamic budget constraint
in equation (2.5) can be simplified by no-arbitrage considerations in equation (2.9)
to the static budget equation
B(c,W ) = E
[∫ T
0
ξscsds+ ξTWT
]
= ξ0W0 (2.17)
For convenience, the pair (c, t ∈ [0, T ],WT ) is abbreviated by (c,W ).
Let us to define the Lagrangian, with Lagrange multiplier y,
L(c,W ; y) = U(c,W )− y(B(c,W )− ξ0W0)
= E
[∫ T
0
(
u(cs)− yξscs
)
ds+
(
u(WT )− yξTWT
)
+ yξ0W0
]
,
which depends only on (c,W ), but not explicitly on the trading strategy θ any more.
When applying the saddle point theorem, we obtain that (c∗,W ∗, y∗) solves the
optimization problem (2.11), if it is a saddle point, i.e. if
L(c∗,W ∗; y) ≥ L(c∗,W ∗; y∗) ≥ L(c,W ; y∗) ∀ (c,W ) , y ≥ 0 . (2.18)
Thus, the procedure is:
1. Consider the Lagrangian multiplier y as parameter and find the optimal
solution (cˆ, Wˆ )(y),∀y > 0, as a function of y. The case y = 0 can be
disregarded due to the utility’s non-satiation property.
2. Substitute (cˆ, Wˆ )(y) into the budget equation (2.17) such that
B((cˆ, Wˆ )(y∗)) = ξ0W0
holds. Afterwards obtain the candidate optimal solution (c∗,W ∗, y∗) =
(cˆ(y∗), Wˆ (y∗), y∗).
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3. Check, whether the candidate solution (c∗,W ∗, y∗) is indeed a correct solution
to the optimization problem.
Step 1.1: Find Parametric Solution
The first-order condition (FOC) of the Lagrangian with respect to (c,W ) can be
’split’ into the pointwise optimization problem
u′(ct) = yξt , ∀t
u′(WT ) = yξT .
By the strict monotonicity of the utility function u the first-order conditions can be
inverted to obtain (cˆ, Wˆ ) as a function of the Lagrange multiplier y > 0,
cˆt(y) = I(yξt) , ∀t
WˆT (y) = I(yξT ) .
The boundary cases ct = 0 or WT = 0 do not exist by the Inada conditions, as
the marginal utility approaches ∞ for these boundaries. From the strict concavity
follows that the solution corresponds to a maximum. Furthermore, the assumptions
of the stochastic discount factor ξ, namely being measurable and adapted, translate
into the solution (cˆ, Wˆ ) as well.
Step 1.2: Solve for the Lagrange Multiplier
The parametric solution (cˆ, Wˆ ) naturally fulfils the following conditions
E[
∫ T
0
ξscˆs(y)ds] <∞ , ∀y > 0
E[ξT WˆT (y)] <∞ , ∀y > 0 ,
since (cˆ, Wˆ ) is bounded due to the corresponding property of the process ξ. The
budget equation B(cˆ(y), Wˆ (y)) =: B(y) = ξ0W0, which will be always hold with
equality due to the non-satiation property of the utility function, has a unique
solution y∗, if B(y) inherits the properties of I(·), namely being continuous and
strictly decreasing in y. B(·) maps from (0,∞) into (0,∞). These properties can be
easily checked by actually inserting the corresponding functions and applying the
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properties of I(y). Consequently, the static budget constraint as a function of the
Lagrange multiplier, B(y), is invertible.
B−1(W0) maps from (0,∞) to (0,∞), so that there is a unique Lagrange multiplier
for each level of initial wealth,
y∗ = B−1(W0) , ∀W0 > 0 .
We thus arrive at the candidate solution
c∗t = cˆt(y
∗) = I(B−1(W0)ξt)
W ∗T = WˆT (y
∗) = I(B−1(W0)ξT ) .
Step 1.3: Check the Candidate Solution
Finally, we have to check whether the candidate solution is indeed a correct solution
to the optimization problem. Let (c¯, W¯ ) be an arbitrarily consumption-wealth pair
that satisfies the constraint B(c¯, W¯ ) ≤ ξ0W0. Then
E
[∫ T
0
u(c∗s)ds+ u(W
∗
T )
]
− E
[∫ T
0
u(c¯s)ds+ u(W¯T )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
u(c∗s)ds+ u(W
∗
T )
]
− E
[∫ T
0
u(c¯s)ds+ u(W¯T )
]
− y∗ξ0W0 + y∗ξ0W0
≥ E
[∫ T
0
u(c∗s)ds+ u(W
∗
T )
]
− E
[∫ T
0
u(c¯s)ds+ u(W¯T )
]
−y∗E
[∫ T
0
ξsc
∗
sds+ ξTW
∗
T
]
+ y∗E
[∫ T
0
ξsc¯sds+ ξT W¯T
]
≥ 0 ,
where the first inequality follows from the static budget constraint holding with
equality for (c∗,W ∗) while with inequality for any strategy θ corresponding to an
arbitrarily (c¯, W¯ ) pair. The second inequality follows from the specific property of
the utility function
u(I(y))− yI(y) ≥ u(x)− yx , ∀x ≥ 0, y > 0 .
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Step 2: Recovering the Portfolio
In order to obtain an explicit characterization of the portfolio strategy, some
additional assumptions are needed. As an example consistent with the results in
the equilibrium of later sections, we require both the interest rate r and the market
price of risk κ to be constants, whereas µt and σt are not necessarily constant;
notwithstanding, the stochastic discount factor ξ follows a geometric Brownian
motion, as can be seen in equation (2.6).
Remark 1. There will be no essential difference in the results when assuming a time-
dependent, but deterministic market price of risk κ(t). In the multidimensional case,
an equivalent restriction sets ||κ||2 as constant (or deterministically time-depended).
The individual market prices of risk κd are not necessarily deterministic functions
and may stochastically evolve over time which adds far more degrees of freedom than
in the case of a constant opportunity set (r, µ, σ) in the sense of Merton (1973a) or
even with constant κd, ∀d ∈ {1, . . . , D} , see Nielsen and Vassalou (2006).
The restriction effectively implies that the instantaneous capital market line is at
most a deterministic function of time. Consequently, there is no hedge motive and
the (D + 2) funds separation of Merton (1990) or Ross (1978) reduces to a two-
fund separation, the money market account and the growth optimal portfolio G,
(more specifically, a fund proportional to the GOP). Furthermore, the GOP θGOP
in equation (2.14) on p. 23 is in general stochastic.
With these additional structural assumptions, one can easily compute the wealth of
agent u
ξtWt = Et
[∫ T
t
ξsc
∗
sds+ ξTW
∗
T
]
= Et
[∫ T
t
ξsI(y∗ξt)ds+ ξTI(y∗ξT )
]
=
∫ T
t
Et
[
ξ
− 1
γ
+1
s
]
I(y∗)ds+ Et
[
ξ
− 1
γ
+1
T
]
I(y∗)
=
∫ T
t
ξ
− 1
γ
+1
t I(y∗)a(s− t)ds+ ξ
− 1
γ
+1
t a(T − t)I(y∗) ,
Wt =
(
A(T − t) + a(T − t))I(y∗ξt) , (2.19)
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with
ρ =
1− γ
γ
(
r +
1
2γ
κ2
) 
> 0 if 0 < γ < 1
= 0, if γ = 1
< 0 if γ > 1
(2.20)
a(τ) = eρτ > 0 (2.21)
A(τ) =
∫ t+τ
t
eρsds =
1− eρτ
ρ
> 0 . (2.22)
By applying Ito’s lemma on optimal wealth (2.19), the dynamics of wealth
dWt = (. . . ) dt+
∂W
∂ξ
(ξt, t) (−ξtκ>)dwt (2.23)
= (. . . )dt + (−Wt
γξt
) (−ξtκ>) dwt
are derived and, by equating the diffusive coefficient, with the one from the dynamic
budget constraint (2.5), WtθtΣtdwt,
(−Wt
γξt
)(−κ>ξt) = Wtθ>t Σt (2.24)
we finally obtain the solution for the optimal portfolio
θt =
1
γ
(Σ)−1t κ =
1
γ
θGOPt .
This interesting result illustrates that the two-fund separation holds, because agent
invests in a multiple of the GOP and the riskless asset, as outlined in Remark 1.
Moreover, the portfolio decision is independent of wealth or the horizon.
2.2.2 The Regulated Investor
Following Artzner et al. (1999) or Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) we define risk measure
as a map % from the set of random variables, describing the wealth distribution
at the terminal date T , to the extended reals, R ∪∞, which satisfies the (inverse)
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monotonicity property
if W 1T ≤ W 2T , then %( W 1T ) ≥ %(W 2T )
and the translation invariance property (add some cash m into the position)
if m ∈ R, then %(WT +m) = %(WT )−m .
A further useful property is that diversification is appropriately mapped, which
results in the convexity property
%($W 1T + (1−$)W 2T ) ≤ $%(W 1T ) + (1−$)%(W 2T ), for 0 ≤ $ ≤ 1 .
If, in addition, the risk measure is positive homogeneous
if $ ≥ 0 then %($WT ) = $%(WT ) ,
then it is a also a coherent measure.
The Value-at-Risk Measure
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) at the level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
V aRα(WT ) = inf{w ∈ R : P[WT ≤ w] > α}
= sup{w ∈ R : P[WT < w] ≤ α} .
The VaR is the terminal wealth level, that is undershot only with some given
probability α; in ’usual’ situations, i.e. in (1 − α) percent of the cases, terminal
wealth will be greater than the VaR.
The VaR is always finite, as compared e.g. to the variance. It is well known that
the VaR can be very sensitive to changes in the underlying probability α due to
its left continuity. Moreover, the VaR is in general not a convex risk measure that
is, there are cases where a better diversified portfolio has a higher VaR than a less
diversified one. Some authors question, whether the absence of subadditivity of the
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VaR indeed poses a problem, see Danielsson et al. (2005) and the references therein.
When an investor is optimizing his investment strategy θ, the distribution of terminal
wealth WT is endogenous, hence the V aRα of his strategy. For regulatory reasons,
however, the VaR from the investment strategy has to comply with an exogenous
given wealth level W . For technical reasons based on the later optimization problem,
the VaR restriction is reformulated to
V aRα(WT ) ≤ W ⇔ P[WT < W ] ≤ α⇔ P[WT ≥ W ] ≥ (1− α) . (2.25)
The Investment-Consumption Problem with VaR Restriction
The optimization problem of the VaR-restricted investor v with intial wealth W v0 is
different to the unrestricted investor, as he has to obey, in addition, the regulatory
risk constraint (2.25).
Remark. As we discuss in the following only the VaR restricted investor v, there
arises no confusion about which agent is meant. Hence, we simplify the notation
and omit the index v from page 31 to 36.
The dynamic problem recast in its static (variational) form reads
sup
{ct,WT }t∈[0,T ]
U(c,W ) = E
[∫ T
0
u(ct) dt+ u(WT )
]
(2.26)
s.t.

E
[∫ T
0
ξscsds+ ξTWT
]
= ξ0W0
P[WT ≥ W ] ≥ (1− α)
ct ≥ 0 ∀t
WT ≥ 0 .
.
Again, as for the unregulated investor, we apply the two step procedure and discuss
the static problem first and recover afterwards the optimal portfolio decision.
Step 1: The Static Problem
In order to have a continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ξt
ξ0
, the
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condition ∫ T
0
‖κs‖2ds 6= 0
is needed additionally. It excludes trivial changes of measure Q = P and/or risk
neutrality. Consequently, there exists a unique ζ = CDF−1ξt
ξ0
(1 − α) ξ0, such that
P[ξT > ζ] = α.
There exists a feasible solution to the problem (2.26), if
W0
W
> E
[
ξT
ξ0
1{ξT≤ζ(α)}
]
(2.27)
holds. In order to proof the sufficiency of this condition, consider the following
feasible trading strategy: choose a very small constant consumption level with value
. Furthermore, implement a trading strategy that results in the constant payment
W for all ξT < ζ. Invest in all other states of the world ξT ≥ ζ such that WT
is constant and equal to w. Obviously this trading strategy is feasible as long as
w ≥ 0. The necessary budget ξ0 + WE[ξT1ξT≤ζ ] + wE[ξT1ξT>ζ ]. Finally, letting
w → 0 and → 0, the minimum initial wealth which is needed to finance W equals
WE[ξT1ξT≤ζ ], which proves (2.27).
Remark. We simplify the previously used notation where the optimal solution was
explicitly indicated by star and omit this indication to enhance better readability.
The solution of the optimization problem is, as derived by Basak and Shapiro (2001),
ct(y) = I (yξt)
WT (y) =

I(yξT ) if ξT ≤ ζ
W if ζ < ξT ≤ ζ
I(yξT ) if ζ < ξT
(2.28)
with boundaries
ζ = u
′(W )
y
ζ : P[ξT ≥ ζ] = α ,
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where the Lagrange multiplier y > 0 is the solution to the (static) budget equation
E
[∫ T
0
ξtct(y)dt+ ξTWT (y)
]
= ξ0W0. (2.29)
Note that the relation ζ < ζ holds, if the VaR restriction is binding. If not, I(yζ) ≥
W and the unrestricted optimal solution already fulfills the VaR constraint. In this
case, the Lagrange multipliers of the unrestricted and the restricted investor are the
same. If the VaR constraint is binding, this is not true and the Lagrange multiplier
of the restricted investor is larger than the one of the unrestricted, since the budget
is tighter with a binding restriction (see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Proposition 1).
In the following, low discount factors ξ are associated with a ’good’ economic
situation and vice versa; this wording is backed by the equilibrium consideration put
forward in the next Section 2.3.1, especially in equation (2.40), where low discount
factors are associated to a high aggregate consumption of the representative agent.
The solution consist of three regions in the state space:
1. ’Good’ states ξT ≤ ζ: In this region the agents behaves as if being unrestricted.
2. ’Intermediate’ states ξT ≤ ζ: In this region the VaR-constrained investor just
maintains the sufficient wealth level W to fulfill regulatory constraint.
3. ’Bad’ states ζ < ξT : In this region the investor is effectively unrestricted, as
the loss his strategy is incurring is not limited by the risk measure, but only
by his risk aversion.
Berkelaar et al. (2002) point out that the solution under a VaR restriction is
qualitatively similar to that of an unrestricted agent, who exhibits loss aversion
in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Agents are more cautious in ’good’
states and take more risks, when losses arise.
The optimal wealth WT jumps downward at ζ. With this time T solution at hand,
it is obvious, that the classical approach of Merton using the HJB equation poses
significant technical problem, when applied to this problem, as terminal wealthWT is
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neither continuous nor convex in ξ; standard verification theorems are no applicable.
Note that the state ζ, where the VaR restriction becomes binding, is independent
of the preferences or the initial endowment of the investor; it depends only on the
distribution of the stochastic discount factor ξT and on the VaR probability α.
Hence, aggregating multiple investors with different initial wealth, but the same
regulatory constraint, into a single representative agent with the same solution
structure can be easily achieved. Ahn et al. (1999) study the use of a finite number
of standard options for risk management with VaR. They find an analogous results,
namely, that ζ is independent of individual agents’ characteristics.
To illustrate the solution, if binding, in an economically more intuitive way, we
replicate it by
1. the scaled GOP fund GT = I(yξT ) of the unrestricted investor, and
2. a put long with maturity T , strike price W , and down-and-out barrier
K = I(yζ), K < W .
The optimal solution WT of the restricted investor can be reformulated as a static
derivative position
WT = GT︸︷︷︸
(1.)
+ max{(W −GT ), 0}1{GT≥K}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2.)
. (2.30)
Note that the VaR restricted investor is less invested in the mutual fund, since the
additional option has a positive value, which in turn tightens the budget as expressed
by a larger Lagrange multiplier y for the VaR restricted investor.
In the extreme case α = 0, the investor in fact prevents terminal wealth from falling
beyond the boundary W as the knock-out barrier K(α) → 0. With α > 0, there
always exist states, where wealth is below the exogenous boundary W .
Step 2: Recovering the Portfolio Decision
To derive the optimal strategy analytically we again assume that the interest rate
r and the market price of risk κ are constant. The result also can be also found in
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Basak and Shapiro (2001). If the optimal Lagrange multiplier y satisfies y ≤ u(W )
ζ
,
then the optimal strategy of the unrestricted investor emerges, as the unrestricted
optimal profile already fulfills the VaR restriction. In case of y > u(W )
ζ
the optimal
wealth reads
Wt =
(
a(T − t) + A(T − t))I(yξt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+a(T − t)I(yξt)
(
Φ(−d1(ζ))− Φ(−d1(ζ))
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
−e−r(T−t)W (Φ(−d2(ζ))− Φ(−d2(ζ)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
,
where Φ is the standard normal distribution and
d1(ζ) =
(
r − κ2
2
)
(T − t) + ln
(
ζ
ξt
)
+ κ
2
γ
(T − t)
√
T − t κ (2.31)
d2(ζ) =
(
r − κ2
2
)
(T − t) + ln
(
ζ
ξt
)
√
T − t κ .
The deviation of Wt can be found in the Appendix to Chapter 3.
As shown in (2.30), WT consists of two components. The first part (i) corresponds
to investment in the growth optimal fund with terminal value GT , see (1.) in (2.30).
The second and third parts (ii) and (iii) represent together the value of the put
option with strike price W and knock-out barrier K at point in time t, compare (2.)
in (2.30).
We want to state that the budget equation B(c(y),W (y)) = ξ0W0 cannot be inverted
analytically to obtain the optimal Lagrange multiplier y. Thus (2.29) has to be
inverted numerically for y. Nevertheless, by the implicit function theorem, the
derivatives with respect to exogenous variables, say χ, y′(χ) = dB
−1
dχ
are known in
the neighborhood of the optimal solution y. It enables us to derive analytically the
sign of effects in the comparative static.
Applying the portfolio comparison as in equation (2.23) on p. 29, the optimal
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strategy turns out to be
θt = qtθ
u
t = qt
1
γ
θGOPt (2.32)
qt = 1︸︷︷︸
(i)
−e−r(T−t) W
Wt
(
Φ(−d2(ζ))− Φ(−d2(ζ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+e−r(T−t)
J
Wt
γ
‖κ‖√T − tφ(−d2(ζ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
,
where θu is the optimal strategy of the unrestricted investor and J = W − I(yζ) =
W−K is the jump’s size. The derivation of the optimal strategy can be accomplished
along the lines presented in the Appendix to Chapter 3.
The portfolio consists of investing in the growth optimal fund, part (i), in a put
option, part(ii), and in the replication of the knock-out feature, part (iii). Parts (i)
and (ii) of (2.32) sum to less than 1, as the investment into the fund (i) has a delta
hedge of 1, and the put option (ii) a delta hedge of (0,-1).
The portfolio decision is a multiple of the GOP, that is, the VaR restriction does not
change the (relative) structure of the portfolio itself, but only how much is invested
in the risky asset in total. Basak and Shapiro (2001) shows that there exists a
(deterministic) ξ(t)∗, where qt > 1, ∀ξt > ξ(t)∗, that is, a point where the portfolio
with VaR constraint (2.32) is more risky then the unrestricted one (2.24). This
behaviour shows the incentive of a VaR restriction to ’gamble for resurrection’ in
adverse situations.
Finally note, that the optimal strategy now depends on the current wealth level,
even though the utility function has constant relative risk aversion.
Remark 2. This section can be interpreted as production economy as well. Assume
that there is a single perishable good, which must be consumed or invested in the
production. There exist different production technologies with constant returns to
scale. If a quantity of the physical good P n is invested in the production n, its pay-
off in the next time instant is P n + dP Y,n. The coefficient functions µ and Σ are, in
this case, exogenously given and are possibly driven by F-measurable state variables.
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The production technology is perfectly elastic.
The difference between our model and the one of Cox et al. (1985a) is that the locally
risk-less production technology is perfectly elastic, whereas in Cox et al. (1985a) the
riskless asset in zero net supply. Our model is in line with Constantinides (1990)
and Obstfeld (1994).
2.3 Asset Prices in a Pure Exchange Equilibrium
This section describes asset pricing in a pure exchange economy of the Lucas (1978)
type. First, we characterize the equilibrium in terms of aggregate demand, state
prices (stochastic discount factor), and the marginal utility of the representative
agents. Then, the results are applied to an economy, where some agents face a VaR
restriction.
2.3.1 Definition and Characterization of the Equilibrium
There is an aggregate ’tree’ which produces the aggregate cash-flow stream δt =∑N
n=1 δ
n
T , the ’appels’. The aggregate cash-flow stream follows the exogenously given
dynamics
dδt
δt
= µδ(δt, t)dt+ σδ(δt, t)
>dwt ,
where µδ is the instantaneous return process and σδ the volatility process. Moreover,
δ0 > 0. The number N of trees is fixed (totally inelastic) and normalized to one. In
a production economy like the one of Cox et al. (1985a), the decision on how much
to invest in the different production technologies is endogenous as opposed to the
fixed supply in the pure exchange economy of the Lucas type.
There are m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} agents in the economy, each with a percentage initial
endowment em0 > 0, (e0 = (e
1
0, . . . , e
M
0 >), 1>e0 = 1, in the tree. Agents can trade
continuously in the (complete) financial market, as outlined in the previous section.
It consists of the risk-less investment with dynamics (2.1) and of the risky securities
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with dynamics (2.2).
Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as a collection of optimal consumption, optimal portfolio
and resulting optimal wealth processes (cm, θm,Wm), as well as the investment
opportunity processes of the market (r, µM , σM), such that the market for the
consumption good with supply δt, the markets for the risky assets and the market
for the money market clear for all t,
∑M
m=1 c
m
t = δt∑M
m=1 θ
m
t W
m
t = P
M
t (2.33)∑M
m=1(1− θmt )Wmt = 0 ,
where P = (P 1, . . . , PN)> is the vector of security prices and PM = P>1 denotes
the market value.
Characterization of the Equilibrium in Terms of the Aggregate
Demand
From the definition of equilibrium we obtain, together with the optimal
consumption, that in any equilibrium
δt =
M∑
m=1
cmt =
M∑
m=1
I(ymξt)
holds, where the optimal Lagrange multiplier ym for the agent m must satisfy the
static budget equations (2.17)
E
[∫ T
0
ξs (I(ymξs)) ds+ ξTWmT (ym)
]
= em0 E
[∫ T
0
ξsδsds+ ξT1
>PT
]
, ∀m .
On the other side, if all budgets under optimal consumption are fulfilled and the
consumption market clears, it is an equilibrium, see Theorem (4.5.2) in Karatzas
and Shreve (1998).
In the following, the characterization of the equilibrium is reformulated in such a
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way that the individual decision can be recovered from aggregate quantities, namely
from δ and the initial distribution of endowments.
Let us define the aggregate demand function for consumption D : (0,∞) → (0,∞)
by
D(ξ; y) =
M∑
m=1
I(ymξ) with y = (y1, . . . , yM)> ,
where D(ξ; y) is a continuous, strictly decreasing, and convex function in ξ, for all
y ∈ Rm+ . Thus, an inverse demand function D−1 exists. Consumption clearing in
equilibrium can be rewritten as
D(ξt; y) = δt , ∀t .
Inverting this equation, the stochastic discount factor corresponds to the inverse
demand function
ξt = D−1(δt; y) , ∀t, (2.34)
and, by inserting back into the static budget equation, the system of equations
E0
[∫ T
0
D−1(δs; y)
(I(ymD−1(δs; y))) ds+D−1(δT ; y)WmT (ym)]
= em0 E
[∫ T
0
D−1(δs; y)δsds+D−1(δT ; y)PMT
]
, ∀m (2.35)
emerges. Again, if all budgets under optimal consumption are fulfilled, if the
consumption market clears, and if prices calculated by the inverse demand function
as a discount factor, it is an equilibrium (see Corollary (4.5.4) in Karatzas and
Shreve (1998)). This result is of importance, since, if we find the ’right’ discount
factors, such that the market for consumption clear and all budget constraints are
fulfilled, we also find an equilibrium.
In the previous derivation, we used the important property that clearing only the
consumption good market also clears asset markets and, according to Walras’s
law, the riskless asset market as well, see Karatzas et al. (1990) (zero net supply
securities) and Basak (1995) (positive net supply securities). Therefore, we need not
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to consider separately the situation at time t = T .
Individual consumption can be now characterized with respect to the (inverse)
demand function
cmt = I
(
ymD−1(δt; y)
)
. (2.36)
From this equation a linear sharing rule follows as, for two agents m an n
cmt
cnt
=
I(ym)
I(yn) , ∀t
holds.
Remark 3. There are slight differences how to model the terminal date in the
economy. Our model uses utility at the horizon which can most easily be understood
as a bequest function; at time T , the market value PMT is transferred to the heirs of
the representative agent, and the economy stops. With this approach, there are no
jumps in prices from T− to T . This approach was also chosen by Basak (2002) and
Berkelaar et al. (2002).
Alternatively, the utility at the horizon of restriction can be modelled as the indirect
utility of an ongoing economy, as in Basak (1995) or Basak and Shapiro (2001). In
this case, a single predictable jump in asset prices P occurs at the horizon of the
restriction between T− and T , since, all market participant know, that the restriction
is relaxed and all market participant can follow their unrestricted investment strategy
from then on; notwithstanding discounted prices ξPt will still be continuous, as to
prevent arbitrage opportunities. To maintain the easiest framework, the first variant
is chosen.
Characterization of the Equilibrium in Terms of a Representative
Agent
Now, we make use of two characteristics of the model to simplify the solution to
the system of budget equations (2.35). (i) Complete markets enable us, to define
a representative agent, where we can isolate the impact of the wealth distribution
between agents from the pricing kernel in equilibrium. (ii) As all agents share
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the same coefficient of relative risk aversion γ, only the initial wealth distribution
will be affecting equilibrium prices. In the special case of an economy with only
unrestricted investors, prices are independent of the wealth distribution, which is a
standard result of the utility function with constant relative risk aversion.
In the following the representative agent is constructed, as in Huang (1987) or
Karatzas et al. (1990). Afterwards, the connection between the (inverse) demand
function, the representative agent’s marginal utility, state prices, and the stochastic
discount factor is illustrated. Finally, we illustrate, how to apply the concept on an
representative agent to solve for the equilibrium.
Define the representative agent as the weighted sum of individual utilities
U(Ct, λ) = max
cm:
∑M
m=1 c
m
t =Ct
M∑
m=1
λmu(c
m
t ) , t ∈ [0, T ] (2.37)
with positive weights λm > 0; the vector of weights is denoted by λ = (λ0, . . . , λM)
>.
In the later part of this section, the connection between the vector of weights λ and
the vector of Lagrange multipliers y which codes the initial wealth distribution, will
become evident. C is the aggregate consumption. The analogous definition holds
for the representative agent’s utility function for terminal wealth. Using z as the
Lagrange multiplier for consumption clearing and solving the utility function, one
obtains the utility function of the representative agent1
U(C, λ) = u(C)‖λ‖γ
U(W,λ) = u(W )‖λ‖γ
(2.38)
with
z = UC(C, λ) = u′(C)‖λ‖γ ,
1The utility function is normalized in the level by a constant g > 0 which is, however, irrelevant
for the following analysis.
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where ‖λ‖γ =
∑M
m=1
(
λ
1
γ
m
)γ
and UC(C, λ) = ∂U∂C .
When differentiating the utility function of the representative agent with respect to
aggregate consumption, the relation
UC(Ct = δt;λ) = D−1(δt; y), ∀t
holds, if and only if
λm =
1
ym
, (m = 1, . . . ,M) (2.39)
holds. If and only if the relation between the weights attributed by the representative
agent to the individual investor and the Lagrange multiplier of the individual
budget constraints is given by (2.39), the individual consumptions, expressed in
dependence of the inverse demand function from equation (2.36), are indeed the
optimal solution for the representative agent’s utility maximization problem (2.37).
Thus, the representative agent attributes, in particular, constant weights to the
various agents.
Note that in equilibrium the following relations are valid
ξt = UC
(
δt;
1
y
)
= u′(δt)‖1/y‖γ
= D−1(δt; y) (2.40)
= zt .
The stochastic discount factor ξ can thus alternatively be interpreted as the
representative’s agent marginal utility UC , or as the value of the inverse demand
function of the market D−1, or as the running shadow price of market clearing
constraint z of the representative agent, given the state of the economy δ. The last
interpretation motivates the name state price.
Note, that the aggregate consumption and the marginal aggregate consumption are
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linear homogenous in the second argument λ
U(C, aλ) = aU(C, λ)
UC(C, aλ) = aUC(C, λ) ,
which gives one degree of freedom for the parameter vector λ; in our applications,
we will use this homogeneity property to normalize the utility function of the
representative agent with the condition ‖λ‖γ = 1.
Now equilibrium values for the instantaneous risk-free rate (process) r and market
price of risk (process) κ can be easily derived by applying Ito’s lemma to ξ as
characterized in equation (2.6) and to UC(δ; 1/y) in equation (2.40) and equalizing
the coefficients of dt and dwt. The interest rate and the market price of risk are
found by comparing coefficients
rt =
(
−UCCUC
)
· µδδt − 1
2
((
−UCCUC
)(
−UCCCUCC
))
‖σδδt‖2
= γµδ (δt, t)− 1
2
γ(1 + γ)‖σδ (δt, t) ‖2
κt =
(
−UCCUC
)
σδδt
= γσδ (δt, t) , (2.41)
where −UCCUC C is the relative risk aversion of the representative agent and −
UCCC
UCC C
is the coefficient of relative prudence.
Using that the utility function for the representative agent exhibits also CRRA, we
further obtain that the relative risk aversion is −UCCUC C = γ and the coefficient of
relative prudence −UCCCUCC C = (1+γ). Consequently, neither the interest rate process
r nor the market price of risk process κ depend on the initial distribution of wealth
of individual investors, as represented by the vector y. If, in addition, the coefficients
of the cash-flow process of the economy, µδ and σδ, are constant, rt and κt are also
constant.
Inserting the state price ξ = D−1(δ, 1/y) together with the interest rate r and the
market price of risk κ back into the system of static budget equations (2.35), the
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determination of equilibrium finally boils down to finding the Lagrange multipliers
y that satisfy the system of equations (2.35).
Remark. Relation to the (Consumption)CAPM of Breeden (1979)
By using the definition of the market price of risk κ and its functional form in
equation (2.41), the excess return of any security, say X, with diffusion coefficient
vector σXt , is in equilibrium
µXt − rt = γσ>δ σXt . (2.42)
Alternatively, a similar result, the Euler equation, can be obtained using the marginal
utility of an agent along its optimal individual consumption path
µXt − rt = γ Ct
[
dXt
Xt
,
dcmt
cmt
]/
dt .
In order to obtain a result more in line with the CAPM, let us define a self-financing
portfolio θM with value PM which contains the exact risk structure as the aggregate
dividend (
θMt
)>
D (Pt) Σt = δtσ
>
δ ,
where D(P ) is the diagonal matrix of the vector of prices P . This can be interpreted
as the ’market’ portfolio. This portfolio leads, under the assumed dynamics
dPMt = P
M
t µ
M
t dt+ P
M
t
(
σMt
)>
dwt ,
to an instantaneous volatility of
σMt =
1
PMt
·D (Pt) ΣtθMt =
δt
PMt
σδ
by construction. Substituting σδ of previous equation into the CCAPM relation
(2.42) and using the instantaneous excess return in equilibrium (2.42) on the
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portfolio itself, the equations for the instantaneous expected excess return
µXt − rt = γ
δt
PMt
(
σMt
)>
σXt
µMt − rt = γ
δt
PMt
(
σMt
)>
σMt
emerge which result in a typical CAPM relation
µXt − rt = βXt (µMt − rt)
where
βXt =
(
σMt
)>
σXt
(σMt )
>
σMt
=
Ct
[
dXt
Xt
, dP
M
t
PMt
]
Vt
[
dPMt
PMt
] .
2.3.2 Equilibrium with VaR-constrained Agents
In this section, we analyze in addition the specific assumption that the aggregate
cash-flow follows a geometric Brownian motion with only one risk source,
dδt
δt
= µδdt+ σδdwt (δ0 > 0) . (2.43)
First, we solve analytically the pure exchange equilibrium with only unrestricted
agents. Afterwards, we consider an economy with two groups of agents, one group
of unrestricted agents and a second group of VaR constrained agents.
In both cases, the techniques to solve for the equilibrium are similar: The system
of budget equations (2.35) for the individual investor together with the equilibrium
state prices in equation (2.34) have to be solved. This will be done in three steps.
First, the state prices can be determined by applying equation (2.40). Second,
inserting these state prices into equation (2.35), all variables beside the Lagrange
multipliers will be known, i.e. finding the equilibrium is reduced to solving for the
vector of Lagrange multipliers. Third, one needs to show existence and uniqueness
of a solution vector.
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Unconstrained Equilibrium
The derivation of the unconstrained equilibrium follows closely the steps in Section
2.2.1, in which we recovered the portfolio from the optimal terminal wealth. Due to
the homogeneity property of the representative agent’s utility function U in λ, the
normalization ‖λ‖γ = 1 can be applied. Applying Ito’s lemma on ξt = UC(δt, λ) and
equating the term dξt from (2.6)
− rdt+ κdwt (2.6)= dξt
ξt
=
d UC(δt, λ)
UC(δt, λ)
(2.38)
=
d u′(δt)
u′(δt)
(2.43)
= −
(
γµδ − 1
2
γ(1 + γ)σ2δ
)
dt− (γσδ) dwt
(2.44)
allows us to identify the equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk.
Comparing the LHS with the RHS
r = γµδ − 1
2
γ(1 + γ)σ2δ (2.45)
κ = γσδ , (2.46)
and substituting the equilibrium state prices (2.44) into equation (2.19), evaluated
at t = 0, we obtain
Wm0 =
(
a(T ) + A(T )
)I(ym)δ0 . (2.47)
On the other hand, the vale of the market PM = 1>Pt in (2.10), i.e. the aggregate
wealth at time t, using the equilibrium state prices, is given by
PMt = Et
[∫ T
t
ξs
ξt
δsds+
ξT
ξt
PMT (δT )
]
=
(
a(T − t) + A(T − t))δt . (2.48)
The functions a and A are as in (2.21) and (2.22), in which the interest rate and
market price of risks in equilibrium, (2.45) and (2.46), are substituted in. Inserting
(2.47) and (2.48), evaluated at t = 0, into the budget equation of investor m,
(
a(T ) + A(T )
)I(ym)δ0 = Wm0 = em0 PM0 = em0 (a(T ) + A(T ))δ0 , (m = 1, . . . ,M),
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the Lagrange multipliers in equilibrium read
ym = u′(em0 )
=
1
λm
. (2.49)
The last equation uses the former result (2.39), that the weight of the representative
agent λm and the Lagrange multiplier are inversely related (see also Karatzas et al.
(1990), Theorem 10.2 and Theorem 10.3).
In order to solve for the drift and the volatility of the market portfolio, we apply
Ito’s lemma on the market value PM in equation (2.48) and obtain
dPMt = (·)dt+
(
a(T − t) + A(T − t))(σδδt)dwt
= (·)PMt dt+ σδPMt dwt .
Comparing the diffusion coefficients with the dynamic budget (2.5), where W θ=1 is
replaced by PM , the instantaneous market volatility and drift are
σMt = σ
M = Σ1 = σδ
µMt − r = µM − r = 1>Σκ = γ‖σδ‖2 ,
(2.50)
where the drift term can be more easily derived from the equation µMt = r + κσ
M
t .
Equilibrium with VaR-Constrained Agents
Now, the set of investors is split into two subsets. The first R investors are
unconstrained as before, (1, . . . ,mR), in contrast, the remaining investors (mR +
1, . . . ,M) face a VaR restriction.
The VaR restrictions for the agents are assumed to be homogenous in the VaR
probability α and the resistance level W , i.e. they are identical for all the restricted
investors. Thus, the investors can be aggregated to two representative agents u
(unrestricted) and v (VaR restricted), where the unrestricted one holds as initial
endowment the fraction ω ≥ 0 of the market, whereas the restricted agent v holds
(1− ω).
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By introducing the VaR constrained agents, the structure of the utility function of
the (total) representative agent does not change. Only the level depends on the new
weights (λu, λv), as can be seen in equation (2.38). From (2.44) follows that the
state prices are not changed if VaR constrained agents are added.
From the homogeneity property of the representative agent’s utility function U(C, λ)
in λ and the normalization
1 = ‖Λ‖γ =
(
λ
1
γ
u + λ
1
γ
v
)γ
follows
1 = λ
1
γ
u + λ
1
γ
v
=
(
1
yu
) 1
γ
+
(
1
yv
) 1
γ
= I(yu) + I(yv) .
The last equation enables us to solve for the Lagrange multiplier of the unrestricted
agent u as a function of the Lagrange multiplier of the restricted agent v,
yu(yv) = u′
(
1− I(yv)) . (2.51)
Finally we need to solve the system of budget equations (2.35), analogously to the
unrestricted case. To do this we insert into the RHS and the LHS of (2.35) (i) the
equilibrium state prices D−1(δt, y) = ξt = u′(δt) from (2.44), (ii) the equilibrium
interest rate r from (2.45) and the market price of risk κ from (2.46), and (iii) the
initial endowment (eu0 = ω, e
v
0 = (1 − ω)). As results we obtain the following two
equations for the two groups of investors
W u0 (y
u) = ωP0(y
v, yu) ,
W v0 (y
v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
= (1− ω)P0(yv, yu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
. (2.52)
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Substituting the representation of yu(yv) from (2.51), we are able to reduce equations
(2.52) to the single equation
W u0 (y
v)
P0(yv)
= ω . (2.53)
(2.53) can be solved for yv. In our case of a VaR restriction, this has to be done
numerically. Nevertheless, existence and uniqueness can be shown. As the same
technique will be used later in a more complex setting, the following part illustrates,
how to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We do this by proving
that there exists a unique yv satisfying the above-stated equilibrium equation.
Proof:
Since
I(yu) + I(yv) = 1 ∧ yu > 0 ∧ yv > 0
hold, the Lagrange multipliers have to satisfy yv > 1 and yu > 1.
To simplify the notation we replace W u0 (y
v),W v0 (y
v), and P0(y
v) by Wu,Wv, and
P . Since Wv,Wu and P are function of y
v only, the derivative with respect to yv is
denoted by (·)′.
The fraction held by the unrestricted investors Wu
P
is strictly increasing in yv since
dWu
P
dyv
=
W ′uP −Wu(P ′)
P 2
P=Wu+Wv=
W ′uP −Wu(W ′u +W ′v)
P 2
=
W ′u(P −Wu)−WuW ′v
P 2
P−Wu=Wv=
W ′uWv −WuW ′v
P 2
> 0 . (2.54)
In the derivation of (2.54) we need (i) Wu > 0,Wv > 0, which is obvious, and (ii)
W ′v < 0,W
′
u > 0. W
′
v < 0 directly follows from y
v being the Lagrange multiplier;
W ′u =
(
Wu(y
u(yv))
)′
= W ′u(y
u)y′u(y
v) > 0 holds, as W ′u(y
u) < 0 and y′u(y
v) > 0.
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Furthermore, the domain of yv is
lim
yv→∞
Wu
P
= ωˆ
lim
yv→1
Wu
P
= 0 ,
where ωˆ is defined by
1− ωˆ
ωˆ
=
Wv/P :yv→∞︷ ︸︸ ︷
WE
[
ξT
ξ0
1{δT≤δ}
]
E
[∫ T
0
ξs
ξ0
δsds+
ξT
ξ0
δT
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wu/P :yv→∞
.
The second assertion follows from
Wu = I(yu)E
[∫ T
0
ξs
ξ0
δsds+
ξT
ξ0
δT
]
yv→1⇔yu→∞−→ 0 .
Consequently, there is a unique yv satisfying the equilibrium condition, if the initial
endowment of the unrestricted investor ω is in [0, ωˆ).

In contrast to the unrestricted case, where any wealth distribution was possible, the
restricted agent v needs to hold at least a market share of (1− ωˆ) in order to finance
the minimum wealth requirement of the VaR restriction in equilibrium, which is
WE
[
ξT
ξ0
1{δT≤δ}
]
.
Finally, we need to find the drift and the volatility of the market portfolio. The
drift will be µMt = r + κσ
M
t , once we have derived the volatility. The market value
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PM = 1>P is
PMt =
(
a(T − t) + A(T − t))δt
+a(T − t)I(yv)δt
(
Φ(−d1(δ))− Φ(−d1(δ))
)
−We−r(T−t) (Φ(−d2(δ))− Φ(−d2(δ)))
where the functions a and A are as in (2.21) and (2.22), using in addition the
following variables for the equilibrium, corresponding to the variables in partial
equilibrium in the first column,
r → r = γµδ − 12γ(1 + γ)‖σδ‖2
κ → κ = γσδ
ζ∗ → δ∗ = W∗I(yv)
ζ∗ → δ∗ = W∗I(hyv)
ζ → δ = WI(yv)
ζ → δ = δ0e(µδ−1/2‖σδ‖2)T+‖σδ‖Φ(−1)(α)
√
T ,
with Φ(−1)(α) being the inverse cumulative distribution of the standard normal
density. By applying Ito’s lemma to the market value PM and comparing the
diffusive coefficients with the dynamic budget constraint (2.5), which has to hold
for the market portfolio as well, i.e. PM = W θ=1, the market volatility and, hence,
the drift are
σMt = q
M
t σδ
µMt − r = γqMt σδ
(2.55)
where
qMt = 1− e−r(T−t)
W
PMt
(
Φ(−d2(δ))− Φ(−d2(δ))
)
+e−r(T−t)
J
PMt
γ
‖κ‖√T − tφ(−d2(δ)) .
with
J = W − I(hyv)δ
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and φ being the standard normal density. Note the close resemblance to the
investment strategy in (2.32).
Chapter 3
Regulating the Banking Sector:
The Banks’ Optimal Decision
This chapter introduces a banking sector into the economy. Banks are characterized
as having debt outstanding and being under the supervision of a regulator. We
discuss neither the existence of banks nor the optimality of regulation. Moreover,
banks are not analyzed on an individual level and aggregated afterwards. Instead,
the entire banking sector is directly modelled on an aggregate level. This new
modelling approach builds on the results of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). They show,
starting at the micro level, what the cash-flow consequences of an interconnected
financial system with many firms/banks under default are.
We proceed as follows. First, the consequences of the banking sector’s strategy are
modelled by specifying payments to outside claim holders at the planning horizon.
Second, the corresponding optimization problem for the aggregate banking sector
is stated and the solution is characterized by comparative statics. In deriving
the results the methodological approach of Basak and Shapiro (2001) and Basak
and Shapiro (2005) is adopted and generalized by considering simultaneously debt
financing and VaR regulation at the same time. Third, the consequences of
regulating on the debt capacity and capital provisioning of the banking sector is
discussed as well as the impact of regulation on the banks’ debt market. Finally,
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the dynamics of the portfolio decision and its implications are illustrated.
3.1 The Banking Sector within the Economy
In order to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, the dimensionality of the
underlying risk factors is set to D = 1. Consequently, there is only one risky asset
necessary for a complete market. The whole analysis can easily be performed with
D factors driving the macro-economic risk, as long as the market remains complete.
The D-factor model yields almost no further insights, but comes with an additional
notational burden.
The Aggregate Debt Portfolio to the Real Sector
As we model the entire banking sector, the (aggregate) assets of the banking sector
are represented by the intermediated share of the total outstanding loans to the real
sector of the economy (borrowers). We assume, that the value P of total loans given
to the borrowers of the real sector follows the dynamics
(
dPt + δtdt
)
/Pt = µtdt+ σtdwt , (3.1)
where δ is the cash-flow process associated with the aggregate loan portfolio. The
cash-flow stream δ represents the (dollar) flow of interest (coupon) payments of
the borrowers. It is stochastic as companies within the real sector refinance their
capital needs depending on the state of nature. Note, that there is no redemption
of the aggregate loan portfolio at time t = T . µ is the instantaneous gross expected
return of this aggregated loan portfolio and σ its volatility. In the following, we
discuss (i) why a continuous process for the value of aggregate outstanding loan P
to borrowers is a feasible modelling choice and (ii) why the value of the loan portfolio
is only driven by a single factor. At first sight, the assumption of a continuous value
process is usually problematic, if a portfolio contains credit risk, since, when a
company within the loan portfolio defaults, there is a jump in value. However, as
we do not explicitly model each individual loan disbursed to a company of the real
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sector, it is feasible to model the aggregate loan portfolio as a continuous process
by two reasons.
First, a loan portfolio is exposed to systematic and idiosynchratic risks. It is
reasonable to assume that the systematic risk is driven by macro-economic factors,
and that their dynamics can be modelled by a diffusion. We do not model these
factors explicitly, but represent it in a reduced form by a standard Brownian motion.
Second, our real economy consists of many companies, rolling over their loans with
different maturities and coupons. Assuming that the loans of these companies build
an infinite granular portfolio, the idiosynchratic default risk is perfectly diversified
(see e.g. Gordy (2003)), and only systematic risk matters.
The total loans to the real economy are for brevity usually called the risky asset. .
The Economic Agents of the Economy
The economy is populated by two types of agents. The
unrestricted investor u represents all those investors who can directly invest
in the market. He optimizes his expected utility over consumption cu and
terminal wealth W uT by his decision on the allocation of wealth W
u. He
can invest in the (locally) riskless asset with interest rate r and the risky
asset with payment stream δ and price P . Since the trading portfolio θu
(fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset) is self-financing, the wealth of
the unrestricted investor follows the dynamics,
dW ut = (W
u
t rt +W
u
t θ
u
t (µt − rt)− cut ) dt+W ut θut σtdwt , (3.2)
with initial wealth W u0 > 0. The
regulated banking sector b is partly financed by equity holders with an initial
equity value W b0 > 0. In addiction, the banking system issues at time t = 0 a
zero bond with exogenously given nominal F > 0 and maturity T at the fair
value D0. Both, equity and debt, are held by external agents, which are a not
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a part of the set of participants in the model. Additionally, the supervising
authority imposes a VaR based equity requirement for the banking system.
The banking system invests the total amount V = D + W b in the same
investment opportunities as the unrestricted investor u, namely the locally
riskless asset and the aggregate loan portfolio P . The resulting portfolio
strategy fulfils the same budget dynamics (3.2) as the one of the unrestricted
investor u, where u is replaced by b.
Next, we characterize the claims of the banking system at the horizon T . In the
classical Merton (1974) approach a levered firm defaults, if the value of the firm’s
total assets VT at maturity T is lower than the nominal debt F . The equity position
WT is zero and the external debt holder is entitled to all the remaining assets,
DT = VT . Otherwise, the debt is repaid, DT = F , and equity holders are entitled
to all the remaining asset value, WT = (VT − F ).
The characteristics of the equity and debt claims at T for a single firm are unrealistic,
when the entire banking system is considered. (i) The model excludes cases where
one bank is in default, while another one is still solvent, as DT < F holds iff the
equity W bT of the whole banking system is zero. This result implies, that all banks
default simultaneously, an unrealistic consequence. (ii) Another drawback, when
applied to the aggregate case , is that even if there are substantial defaults within
the banking system, no costs for the solvent banks in a distressed banking system
arise. As the banking system is vital to any modern economy, this assumption
is unreasonable. Furthermore, without costs of distress, there is no room for an
endogenous default decision, as there are no incentives to deviate from the optimal
solution without debt. (iii) Due to the importance of the banking sector to the
economic development, banks are regulated. The core of any regulatory approach
is to restrict the business activities of banks by requiring an underlying amount of
equity capital.
Consequently, three additional components have to be included in a model of the
Merton type, if the aggregate banking sector is considered:
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Panel 1: Equity Panel 2: Debt
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Figure 3.2: Payments at Horizon
This figure shows the payments at maturity depending on the value of total asset VT .
The aggregate equity position W bT is displayed in Panel 1; aggregate debt redemption
payment DT on nominal F in Panel 2. The dashed line represents the Merton (1974)
case, whereas the dotted line the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model. The dotted-dashed
lines are the payment as used in the model before costs, whereas the solid is after
costs.
1. The payments to the claimants of the aggregate banking system at the planing
horizon have to be modified, in order to gain a better image of heterogenous
banks within the banking system.
2. Direct and indirect distress costs have to be modelled.
3. It has to be considered that banks are regulated.
Modelling Heterogeneous Banks
When aggregating individual banks’ balance sheets into a single aggregate balance
sheet of the banking sector, it is at first sight unclear how the interbank market
influences the repayments to the outside claim holders at the horizon. The problem
appears as each individual bank holds on the assets side of the balance sheet
liabilities of other banks and vice versa. At the horizon, all these different contractual
relations have to be cleared. By applying the results of Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
Lemma 5, the clearing vector (the repayments on the different debt titles) is a
concave and increasing (non-expansive) function of operating cash-flows. Including
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the claim of the outside debt holders as an additional agent in the model of Eisenberg
and Noe (2001), the redemption payment DT must inherit in particular these
properties as well, see also Shin (2008), Lemma 1. In our modelling framework,
the relevant operating cash-flow is total assets VT . Hence, we assume that the
default relations within the aggregate banking sector result in the following linear
approximation of redemption payments for external debt with nominal F as
DT = min{(1− β)VT , F} . (3.3)
The parameter β ∈ (0, 1/2] is a measure of heterogeneity, where larger values
correspond to a more heterogenous banking system. The restriction to this interval
is for technical reasons. Economically it excludes cases, where the equity value of the
total banking system will be higher than the debt value, when some banks default.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the differences in modelling by showing equity W bT (Panel 1)
and debt DT (Panel 2) at the planning horizon T , depending on the total assets
(cash-flows) of the banking system VT . The Merton (1974) solution is depicted by
the dashed line, a function of the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) type is plotted as a
dotted line, and our linear approximation by the dotted-dashed line.
In order to motivate, why β is related to heterogeneity in the banking system, two
aspects of heterogeneity are presented, namely the leverage and the business model
of banks. We illustrate these two aspects by considering two extreme cases.
In the first case, banks have an homogenous business model and each bank invests
(directly or by the use of the interbank market) in the well-diversified portfolio of
loans to the real sector. Consequently, there are no idiosyncratic risks in each of
the banks loan portfolios. The probability of default due to an idiosyncratic event
is zero. However, in aggregate, because the banks’ assets are perfectly correlated
(an implication of diversification) on an individual level, the systemic risk to the
banking sector is large. Banks default sequentially, starting at the bank with the
highest leverage ratio. Banks default, even if the aggregate cash-flow VT is still larger
than the aggregate nominal debt F . This property implies β  0. In contrast, if all
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banks are homogenous with respect to their leverage, they default at the same time
and we recover in aggregate the Merton (1974) solution, i.e. β = 0.
As an example, Allen and Carletti (2006) formalize this argument and show in their
model that credit risk transfers between banks, i.e. the construction of the well-
diversified portfolios in our model context, can lead to contagion via the interbank
market and effectively increase the risk of systemic crisis. Duffie (2008) also intensely
discusses the problems arising from credit risk transfers.
In the second case banks set up very heterogenous business models: each bank
invests in a ’single sector’ of the economy and hence the loan portfolio of each bank
contains sector risks. Notwithstanding, the aggregate credit portfolio of banks is
again well diversified. In this case, the probability of default due to sector risks is
larger than in the previous example. However, even with identical banks in terms
of leverage, there will be no common default of the banking system.
From the viewpoint of the aggregated balance sheet of the banking sector, both
types of heterogeneity have at least two consequences: debt may not be fully paid,
DT < F , while at the same time there is still equity capital left, W
b
T > 0. Moreover,
the more the business models of banks differ, the earlier the first default of a bank
within the system occurs. Thus, the specific value of total assets VT , where debt
will not fully be paid, is increasing in the heterogeneity parameter β.
On a theoretical level, the above argument is also put forward e.g. by the works of
Wagner (2006, 2008) and Acharya (2009). The impact of theses two cases is in line
with the empirical findings of e.g. Baele et al. (2007).
Costs, when Banks Default
First, we discuss the different components of costs that arise, if there are defaults
within the banking system. Afterwards, we show that a part of these costs is
borne by the banking system. In our modelling framework, we again use a linear
formulation for the part of costs that is attributed to the banking system
Default costs may consist not only of direct costs, such as administrative costs
and costs of liquidation (takeover), but also of indirect losses such as reputational
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considerations and the loss of future business possibilities (bank charter). These
losses can be substantial parts of the value of defaulted assets as the Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of the United States Congress (1984) reports.
James (1991) estimates 10% for administrative costs and a total loss in assets of
30%.
From an economic perspective, some of these costs might have systemic relevance
in the sense that they impact market participants that are not directly connected
to the defaulted banking institution: The forced liquidation of assets may depress
their market prices and affect other banks, see e.g. Hombert (2007) or Acharya et al.
(2009); damages to the reputation of the banking (group) may spread through the
system and generate informational contagion. In extreme cases, there might even
arise a breakdown of some markets, see Leland and Pyle (1977).
Since individual banks in general cannot invest into the well-diversified portfolio
directly, banks will not only hold position of pure credit risk, but are additionally
engaged in the interbank and derivatives markets in order to transfer risk and
diversify the idiosyncratic risks’ components they obtained due to their business
model. This risk-sharing function of the interbank markets is obviously welfare
enhancing, when comparing a banking system in autarky, where every bank holds
its own portfolio including large idiosyncratic risks, with a banking system, where
any risk can be transferred, i.e. complete markets. When aggregating over all banks,
the interbank market is in zero net supply, as long as there are no defaults, which
is in our model framework over the period t ∈ [0, T ) and in t = T in case of no
defaults. If, however, an individual bank defaults in T , not only are external debt
holders confronted with costs due to a default, but also ’internal’ debt holders, i.e.
other banks by their contractual relations through the interbank markets. Hence, a
part of total costs of a banking system in distress, i.e. where some banks default,
transmits to the aggregate equity position of the banking system.
Beside these contagion effects within the banking sector, there might be a
transmission into the real sector of the economy, e.g. via a credit crunch, with
large costs to the economy, see e.g. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) and Caprio and
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Klingebiel (2002).
Parts of these default costs have to be covered by the holders of the aggregate equity
position. They are modelled as
CT =
 λ(F −DT ) VT > VˇβVT VT ≤ Vˇ , (3.4)
with
Vˇ =
λ
β + λ(1− β)F . (3.5)
The loss given default in aggregate terms, (F−DT ), proxies the severity of a banking
system in distress. It seems reasonable that costs are increasing with the volume
under distress. The cost share1 λ ∈ (0, 1] guarantees that the banking system covers
a non-negative amount of costs and at most 100% of the loss given default. The case
VT ≤ Vˇ is introduced in order to enforce limited liability, as otherwise equity W bT
can be negative; Vˇ is defined as the terminal value of assets, where equity is for the
first time zero. The second part of the cost function is chosen such that WT = 0, if
VT ≤ Vˇ . Finally, the model we use is (up to now) formally a particular case of the
one presented by Basak and Shapiro (2005).
In Panel 1 of Figure 3.2, the costs can be seen as the difference between the dotted-
dashed line W bT + CT and the solid line W
b
T . In addition, Panel 1 in Table 3.1
summarizes the cash-flows at maturity, dependent on VT . For further reference,
Panel 2 shows the redemption payment structure after inversion to W bT , if VT ≥ Vˇ .
Regarding the direct cost components, the proportionality factor λ can be seen as a
proxy of intensity of the contractual interbank relations. We illustrate the argument
with two examples:
First, think of a bank that has no relations to other banks; consequently, other
banks face no loss due to their contractual relations with this bank, irrespective of
the volume of total losses in the loan portfolio of this specific bank.
1Even though λ was used in the previous chapter, no confusion should arise, as in the following
λ will denote the cost share.
3.1 The Banking Sector within the Economy 63
In contrast, imagine a bank that is primarily financed using the interbank market.
If this bank defaults - and assuming that the default raises the same costs as in
the previous example and that the bank holds a loan portfolio of the same size -
almost all the costs are effectively borne by the equity of other banks, since interbank
liabilities make up a high proportion of the total debts and have the same seniority
as external debt (senior unsecured).
In these two examples, the degree of linkages between banks affects, which part of
the total costs stays within the banking system (and how the costs are distributed
within the banking sector); this argument can be made more precise within a network
type of model like Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Nier et al. (2007),
and Elsinger et al. (2006).
When using a strict interpretation, the model presented above allows only for costs
that results in leakage of cash-flows, i.e. direct costs. All other costs components
without a direct cash-flow consequence are not included.
However, following Remark 3 on p. 40, alternative interpretations are possible.
Instead of cash-flows, one can also think in continuation values for equity and debt
in a post-horizon economy, if it were specified. Within such an environment, other
cost components such as indirect costs, systemic costs and costs from feedback effects
can be incorporated indeed.
The systemic parts of the costs of a banking system in distress cannot be attributed
easily: by the fair value principle in accounting, depressed prices due to (cascades
of fire) sales obviously spread into the equity value of other banks. However, it is
not obvious to what extend this transmission channel is linked to the structure of
the interbank markets. Even more complex is the question of how a credit crunch
impairs the real economy and thereby feeds back into the portfolio of total loans.
Still, it seems reasonable to assume that systemic and feed back effects are positively
related to the volume under distress; for the case of system effects see e.g. Nier et al.
(2007) and Elsinger et al. (2006).
Remark. Costs arising to other economic agents, in particular the bank’s debt
holders, do not directly affect the optimal portfolio decisions, as bank managers solely
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act in the interest of equity holders in this model framework. Problems regarding
managerial agency problems are discussed e.g. in Rochet (1992) and Jeitschko and
Jeung (2005). In order to keep the model parsimonious, valuation is being conducted
without costs or benefits to the external debt holder.
Regulation and Risk Management of Banks
The failure of some small banking institutions will not constitute a crisis to the
system as a whole. Notwithstanding, there is no clear understanding of how to
differentiate on an economic basis between harmless losses and those critical losses
that are threatening to the survival of the banking system as a whole.
However, one can characterize two critical levels. At Vˇ , given in equation (3.5), all
the equity capital is needed to cover costs CT , that is, W
b
T = 0 or all the banks are
in default.
The second level arises due to regulation. Most regulatory policies with respect to
the banking system are based on the principle, that, for any business activity on the
active side of the balance sheet, there has to be a certain, possibly risk-weighted,
amount of equity on the passive side, i.e. regulation restricts the size of the business
in which a bank is able to engage. Consequently, one can implicitly define critical
states depending on regulation, where there is ’too much’ aggregate business activity
per aggregate equity, i.e. W
b
V
≤ n, where the Cooke ratio n ∈ [0, 1] is the regulatory
control. The boundary V can be determined by using the results from Table 3.1;
one obtains
V =
λ
β + λ(1− β)− nF . (3.6)
Hence, we are able to identify on a formal basis four regions by their special
characteristics, namely a
normal economic environment, VT ≥ F(1−β) , where there is no individual default
in the banking system; debt is fully paid and the remaining value is paid as
equity capital, i.e. W bT = VT − F . The second region constitutes a
distress of the financial system, V ≤ VT < F(1−β) , where some banks default, but
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losses are not critical in a regulatory sense, i.e. on the aggregate level W bT ≥
nVT . The third region is called a
crisis of the financial system, Vˇ < VT < V , where the banking system is operating
with less than the required equity capital on average, but some banks are still
solvent, i.e. 0 < W bT < nVT . The last region encompasses the
breakdown of the financial system, 0 < VT ≤ Vˇ , where all banks are in default,
i.e. W bT = 0.
The regulatory policy within our model framework requires that the banking system
initially holds enough capital such that there is currently no crisis,
W b0 ≥ nV0 . (3.7)
Moreover, in order to react to events that may bring forth a violation of the
regulation constraint in the future, regulation enforces risk management systems
such that the banking system behaves as if it uses a VaR-based capital requirement
of the form
P[W bT ≥ nVT ] ≥ (1− α) . (3.8)
By this restriction, the aggregate equity capital W bT will be more than the total assets
weighted by the Cooke ratio, nVT , under ’normal market conditions’, meaning in at
least (1− α) percent of cases; crisis happens in at most α per cent of the cases.
We do not intend to discuss whether a VaR rule for risk management can be obtained
as a solution to an optimal contracting problem, e.g. Adrian and Shin (2008a).
This rule is meaningful for different reasons. Risk management by Value-at-Risk
has become the industry standard, since the VaR idea emerged into markets from
JPMorgan’s RiskMetrics Group. Finally, it gained its seal of approval, when it
became the fundamental idea behind regulation in most countries due to the 1996
Market Risk Amendment of the Basel Accord and the Basel II Regulation.
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We want to stress two aspects of this risk-sensitive capital requirement:
First, it is not obvious that a VaR-based risk management of an individual bank
translates into this form for the aggregate case. From a purely theoretical viewpoint,
the VaR restriction is not an impediment to aggregation if the VaR probability is
identical across banks (homogenous regulation) and if the additional assumption
holds that the behaviour of the market participants does not influence neither the
interest rate nor the market price of risk (valuation irrelevance of regulation). Then,
the state of the economy where the VaR restriction becomes binding at an individual
level is independent of the agent’s characteristics and, hence, the same for every
decision maker, see Basak and Shapiro (2001). Therefore, aggregation is simplified,
as the individual restriction can be replaced by the one formulated on aggregate
variables. It turns out that the pure exchange equilibrium in Chapter 4 and 5 is in
compliance with this condition.
Second, the combined capital requirements (3.7) and (3.8) are (time-)inconsistent.
Rational bank managers should take account in their decision strategy today that
they have to comply at least with some probability with regulation again as time
goes by. In a perfect framework, the regulatory restrictions should hold at any point
in time. Instead, we choose to incorporate a single restriction over the period [0, T ].
An intuitive argument runs as follows: most large banks have invested substantial
amounts of money and knowledge in their risk management systems. This system
influences the bank behaviour on at least two levels. (i) On the executive board
level, the management chooses its decision based on the information supplied by
the risk management tools; annual reports of most banking institutions extensively
discuss their VaR estimates. Furthermore, many banks define a range for their
regulatory capital ratios within they attempt to operate, c.f. Annual Report (2007)
of Commerzbank AG, p. 225 ’Comfort Zone’ for Tier 1 (6.5% − 7.5%) and Tier
2 (10.5% − 11.5%). (ii) The second level can be attributed to the incentives of
compensation schemes within banks. For the evaluation which activities are the
most profitable ones, the adjustments for the risk and the costs of (regulatory)
equity heavily depend on the risk management system as well. Extrapolating these
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arguments, one can imagine that, once these systems are installed, banks choose
their portfolios quasi-’automatically’. Even though, these systems provide a ’state’
dependent answer, they are slow to adapt to structural changes. Therefore, we
prefer to use the commitment solution over the time-consistent solution with an
continuously updated VaR restriction. For a discussion on time consistency see
Strotz (1955) or in an investment decision framework Basak and Chabakauri (2009).
Remark. Section 2 of the concluding Chapter 6 discusses the robustness of the
results, when generalizing the structure of redemption payments, the costs structure,
or the homogeneity assumption within the VaR restriction. Moreover, it argues that
the VaR restriction is merely the one with the most pronounced impact, but many
other risk measures will in fact generate similar results.
Remark. There are three different time horizons to consider in the model: the VaR
horizon, the maturity of the bond, and the lifetime of the agents. We have chosen
to use the same horizon for all of them. This choice induces a non-path-dependent
solution. Furthermore, a more complex model with different time horizons will have
a smoothing effect, which is documented in similar models: for the case of a VaR
restriction see Basak and Shapiro (2001) and for debt see Basak and Shapiro (2005).
Regarding amplifications of volatility due to regulatory impact, our model represents
the worst case.
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3.2 Characterization of the Optimal Solution
In this section, we formulate the optimization problem of the unrestricted agent u
and of the banking sector b. The solution requires no assumption in addition to the
ones outlined in the previous chapter, mainly a complete market and an adapted
investment opportunity set (µ, r, σ). Furthermore, in their optimal decision, agents
take the prices as given. Consequently, the wealth of the unrestricted agent W u0 and
equity value W b0 are exogenous.
On this general level, we are able to discuss the impact of regulation at two points
in time: first, the direct effect of a changing regulation at time t = T on the optimal
profile of the banking system W bT ; second, by virtue of the budget constraint in
t = 0, there is also an indirect impact of regulation, as these direct effects have to
be financed by a modification of the portfolio decision.
3.2.1 Formulation of the Optimization Problems
The unrestricted agent u as well as the banking system b optimize the expected
utility
E
[∫ T
0
u(cns ) ds+ u(W
n
T )
]
n ∈ {u, b} ,
with a CRRA utility function as defined in (2.12) on p. 21. As heterogeneity
in agents’ characteristics introduces superimposing effects, economic agents are as
similar as possible. Therefore, both representative agents share the same coefficient
of constant relative risk aversion γ.
Since the market is complete, the problem can be solved using the martingale
techniques of Cox and Huang (1989) and Karatzas et al. (1987), which convert
the dynamic optimization problem into a static variational one. The state-price
density process is defined as in the previous chapter,
dξt = −ξt(rtdt+ κtdwt) ,
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where r is the locally risk-free interest rate and κ = µ−r
σ
the market price of risk
process, both adapted to F .
The resulting static-variational optimization of the aggregate banking sector reads
as follows
max
{ct,WT }
E
[∫ T
0
u(cbt)dt+ u(W
b
T )
]
(3.9)
s.t.

E[
∫ T
0
ξtc
b
tdt+ ξT (W
b
T + CT )] ≤ ξ0W b0 Budget with Costs
Eq. (3.3) and (3.4) Aggregate Behavior
Eq. (3.7) and (3.8) Regulation
cbt ≥ 0, W bT ≥ 0 Non-Negativity.
This new optimization encompasses the particular case of an
unrestricted agent u as in Cox and Huang (1989). He is not indebted and has
no other exogenous restrictions; i.e. (F = 0, α = 1, n = 1). Furthermore, the
case of an
VaR restricted agent v as in Basak and Shapiro (2001) is nested. The agent
uses a VaR management, which aims at maintaining a certain wealth level
with at least a probability of α, but no debt; i.e. (F = 0, n = 1). Finally, the
optimization problem of the
unrestricted financial intermediary i as in Basak and Shapiro (2005) can be
recovered by setting (α = 1, n = 1). This agent has debt outstanding, but has
no regulation and VaR management.
This case is also of further interest since it represents the case where the
banking sector is not regulated. To facilitate an easy comparison of different
solutions, we denote this unregulated banking sector in the following as
financial intermediary i. Furthermore, regulation is in some cases effectively
not binding, meaning that, even though there exists regulation, initial equity
W b0 is sufficient such that the VaR restriction does not bind.
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3.2.2 Optimal Solution
First, the solution to the unrestricted representative agent u is repeated. Afterwards,
the solution of the restricted banking system is given and characterized.
Solution of the Unrestricted Investor
The solution to the problem of the unrestricted investor u is, as outlined in the
previous chapter,
cut (y
u) = I (yuξt) , W uT (yu) = I(yuξT ) , (3.10)
where the Lagrange multiplier of the unrestricted agent yu > 0 is the solution to the
static budget equation
E
[∫ T
0
ξsc
u
s (y
u)ds+ ξTW
u
T (y
u)
]
= ξ0W
u
0 . (3.11)
I(y) is the inverse function of marginal utility, see equation (2.13) on p. 21.
Optimal Solution of the Banking Sector
We characterize the solution when the VaR restriction is binding
cbt(y
b) = I (ybξt)
W bT (y
b) =

I(ybξT ) if ξT ≤ ζ∗
W∗ if ζ∗ < ξT ≤ ζ∗
I(hybξT ) if ζ∗ < ξT ≤ ζ
W if ζ < ξT ≤ ζ
I(hybξT ) if ζ < ξT
(3.12)
with the boundaries
W∗ =
β
(1−β)F ζ∗ =
u′(W∗)
yb
ζ∗ = ζ∗
h
W = ψ(n) β
1−βF ζ =
u′(W )
hyb
ζ : P[ξT ≥ ζ] = α ,
(3.13)
the costs sensitivity
h =
β
β + λ(1− β) ∈ (0, 1) , (3.14)
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and a variable, representing the strictness of regulation
ψ(n) =
1− β
β
nλ
β + λ(1− β)− n) ∈ (0, 1) , (3.15)
where again the Lagrange multiplier of the banking sector yb > 0 is the solution to
the static budget equation
E
[∫ T
0
ξsc
b
s(y
b)ds+ ξT (W
b
T (y
b) + C(W bT (y
b))
]
= ξ0W
b
0 . (3.16)
The proof is provided in the Appendix. If ζ > ζ, the VaR restriction is effectively
not binding. In this case or when the solution of the financial intermediary i is of
interest, it can be recovered by formally setting ζ = ζ.
The feasibility constraint for the restricted problem is
W b0
F
≥ βλ
β + λ(1− β)− nE0
[
ξT
ξ0
1{ξT≤ζ(α)}
]
+
βλ
β + λ(1− β)E0
[
ξT
ξ0
1{ξT>ζ(α)}
]
. (3.17)
If capital requirements n (given α) are too restrictive, the solution ceases to exist, as
a foreclosure of any banking business activity is optimal. Accordingly, the condition
n ≤ β (3.18)
represents an incentive compatibility constraint.
Remark. h can be seen as cum-ex sensitivity of equity in case of distress or crisis,
∂(W bT+CT )/∂VT
∂W bT /∂VT
|VT<F/(1−β), see Table 3.1, Panel 1. A decrease in h measures the loss
in equity return due to bankruptcy costs,
W bT+CT
WT
, with respect to a loss in VT . Under
optimality, the agent balances state-by-state these losses with the marginal loss, paid
to the outsiders, by setting up a portfolio policy to increase (resp. decrease) VT ,
thereby providing more (resp. less) equity wealth net of fees in this particular state.
3.2 Characterization of the Optimal Solution 73
Table 3.2: Standard Parameter Set
This table reports the set of parameters that will be used, if not stated otherwise.
partial equilibrium
riskless rate market price of risk initial state initial wealth (distr.)
r = 5% κ = 40% ξ0 = 3.69
W u0 = 2
W b0 = 2
pure exchange equilibrium
growth c.f. vola. c.f. initial c.f. initial endowment
µδ = 8.5% σδ = 20% δ0 = 0.52 1− ω = 79
agents’ data
CRRA coefficient horizon
γ = 2 T = 5
nominal heterogeneity prop. costs
F = 7 β = 14.10% λ = 5.34%
regulation
Cooke ratio VaR probability
n = 13.3% α = 1%
resulting economy in a balance sheet (present value)
tot. debt to real sector
P0 = 9
total assets
V0 = 7
banks’ equity
W b0 = 2
banks’ debt
D0 = 5
wealth unr. agent
W u0 = 2
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Figure 3.3: The Bank Sector’s Optimal Solution for Terminal Wealth
This figure shows the solution of the optimization problem using the set of standard
parameters. Each graph is plotted over the scaled state price ξT /ξ0, where low values
represent ’good’ times and vice versa. Panel 1 shows the total value VT , whereas
Panel 2 the equity capital W bT , and Panel 3 the debt redemption payment DT . The
parameters are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the optimal solution in the form of a balance sheet: the
resulting total value VT is displayed in Panel 1, debt value DT in Panel 2, and
terminal equity value W bT in Panel 3, each plotted against the scaled state price
ξT/ξ0. High scaled state prices correspond to economically ’bad’ times, whereas low
state prices indicate a favourable economic development. Due to the fixed default
procedure, total assets VT and equity W
b
T are structurally identical. For those states
in which default occurs, debt DT also inherits a similar structure. The graphs are
plotted using the parameters of the model as given in Table 3.2 (standard parameter
set).
The optimal solution splits the entire state space into the same regions mentioned
on p. 65, namely a
normal economic environment with ξT ≤ ζ∗ and ζ∗ < ξT ≤ ζ∗. This region can
be further separated into two parts. In economically ’good’ time, the banking
systems behaves as if being unrestricted. However, at ζ∗ the retention level to
distress W∗ starts, corresponding to F/(1− β) on the total asset level. Here,
the agent avoids the first default, as long as the default costs are higher than
the costs of obviation, i.e. up to the distress boundary ζ∗. A
distress of the financial system will occur in the regions ζ∗ < ξT ≤ ζ and ζ < ξT ≤
ζ. In the first part, the banking system behaves like the unregulated financial
intermediary i.
The second part with the retention level W is induced by the VaR requirement.
The least wealth W that is required to maintain the VaR restriction, is reliant
on regulation through its dependence on the regulation parameter n. The
VaR boundary ζ is the (1 − α) quantile of the state price density and thus
independent of preferences and endowments. The last region corresponds to a
crisis of the financial system that occurs in the states ζ < ξT . In these remaining
states, wealth W bT is not restricted and is proportional to the unrestricted
profile I(ξT ). This property is especially noteworthy in the ’tail’ of the
distribution, as VaR does not restrict wealth in these states.
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Finally, at the VaR boundary ζ, a jump from the retention level to the
unrestricted policy appears,
J = W − I(hybζ) ≥ 0 . (3.19)
A total
breakdown of the financial system is not sustainable due to the form of the utility,
which prevents the banking sector from reaching a breakdown, as u′(W )→∞
for W → 0.
The optimal wealth at time T can be replicated by a static portfolio of derivatives.
As in the previous chapter, one can define a mutual fund G = I
(
yb ξT
ξ0
)
and
decompose the optimal solution into
1. I(h) units of the fund G,
2. I(h) > 1 calls options short with strike W∗I(h) ,
3. 1 call option long with strike W∗,
4. I(h) > 1 puts long with strike WI(h) and knock-out barrier K(α)I(h) ,
where K(α) = I(hybζ). Positions (1., 2., 3.) correspond to the solution of the
unrestricted financial intermediary i and position (4.) is necessary to generate the
deviation from optimal policy due to the VaR constraint. The static decomposition
in more formal terms is
W bT = I(h)GT −max{I(h)GT −W∗, 0}+ max{GT −W∗, 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Solution of i
+ max{W − I(h)GT , 0}1{I(h)GT≥K(α)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
VaR - effect
.
(3.20)
Note the resemblance to the static derivatives position of the VaR restricted agent
in (2.30) on p. 34. This static derivative portfolio is of importance for an attempt to
explain the risk taking behaviour of banks and the success of derivatives’ innovations
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before the current financial crisis emerged, based on a regulatory side effect2. The
completeness of markets, be it based on dynamic trading or on a sufficient set of
derivatives existent on markets, enables banks to exactly fulfill the requirements of
regulation. However, it also permits to make full use of all states, where regulation
is not binding. Within any kind of VaR based measure, these states are inherently
in the tails of the distribution, as is illustrated in the above derivative position
through the knock-out options. In a more general understanding, which overcomes
our specific model framework, these states may cover also developments, where
markets participants expect regulatory authorities to lessen their policy and/or to
intervene, in order to stabilize the system. Finally note, that this side effect of
regulation is increasing with the nominal debt level of the banking system.
As our model framework provides a close link between dynamic trading strategies
and static derivative positions via market completeness, this side effect cannot be
obtained in a standard static framework with linear contracts.
3.2.3 Reaction of the Banking System to Regulation
This model framework facilitates the separation of the reaction to a change of a
parameter by comparative statics of the solution into three effects:
Step 1 results in the direct effect on the optimal decision in time T , i.e. how do
boundaries change and what are the implications for equity wealth in these
states? The parameters of interest χ are the VaR probability α, the aggregate
capital requirements n, nominal debt F , and the parameters that structure
the model, λ (costs fraction borne by the banking sector) and β (heterogeneity
within the banking sector).
These parameters may have an impact on the relevant boundaries ζ, W∗, and
W as well as on the cost sensitivity h. Thereby, terminal wealth reacts to
changes in parameters,
∂W bT
∂χ
.
2This certainly covers only one aspect of the crisis. Other ones, such as compensation schemes
or problems of moral hazard due to securitization, are not the focus of this thesis.
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Step 2 results in the indirect reactions due to wealth transfers at time t = T , i.e.
how are the previously mentioned changes in wealth financed? In general, the
budget equation does not hold any more after the first step. The only way to
fulfil the budget equation optimally is to adjust wealth in these states, where
a solution of the unregulated type I(·) prevails, i.e. in the regions (0, ζ∗],
(ζ∗, ζ], and (ζ,∞). By the relation ∂W bT
∂yb
< 0 in these regions, this adjustment
effectively amounts to changing yb. Thereby, indirect effects of financing arise,
as expressed by the sign of y′b(χ).
3
Step 3 results in the induced provisioning of equity capital at time t = 0. Capital
provisioning is defined as how much equity capital of (constant) total equity
W b0 has to be ’put aside’, in order to pay for the modifications of the portfolio
strategy necessary to generate the direct (Step 1) and indirect (Step 2) changes.
W b0 −W i0(yb) measures exactly the amount of capital that has to be put aside.
The possibility of this separation is due to the new model proposed and solved above.
Remark. The following arguments are with respect to equity capital. As the total
assets V are a monotonous transformation of W b, the same results are valid for the
total assets. Debt D also inherits the same characteristics in the distress and crisis
regions ξT > ζ
∗.
For further reference, Table 3.3 at the end of this section lists derivatives with respect
to the VaR probability α, the Cooke ratio n, costs λ, heterogeneity parameter β, and
nominal debt level F . In Step 1, the sign of the derivatives needed for the direct
effect, namely the ones of the distress level W∗, crisis level W , VaR boundary ζ,
and the costs sensitivity h are displayed. Step 2 shows the impact on the Lagrange
multiplier yb. Lastly, the change in capital provision for Step 3 is given.
Finally we have to address of how to measure financial (in)stability. Going further,
the literature (and regulatory authorities) does not even provide a generally accepted
3In order to keep notation simple we define y′b(χ) =
dy(χ)
dyb
.
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definition of what constitutes a stable (fragile) financial system, what the systemic
risks are, and how to define a crisis in the financial system, see de Bandt and
Hartmann (2000), Davis (2003) or Goodhart (2006) for a discussion. In our analysis
we follow the micro-economically founded models of Tsomocos (2003), Catarineu-
Rabell et al. (2005), Goodhart et al. (2006), and Goodhart and Tsomocos (2007)
and use not only the probability of distress as a measure, but also the wealth of the
economy in crisis and the sensitivity of the economy to the driving economic factor in
distress and/or crisis. These authors note that an increasing probability of distress
might just represent increased risk taking, but is not harmful to the economy if it
is not accompanied by serious loss to profitability (in our case equity wealth) in the
economy.
Let H be an endogenous variable representing an aspect of financial stability and
χ one of the exogenous parameters, then the (total) derivative can be decomposed
into
d
dχ
H(yb(χ), χ) =
∂H
∂yb
y′b(χ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
+
∂H
∂χ︸︷︷︸
direct
(3.21)
Table 3.3, Panel 2 displays the sign of all three relevant derivatives. H are variables
that measure aspects of financial stability, which are the probability of distress,
P[DT < F ], the probability of crisis, P[W
b
T < nVT ], capital provision (needed for
Step 3), W b0 −W i0(yb), the jump size J , and the equity value in crisis, I(hybξT )|ξT>ζ .
Regulation by the VaR probability
As an example, we discuss the case where the banking system faces stricter regulation
by the VaR probability, that is, α decreases. The decomposition of the effects on
the optimal solution are displayed in Figure 3.4. The
direct effect of Step 1 is displayed in Figure 3.4, Panel 1. The VaR boundary ζ,
by virtue of its definition increases, see Change 1. The optimal solution (3.12)
is not affected in its principal structure (W∗ and W are constant), only the
region, where wealth is kept at level W becomes wider, see Region A. Thus,
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Figure 3.4: Impact of a Change in the Regulation Parameter α
This figure decomposes the impact of stricter regulation on terminal wealth into its
direct effect in Panel 1 and into the indirect effect in Panel 2, as in Equation (3.21).
there are some states where wealth has to be raised from the lower unrestricted
wealth I(hybξT ) to the level W . Furthermore, the jump size J is enlarged, see
Change 2. The
wealth transfers of Step 2 are displayed in Figure 3.4, Panel 2. Obviously, the
budget equation does not hold any more; this profile needs more initial capital
due to region A in Panel 1. As the resistance levels W∗ and W do not change,
the only way to ’refinance’ these positive wealth differences is to reduce the
wealth in all non-restricted states, i.e. the Regions B, C, and E in Panel 2, i.e.
an increase in the shadow price of equity capital yb, exactly up to the point
where the budget equation will hold again. The present value of regions B, C,
and E is identical to the one of region A in order to fulfil the budget equation.
The
provisioning of equity capital in Step 3 can be deduced, when comparing the
region that is enclosed by the solution of the unrestricted financial intermediary
i (dashed line in Panel 1) and the solution of the banking system b before a
change of α (solid line, before changes), with the same region in Panel 2 (after
changes); the difference is the combined Regions A and D. Thereby we obtain
a raised risk provision that can be directly attributed to the VaR constraint.
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However, this form of regulation impairs financial stability by its side effects:
reducing the probability of crisis P[W bT < nVT ] = P[ξT > ζ] by means of stricter
regulatory policy comprises indirectly a higher probability of distress, P[DT < F ] =
P[ξT > ζ
∗], as ζ∗ decreases through the indirect refinancing effect, see Panel 2,
Change 3. Moreover, the crisis becomes more pronounced as the jump size J
heightens, both directly as a result of the regulatory impact of α on the VaR
boundary ζ (Panel 1, Change 2) as well as indirectly through the effect of wealth
transfers, as expressed by yb, on ζ∗, see Panel 2, Change 4. The jump size is of
interest with regard to financial stability, as it is related to the question to what
extent the banking system reacts to a small change in the underlying economic
situation; it thus can be seen as a way to measure the escalation potential of less
favourable economic situations. In addition, the severity of crises, as measured
by aggregate wealth in case of a crisis I(hybξT )|ξT>ζ , will be lower than in a less
regulated economy, see Panel 2, Change 5.
This discussion of the change in the VaR probability α on the solution vividly
illustrates that (stricter) regulation, i.e. Change 1 in Panel 1, leads to complex
modifications in the behaviour of the banking system. These modifications may
result in less financial stability when other viable measures of financial stability are
in view. In particular it is to stress that, even with the minimal assumption in place,
the probability of distress in the financial system is increasing due to regulation.
Tracing back the result to the static derivative portfolio of equation (3.20) shows
that this side effect will also happen in world with sufficient innovations in the
derivative markets.
Capital Requirement
While α restricts the probability of a crisis, a positive change in the capital
requirements n alleviates the severity of the distress in the banking sector by
increasing the retention level W .
By an analogous argument, the indirect financing effect countervails this positive
influence, since a similar argument as before shows that the probability of distress,
the jump size and the severity in crisis increase, see Table 3.3.
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From the viewpoint of regulatory policy, both instruments, the capital adequacy n
and the VaR probability α imply adverse reactions: while stability benefits directly
from regulation the way one expects, indirect (optimal) wealth transfers are to the
detriment of stability in the banking system.
Relation to the Structural Parameters of the Economy
Even though, within the modelling framework, the nominal debt level F , costs λ,
and heterogeneity β are given constants, they may, in fact, not be constant, since
they are subject to the Lucas (1978) critique. Thus a study of the effect stemming
from changes in theses variables is necessary in order to assess the robustness of
regulatory policies. The arguments in the following are based on Table 3.3.
The banking system e.g. might respond to a change in regulatory policy by
downsizing its business activities by lowering aggregate debt exposure F . This in
turn lessens both retention levels in absolute terms. Lower retention levels do not
matter in this case, as on a relative scale the ratios W∗/F or W/F will not change.
Yet, even on a relative scale, the jump size is reduced and positive wealth transfers
additionally amend the situation with respect to the probability of distress and
the recovery rates of debt DT/F . When combined in this way, the reaction of the
banking system to a change in regulation ameliorates the secondary negative effects
of regulation.
Without any VaR restriction, i.e. the unregulated financial intermediary i, costs
λ decrease h and thus raise the terminal equity value of the financial intermediary
W iT in the distress region ξT > ζ
∗. The increase, though, is financed over both
unrestricted areas, ξT < ζ∗ and ξT > ζ∗. Consequently, terminal wealth in distress
W iT |ξT>ζ∗ is still increased after shifts due to financing. If there are no cost λ = 0, a
Modigliani and Miller (1958) type of argument holds and there is no disturbance of
the unrestricted policy with terminal profile I(ybξT ).
When financial intermediaries already expect at time t = 0 to be hit by some losses
due to defaults within the financial system, they behave as if they are more risk
averse. If every bank indeed shows this behaviour, the unregulated financial system
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behaves unambiguously as being more risk averse in order to avoid these exogenous
costs. This is in contrast to standard results in literature, as in Jensen et al. (1976),
where there are risk-increasing incentives due to limited liability. In this model
framework, financial intermediaries do know that they will be hit by some losses
from other institutions, which in turn lessen their willingness to take larger risks.
The regulated banking sector b differs with respect to costs by the additional
retention level to crisis W ; for λ = 0 it is zero, i.e. VaR is non-binding. As λ
increases, W increases and may become binding; when leverage is too low, it will
never be binding. Relative to the unrestricted case, the retention level W must
be financed, resulting in a faster relative increase of the budget tightness yb. On
the other hand, if λ is very high, the VaR restriction is effectively not binding, as
the costs themselves are already a big enough incentive. Thus, regulation is non-
monotonous in systemic costs.
Costs reduce the riskiness of the banking system. However, the effectiveness of
a VaR-based regulation depends on the degree of systemic costs; it only works
well for moderate costs. If the costs are ’prohibitively’ high, there is simply no
need for regulation, as agents voluntarily reduce their exposure. Two properties of
costs in our model framework are essential: if costs are not ’expected’ to appear by
market participants, they will not change their optimal decision; regulation becomes
ineffective as well. Moreover, the costs in our model framework are borne by the
banking system. If the ’total’ costs (consisting of direct, indirect, systemic, real
feedback) do not generate enough costs, which are borne by equity holders of banks,
regulation is effectively impaired as well. Note that one of the main determinants of
the costs fraction λ consist of the degree of connectivity within the banking system.
Hence, a well-functioning interbank-market has a disciplining effect.
Remark. The impact of heterogeneity β is indistinctive, as even the direct effects of
the unregulated financial intermediary are ambivalent. Both retention levels W∗ and
W are (progressively) increasing inducing a tighter budget equation. At the same
time, the increase in h lessens the restrictiveness of the budget. Without further
assumption, it is unclear which effect prevails.
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3.3 The Banking Sector in Partial Equilibrium
In order to obtain quantitative statements or to explore the characteristics of the
solution at some arbitrary point in time t ∈ (0, T ), we need to impose further
structure on the investment opportunity set.
In the previous section, we presented the solution where all the agents take the
investment opportunity (r, µ, σ) set as a given. It was required to be continuous
and adapted to the filtration F . In order to be consistent with the pure exchange
equilibrium in the following chapter, we assume a constant interest rate
rt = r ≥ 0 , ∀t .
Moreover, the adapted processes (µ, σ) are connected in such a way as to guarantee
a constant market price of risk
κt =
µt − r
σt
= κ > 0 , ∀t .
With these additional assumptions, the state price process ξ in equation (2.5) on p.
16 follows a geometric Brownian motion. This enables us to evaluate the expectation
operators (semi-)analytically.
Yet, there is no need to specify the drift and the volatility of the risky asset more
explicitly. In contrast to the following chapter, prices are still exogenous by the
choice of r and κ.
Remark. On the impact of this structural assumption, see Remark 1 on page 28.
In this section, we analyze the restrictiveness of the VaR. We do this by
characterizing (i) the point, where the VaR restriction becomes binding and (ii)
the capacity of the banking system to load on nominal debt.
We then quantify the equity capital provisions of the VaR constraint and the impact
on the banks’ debt market.
Finally, we discuss the evolvement of the portfolio decision of the aggregate banking
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sector over time and states and link it to an instantaneously adjusted risk aversion,
caused by the incentives given through the VaR restriction.
Remark. Analogous to the discussion in Remark 2 on p. 36, this framework can
be seen as a Cox et al. (1985a)-type production economy. Then, prices have to be
interpreted as quantities.
3.3.1 Value of the Optimal Solution
The wealth of the unrestricted investor is, as shown in (2.19) on p. 28,
W ut (y
u) = I(yuξt)
(
a(T − t) + A(T − t)) .
Using the static budget equation of the unrestricted investor W ut (y
u)|t=0 = W u0 , we
can solve for the Lagrange multiplier analytically
yu =
(
a(T ) + A(T )
W u0
)γ
1
ξ0
.
By the same procedure, the aggregate equity position of the banking system b is, as
sketched in the Appendix,
W bt (y
b) = (A(T − t) + a(T − t)) I(ybξt)
+a(T − t) I(ybξt)
(
− I(h)(Φ(−d1(ζ∗))− hΦ(−d1(ζ∗)))
−I(h)(hΦ(−d1(ζ))− hΦ(−d1(ζ))
)
+ e−r(T−t) W∗
(
Φ(−d2(ζ∗))− hΦ(−d2(ζ∗))
)
+ e−r(T−t) W
(
hΦ(−d2(ζ))− hΦ(−d2(ζ))
) ,
(3.22)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution and
d1(ζ) =
(
r − κ2
2
)
(T − t) + log
(
ζ
ξt
)
+ κ
2
γ
(T − t)
√
T − t κ
d2(ζ) =
(
r − κ2
2
)
(T − t) + log
(
ζ
ξt
)
√
T − t κ
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are as in equation (2.31) on p. 35.
The budget equation W bt (y
b)|t=0 = W b0 cannot be solved in closed form. The
function W bt (y
b)|t=0 is strictly (and progressively) decreasing in yb, see equation
(3.45); therefore, a unique Lagrange multiplier yb, satisfying the budget equation,
exists, given that the feasibility condition is fulfilled.
Equipped with the numerical solution to the Lagrange multiplier, one can recover
other variables of interest. Even though we have to rely on a numeric procedure for
yb itself, derivatives with respect to some parameter χ of the Lagrange multiplier,
y′b(χ), can be analytically derived, by applying the implicit function theorem on the
static budget equation, W bt (y
b(χ), χ)|t=0 = W b0 .
Remark. When directly comparing the regulated banking sector b with the
unregulated financial intermediaries i, we use the superscript b or i also on total
asset V , debt D, or other variables of interest. If no superscript is used, the regulated
banking sector b (alone) is discussed.
Figure 3.3 shows the balance sheet of the banking sector at time t = 4 as a function
of the scaled state price ξt/ξ0. The aggregate assets V
n
t are shown in Panel 1, equity
W nt in Panel 2, and debt D
n
t in Panel 3, where n ∈ {b, i}. The corresponding
formulae are given in the Appendix.
The decomposition of terminal wealth presented in equation (3.20) illustrates that
aggregate wealth has a formula of the Black and Scholes (1973) type. The principal
structure of W bt as a function of the state price ξt is similar to the one at time T ;
however, time to maturity has a smoothing effect. Since aggregate equity capital
W bT is monotonous in the state prices ξT , the continuous solution in t is strictly
monotonous as well. The non-convexities of W bT in ξT are also transmitted. It is
easy to imagine how the curve shapes out over time into the retention levels W∗, W ,
and the jump J at the VaR boundary ζ. The additive first term captures the value
of future consumption.
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Figure 3.5: Value of Total Assets, Equity and Debt
This figure shows the balance sheet of the aggregate banking sector in present value
terms at time t = 4, for the restricted banking sector as solid lines and for the
unrestricted financial intermediary as dotted lines. Each panel is plotted over the
scaled state-price-density ξt/ξ0, where low values represent ’good’ times and vice versa.
Panel 1 shows the total value Vt, whereas Panel 2 the equity Wt, and Panel 3 the debt
value Dt. The parameters are as in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
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The mean and volatility of the aggregate equity value W b are stochastic, even
if the underlying investment opportunity set (r, µ, σ) is set constant. This is to
be expected, as the returns are transformed by the structure of the aggregate
balance sheet. However, as the total assets VT are a piecewise linear function of
the aggregated wealth W bT , the total assets also have stochastic mean and volatility,
even though the model framework is alike a ’classical’ Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1973b) type of economy. This result turns out to be robust, as it only needs
a fixed settlement procedure at time T , which results in some disturbance of the
unrestricted optimal profile I(·).
Remark 4. This stochastic behaviour of µ and σ translates into total assets as
well. This contrasts many models assuming that the total assets (or cash flows)
follow a geometric Brownian motion, see Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976),
Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein et al. (2001), and Dangl and
Zechner (2004) regarding corporate debt contracts, and Merton (1977), Merton
(1978), Fries et al. (1997), Bhattacharya et al. (2002), and Dangl and Lehar (2004)
on a regulatory framework.
3.3.2 Restrictiveness of the VaR Restriction
Given a regulation policy (α, n), the restrictiveness of the VaR restriction is
characterized by two specific nominal debt levels: (i) by the transition point ~F where
the restricted solution first becomes effectively restrictive and (ii) by the (maximum)
debt capacity Fˆ , the highest level of nominal F that the banking system is able to
maintain, given fixed initial value of equity.
Remark. There are two laterally reversed variables of interest, W b0 and F , see
also the feasibility constraint (3.17). The question of the maximal feasible nominal
debt level F is equivalent to the minimal initial equity capital W b0 or the maximal
nominal leverage F/W b0 . For expositional reasons, we vary the nominal debt level
F . All conclusions are analogous if one picks one of the other variables.
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When F = 0, the VaR restriction is obviously non-restrictive and yb = yi = yu.
Furthermore, comparative statics in the previous section shows that y′b(F ) ≥ y′i(F ) >
0, where the equality holds if the VaR restriction is not binding. Consequently, once
VaR is first binding, it is binding from than on, when increasing the nominal debt
level F .
The transition point ~y, where the restricted solution changes from being effectively
unrestricted to being restricted, can be characterized by
~y =
u′(W )
hζ
.
By inserting into the budget equation W it (~y)|t=0 = W b0 and solving for F , on obtains
the analytical solution to the transition nominal ~F .
The maximum debt capacity Fˆ can be characterized by evaluating the feasibility
condition for the solution and solving for F ,
Fˆ = erTW b0
β + λ(1− β)
ψ(n)Φ(d2(ζ(α))) · β + λ(1− β)
, (3.23)
where ψ(n) is defined in equation (3.15). Note that ~F ≤ Fˆ , where equality holds in
the non-generic cases α = 1, n = 0, or λ = 0. It is in these cases that the restricted
problem is in fact equivalent to the unrestricted for all F .
Figure 3.6 shows the type of solutions: Region A, where the VaR restriction is not
binding, corresponds to 0 ≤ F ≤ ~F , and Region B, where the effectively restricted
solution is obtained, to ~F < F < Fˆ .
Regulation
Panel 1 of Figure 3.6 depicts the type of solution in terms of the VaR probability α.
Debt capacity in the unrestricted banking sector is Fˆ (α = 1, n = 0) = erTW b0
1
hλ
=
63.75 and with maximal regulation Fˆ (α = 0, n = β) = erTW b0
1−β
β
= 15.65.
Since region B is generically non-empty, i.e. 0 < ~F < Fˆ , the banking system will
actively manage its portfolios in order to comply with the VaR restriction. Whether
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Figure 3.6: Restrictiveness of the VaR Restriction
This figure shows the type of solutions if varying the regulation instrument α (Panel 1)
or the costs fraction λ (Panel 2) together with the nominal debt level F . In region A,
the VaR restriction is not active, whereas in region B, the VaR restriction is binding.
The transition nominal ~F separates Region A (non active / effectively unrestricted)
from Region B (active / effectively restricted). Fˆ b and Fˆ i are the debt capacities
of the restricted banking sector b and of the unrestricted financial intermediary i,
respectively. All other parameters are as defined in the standard parameter set in
Table 3.2.
the banking sector reacts to the introduction or a change in regulation depends on
the nominal debt level F . Furthermore, stricter regulatory policy (n, α) reduces the
transition nominal, ~F ′(α) > 0, ~F ′(n) < 0; the banking system reacts earlier.
If financial stability is measured by the maximum debt capacity Fˆ of the banking
system, regulation is effective in reducing the maximum exposure, in our numerical
example from (i) : 63.75→ (b) : 18.26.
Remark. The results with respect to the capital adequacy restriction n is similar,
see the Appendix.
The Underlying Economic Structure
Panel 2 of Figure 3.6 depicts the type of solution in terms of the costs λ.
The cost fraction λ weakens the debt capacity Fˆ , irrespective of being restricted,
Fˆ b, or not, Fˆ i, as the aggregate banking sector expects more losses to come. Recall
that the fraction of ’total’ costs due to a financial system in distress, which are
transmitted to the equity position of the banking system itself, depends crucially on
the degree of connectivity within the banking sector. The result states that (rational)
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agents are willing to extend less credit in aggregate to a financial system with a large
interbank market. This contrasts with an argument, where a financial system is able
to maintain more debt, because losses will be (effectively) more diversified across
banks within the financial system.
Regulation further abates the ability of the economy to leverage up, Fˆ b < Fˆ i as it
entails ancillary capital provisions.
The effect of costs on the transition nominal ~F is ambiguous. When increasing costs
at a low level of λ, the transition point ~F (usually) declines, as the VaR retention
level W is positively related to the costs fraction λ and thus the VaR restriction is
binding earlier.
On the other side, costs increase wealth in distress, I(hybξT )|{ξT>ζ}, and thereby
VaR is less restraining. Since ~F grows at high costs, the second effect dominates the
first effects.
The fraction of costs, where the derivative d~F/dλ changes sign, also relies on risk
aversion. If risk aversion is very high, in our numerical example γ ≥ 97.14, the
second wealth effect always dominates, d~F/dλ < 0 for all feasible parameters of
regulation (n, α).
Remark. With regard to the parameter of heterogeneity β, the arguments concerning
~F are similar.
The debt capacity Fˆ i of the unregulated financial intermediary i is lowered. However,
in the regulated economy b the sign of Fˆ ′b(β) is determined by a complex relation
between the parameters α, n, λ and β itself; hence neither ~F nor Fˆ b is monotonous
in the degree of heterogeneity β.
With these results in view, the ’effectiveness’ of regulation, when measured by the
ability to change the decision of the banking system, depends non-monotonously
on the underlying economic structure (λ, β). As we directly model the aggregate
banking sector, our model is subject to the Lucas (1976) Critique. If regulation in
fact affects also the underlying structure, like the size of the interbank markets or
the business model of banks, the previous analysis shows that the (net) impact of
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Figure 3.7: VaR Induced Difference in Optimal Solution
This figure shows the VaR induced changes in equity capital in Region A by displaying
equity capital with VaR, W bT (y
b) (solid line), and equity capital of the financial
intermediary using the same tightness of the budget constraint as the regulated banking
sector, W iT (y
b) (dotted line). The parameters are as defined in the standard set in
Table 3.2.
regulation is hard to predict, even within this simple economy.
3.3.3 VaR-induced Capital Provision
This section quantifies how much equity capital the banking system has to provide
purely due to the VaR regulation. Figure 3.7 plots the terminal equity wealthW bT (y
b)
over the scaled state prices ξT/ξ0 as a solid line. The dotted line corresponds to
W iT (y
b). It differs from the regulated banking sector W bT (y
b) only in those states
that are affected by VaR, namely ξT ∈ (ζ, ζ).
Accordingly, W i0(y
b) is the initial equity capital needed to implement an unregulated
portfolio strategy with a terminal equity position that coincides in all states but
those directly attributable to the VaR restriction, see Region A.
Our measure of capital provision due to VaR is
CP =
W b0 −W i0(yb)
W b0
. (3.24)
The normalization by the initial wealth W b0 to a proportion of equity capital makes
CP comparable in size to a capital requirement, based however on equity capital.
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Figure 3.8: VaR Induced Capital Provisions
This figure shows the (relative) capital provision CP of the banking sector. Panel
1 graphs provisioning with respect to the regulatory parameter α. The solid line
represents the standard case (F = 7, n = 13.3%) , whereas the dashed line the case of
(F = 11, n = 13.3%) and the dotted-dashes the case of (F = 11, n = 10%). Panel 1
displays the capital provisioning with respect to the costs share λ. All other parameters
are as defined in the standard set in Table 3.2.
Because W iT (y
b) captures all the equity capital that a rational agent provides due
to debt financing, CP can also be interpreted as (relative) excess capital to cover
’unexpected losses’.
Figure 3.8 shows (relative) capital provisions CP for two nominal debt levels F and
two Cooke ratios n, depending on the regulatory control α in Panel 1 and depending
on the cost fraction λ in Panel 2.
Regulation
With a stricter regulation policy, the aggregate banking system’s capital provisions
(progressively) rise due to regulation. Even though it seems tautological, this result
is not directly obvious, as regulation restricts equity capital to be less than nV0
and less than nVT with probability α. However, CP is different from the capital
requirement n, as it measure the restrictiveness of the VaR restriction in terms of
initial equity. Conditioning on some regulatory policy, capital provision CP may be
higher or lower than the capital requirement n, depending on nominal debt F , as
can be seen in Figure 3.8, Panel 1.
There is an upper bound ĈP in risk provision, when (α = 0%, n = β), where debt is
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risk-free. In our numerical example, maximal risk provision will be (ĈP (F = 7) =
5.62%, ĈP (F = 11) = 39.11%).
Furthermore, given an arbitrary regulation, CP is increasing in the nominal debt
level F . Governing excess capital provisions of the banking system by means of a
capital adequacy requirement without having control over nominal debt levels F
turns out to be futile within this model framework.
Structural Parameters
Panel 2 of Figure 3.8 plots the capital provisions in dependence of the costs λ. It
further underlines the result from the previous subsection that the ’effectiveness’ of
regulation non-monotonously relies on the underlying economic structure.
For low costs λ, the VaR-regulated banking system increases capital provisions in
order to finance an increased retention level W . For high costs, the impact of λ on
W is almost negligible, whereas raised costs increase the wealth in distress of the
unrestricted intermediary (as a direct effect, not through the budget constraint),
which lessens the capital provisions.
3.3.4 The Impact of Regulation on Debt Markets
In this section, three standard variables of interest in debt markets - (i) the
probability of distress, (ii) recovery rates, and (iii) spreads - are discussed.
However, as recovery rates and spreads are calculated with aggregated quantities
of the banking system, they should be interpreted rather as indicators than as true
market variables.
Probability of Distress
The (conditional) probability of distress PDt is defined as
PDt = Pt[DT < F ] = Φ ( −d0 (ζ∗) ) where ζ∗ =
u′
(
β
1−βF
)
hyb
< 0 . (3.25)
The definition of ζ∗ is repeated to show that it neither depends on α nor on n. The
impact of regulation is only indirectly through the repercussion of wealth transfers at
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Figure 3.9: Initial Probability of Default and Yield Spread
This figure shows the probability of distress in the banking system PD0 (Panel 1) and
the yield spread s0 (Panel 2) as function of the Cooke ratio n. Both are illustrated
for three different levels of VaR probabilities, α = 10% (dotted dashed line), α = 1%
(solid line), and α = 0.1% (dashed line). The probability of distress of the unrestricted
financial intermediary is 19.1% and the yield spread 226 bp p.a. All other parameters
are as defined in the standard set in Table 3.2.
time T wherby the probability of distress enlarges. Figure 3.9, Panel 1, quantifies the
results regarding the initial probability of distress PD0 using the standard parameter
set. Clearly both regulatory instruments (α, n) increase the probability of distress.
Figure 3.10 shows the difference between the conditional probability of distress
under the risk-neutral measure Q and the real one P. The dotted line displays
the unregulated financial intermediary i, and the solid line the regulated banking
system b.
When the economic situation turns out to be very ’good’, ξt → 0, the chance of
distress approaches zero. Using a sloppy formulation, there is no need for a change
of measure. The analogous argument holds for the opposite case, where distress is
almost sure when ξt →∞.
In between, the risk neutral PDQt is, consistent with risk aversion, strictly greater
than the real probability measure PDPt , with a peak at ξt = e
−r(T−t)ζ∗; empirically,
Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) document similar results using an options data
set. When the economic situation is worsening from ’boom’, prices reflect a fast-
increasing risk aversion with respect to defaults, as the difference in probability of
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Figure 3.10: Probability of Distress: Change of Measure
This figure shows the difference between the probability of distress under the risk-
neutral measure and the real one, PDQt − PDPt , dependent on the scaled state prices
ξt/ξ0 at time t = 4. The solid line displays the regulated banking system b, whereas
the dotted line the unregulated financial intermediary i. The parameters are as defined
in the standard set in Table 3.2.
distress exhibits a large slope with respect to the state prices. In contrast, when the
economy recovers from ’bust’, the implicit risk aversion is more inert than otherwise.
Coudert and Gex (2008) empirically find a similar result. The graph also illustrates
that regulation shifts the change of measure to the right.
Recovery Rates
The recovery rates in this model are
RT =
DT
F
.
As DT is a function of state prices ξT , the recovery rate itself is stochastic. It
ranges between 1 in case of no distress and the minimum recovery rate, given by
Rˇ = h(1−β)λ
β
.
Furthermore, the expected recovery rate is
Rt = E
P
t [RT ] , (3.26)
where the expectation is under the real-world measure P.
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Figure 3.11: Recovery Rates
This figure shows the expected recovery rates, Rt, dependent on the scaled state prices
ξt/ξ0 at time t = 4. The solid line displays the regulated banking system b, whereas
the dotted line the unregulated financial intermediary i. For reference, the dashed line
represents the state depended recovery rates of the baking system RbT . The parameters
are as defined in the standard set in Table 3.2.
Figure 3.11 shows the recovery rate RT (dashed line) and the expected recovery, Rt,
depending on the scaled state prices, ξT/ξ0, respectively ξt/ξ0.
The model endogenously determines the state-dependent recovery rates, irrespective
of using a regulated or unregulated financial system. State-dependent recovery
rates are opposed to the ’standard’ assumption in the credit risk literature, where a
constant recovery rate is usually a modeling assumption, see Jokivuolle et al. (2003)
and Schuermann (2004) for a discussion of this point with regard to advanced IRB
approach in Basel II. Our model predicts that the recovery rates are in fact lower in
economically worse times; Altman et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2003) empirically
underline the same result.
Regarding regulation, the effects are twofold: on the one hand, there is a higher
recovery rate in those states that are now better insured, i.e. in the crisis retention
region ζ < ξT ≤ ζ; on the other hand, the recovery rate is lowered by the indirect
wealth transfers at time T , as represented by the higher Lagrange multiplier y, i.e.
lower recovery rates in the regions ζ∗ < ξT < ζ and ξT > ζ.
Time to maturity quickly smooths out the kinks and the jump of the terminal
recovery rates RT . The expected recovery rates are strictly decreasing in state
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prices, starting at 1 and also approximating Rˇ in economically ’bad’ times.
Yield Spread
The (conditional) yield spread
st =
log
(
F
Dt
)
T − t − r =
log
(
F
EQt [e
−r(T−t)DT ]
)
T − t − r =
logRQt
T − t (3.27)
is a transformation of the expected recovery rate under Q.
The yield spread falls with stricter regulation, as displayed in the Panel 2 of Figure
3.9. Since, at regulation level (α = 0%, n = β), the debt is risk-free, the yield spread
will be s0 = 0.
Summarizing the impact on a hypothetical debt market, one can state that
regulation puts debt holders of the banking system at time t = 0 in a better position,
when measured by the spread, however worse off when the probability of distress is
in view.
At maturity, t = T , the question of whether debt holders are better off or worse,
depends on the economic development: they are negatively affected by regulation
in crisis and at the beginning of distress, ζ∗ < ξT < ζ, however, they are negatively
affected in between.
3.3.5 Implied Risk Aversion of the Banking System
The aim of this subsection is to show the impact of regulation on the portfolio
decision of the banking system b, relative to an unregulated financial system i.
Since the portfolio decision is in the general case not univariate, an indirect approach
is chosen. We first define an univariate measure, the implied risk aversion of an agent,
by relating its portfolio decision with a hypothetical risk aversion, which results in
the same portfolio decision. The ratio of the implied risk aversion of the banking
sector to the one of the unregulated financial system maps the incentives given by
regulation into a relative change of risk aversion derived from the portfolio.
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The Definition of Implied Risk Aversion
The optimal portfolio decision of the unrestricted investor u, which is identical to
the portfolio of the mutual fund G in the decomposition (3.20), is
θut =
1
γ
µt − r
σ2t
=
1
γσt
κ.
Imagine that an investor n chooses a possibly state- and time-dependent multiple
of the mutual fund G, namely qnθu; his instantaneous portfolio choice would be
the same as if he were an unrestricted investor with an instantaneous relative risk
aversion coefficient at time t of γ/qnt . This inspires the definition of an implied risk
aversion qn. If qn < 1 the portfolio choice is like the one of a more risk-averse agent,
whereas qn > 1 relates to less risk aversion, than the unrestricted investor. Note
that relative risk aversion is univariate even in a case with multiple assets.
The Definition of Implied Relative Risk Aversion
The implied relative risk aversion is defined as,
IRRAt =
qbt
qit
(3.28)
where qnt , n ∈ {i, b}, represents the time t load of the unrestricted investor i and the
banking system b to the mutual fund portfolio of the unrestricted investor θu. Here,
the riskiness of the portfolio of the banking system is normalized to the one of the
unrestricted banking system i. Thus, IRRAt measures the proportional change
in implied risk aversion relative to the equivalent unrestricted banking system,
when the regulated banking system behaves less riskily than the unregulated one,
IRRAt < 1, and vice versa.
The Portfolio Choice of the Unregulated and Regulated Financial
Sector
The portfolio of any wealth process can be derived by applying Ito’s lemma to the
respective time t fair value V n and equating diffusionary parts with the budget
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dynamics in equation (3.2),
∂V nt
∂ξ
(−κξt) = V nt θnt σt
= V nt q
n
t θ
u
t σt = V
n
t q
n
t
1
γ
κ
qnt = −γ
∂V n
V n
∂ξ
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣
(ξt,t)
,
where, in the second line, first the definition of implied risk aversion is substituted
and afterwards the optimal portfolio decision of the unrestricted investor θu as in
equation (3.28). Hence, implied risk aversion qn is proportional to the sensitivity of
the portfolio value V n with respect to the state price ξ.
When applied to the total assets of the regulated banking system V b (resp. to V i),
the implied risk aversion amounts to
qbt = 1︸︷︷︸
(i)
(3.29)
−e−r(T−t)W∗
V bt
(
(1− β)
β
+
(
Φ (−d2(ζ∗))− hΦ (−d2(ζ∗))
) )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
−e−r(T−t)h
β
W
V bt
(
Φ
(−d2(ζ)))− Φ (−d2(ζ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
+e−r(T−t)
h
β
J
V bt
γ
κ
√
T − tφ
(−d2(ζ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iv)
.
It can be decomposed into four parts:
(i) the unrestricted portfolio part,
(ii) the replication strategy, which insures the retention level to distress W∗,
(iii) the replication strategy, which that generates the minimum wealth required
to comply with VaR level W , and
(iv) the replication strategy, which results in the jump J at the VaR boundary ζ,
which similar to the dynamic duplication of a binary option.
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Figure 3.12: Implied Risk Aversion of the Financial Sector
Panel 1 of this figure shows the implied risk aversion of the restricted banking system,
qbt , as a solid line, and of the unrestricted financial intermediary, q
i
t, as a dotted
line. Panel 2 displays the implied relative risk aversion qbt/q
i
t. The parameters are as
defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2 and t = 4.5.
The portfolio multiple qi of the unrestricted banking system comprises only the
parts (i) + (ii). Accordingly, (iii) + (iv) are attributable to the impact of VaR
regulation.
Implied Risk Aversion of the Financial Sector
Figure 3.12, Panel 1 shows the principal structure qi (dotted line) and qb (solid
line) as a function of the scaled state prices ξt/ξ0. The implied risk aversion of the
unrestricted financial intermediary qi can be shown to lie within the unit interval,
i.e. total assets V i of the intermediated financial system are less risky than the
wealth of the unrestricted agent W u, when the respective portfolio strategies are
compared.
The structural form can be explained by using the identity σV,nt V
n
t = σ
W,n
t W
n
t +
σD,nt D
n
t , n ∈ {i, b}. First, the behaviour at the boundaries ξt → 0 and ξt → ∞ is
described for the case of a financial intermediary with no regulation. Following this,
the intermediate behaviour is motivated. Afterwards, the previous arguments are
carried over to the case of the regulated banking sector.
When times are ’really good’, i.e. ξt → 0, the total assets V it of the unregulated
financial intermediary i are very high, hence debt is almost riskless, σD,it ' 0, and
equity participates almost one-to-one in changes in the mean variance portfolio, i.e.
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σW,it ' σut . Consequently, qit ' W it /V it holds.
On the other hand, if times are ’really bad’, i.e. ξt → ∞, V it slowly approaches
Vˇ in equation (3.5) from above in the style of a portfolio insurance strategy, thus
σV,it ' 0, or qit → 0.
In between, the properties of terminal asset value pertain. Total assets of the
unregulated financial intermediary V iT are continuously decreasing in ξT , have two
kinks at ζ∗ and ζ∗, and are linear in I(·) otherwise. Accordingly, at any time t the
sensitivity is in (0, 1) by the smoothing property of this type of dynamic problems.
The kinks cause the single downward hump.
In the case of the VaR regulated banking sector b, the limits with respect to ’good’
or ’bad’ times of the portfolio multiple of the restricted banking system qb do not
change by the same arguments as presented above, namely qbt → W bt /V bt as ξt → 0
and qbt → 0 as ξt →∞.
In the states between those two extremes, the optimal time T profile V bT has two
retention levels, h
β
W∗ and hβW , and a jump of size
h
β
J at the VaR boundary ζ.
The second retention level results in another downward hump, whereas the jump
effectuates the upward hump at approximately ζ; this is due to the part (iv) in
equation (3.29) and is more pronounced depending on the jump size J and time to
maturity T − t.
In the aggregate case, the costs due to an unregulated financial system i under
distress, ξt > ζ
∗, spread via the interbank market through the system and are
in part absorbed by equity capital, not only by debt holders. As managers
rationally incorporate this, there is a considerable risk reduction relative to an un-
intermediated economy, i.e. relative to the unrestricted investor u with portfolio
θut =
1
γσt
κ, as qit < 1.
When additionally introducing regulation of the financial system, the same argument
still holds; however, the VaR restriction substantially increases the implied risk
aversion in the proximity of the VaR boundary ζ, i.e. banks follow riskier policies
under regulation. Gonza´lez (2005) documents in a study covering 36 countries that
stricter regulation in fact increases the risk taking of banks.
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Figure 3.13: Level Curves of Implied Relative Risk Aversion
This figure shows in Panel 1 the level curves of the IRRA coefficient over the state
space (ξ, t). The dashed lines localize the 1% and 50% quantiles. Panel 2 is identical
to Panel 2 in Figure 3.12 with interchanged coordinates; it is the cut through the state
space at time t = 4.5, represented by the dotted line in Panel 1. Parameters are as
defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
Changes in the Risk Attitude due to Regulation
The resulting implied relative risk aversion as a function of the state price, IRRA(ξt)
is displayed in Figure 3.12, Panel 2. It has the following structure which is
qualitatively stable over time: it starts at 1, has a S-shaped curve, first downwards,
then upwards, and eventually converges to unity again. As a reference point, Panel
2 in Figure 3.13 as well as Panel 2 in Figure 3.14 are the same graph, albeit with
interchanged coordinates.
Panel 1 of Figure 3.13 is the contour plot of the IRRA coefficients. It shows for
each time and state (t, ξt) the level of the IRRA coefficient. Panel 2 is the cut at
time t = 4.5.
Both regions IRRA 1 and IRRA 1 disperse in time and states; time smooths
the impact of the VaR restriction and the humps in the ξt cut of the IRRA level
plot become less incisive, as time to maturity is further away.
As the IRRA coefficient can be considerably greater than one, the banking
system takes much more risk relative to being unrestricted under some specific
circumstances. This behaviour can be attributed to the characteristic of the VaR
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measure that it limits losses by their probability, yet, the level of losses beyond
the limit is not relevant for the measure. When VaR is not only used as a passive
risk measure for risk, but used actively to manage the risk of the banking sector,
there is an incentive to transfer losses beyond the 1% quantile, that is, into the
crisis states. Within the model framework, two sources ameliorate this incentive,
increasing marginal utility for decreasing wealth and the additional proportional
costs to equity.
The circumstances, in which the banking system behaves in such a way are fairly
special. The upper dashed line presents the (running) 1% quantile of the economy
starting at ξ0, whereas the lower dashed line shows the median state. In most states
of the world, there is almost no effect, as IRRA ' 1 below the median, or a risk
reduction, as almost all IRRA coefficients below the 1% quantile are less than 1.
Even though risk taking is improbable, it happens just at the moment when the
economy is already in trouble, that is, where the marginal utility of the representative
agent ξ is already very high. Furthermore, the level plot in Figure 3.13 shows,
especially for short VaR horizons that there is almost no ’separating’ area IRRA ' 1
in between the two regions IRRA  1 and IRRA  1. The behaviour of risk
taking, both in absolute and relative terms, will be very sensitive to changes in the
underlying economic variables in these cases.
Changes in Regulation
Figure 3.14 illustrates that, if the banking sector is regulated more strictly, two
effects appear: first, the point where the banking sector becomes riskier than the
unregulated intermediary slightly decreases to ’better’ states. Second, the risk
exposure is increased. Both effects are not desirable from the viewpoint of regulation.
Especially when crisis is already ahead, regulation is implicitly an incentive for
increased risk taking. Even worse, the more regulation, the increasing more risk
loading, relative to an unrestricted financial intermediary.
Remark. If not stated otherwise, the results in this subsection are not proven in
a rigorous way, as the formulae are too complex to determine signs of derivatives.
However, well known results from hedging binary options suggest that the stated
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Figure 3.14: Impact of Regulation on Implied Relative Risk Aversion
This figure shows in Panel 1 the level of the IRRA coefficient for various (ξt, n)
combinations at time t = 4.5. Panel 2 is identical to Panel 2 in Figure 3.12 with
interchanged coordinates; it is the cut at n = 13 1/3%, represented by the dotted line
in Panel 1. All other parameters are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table
3.2.
arguments are not subject to the specific parameter set used as an example.
Remark 5. Relating to Remark 2 on p. 36 an alternative interpretation can be
used. In an economy of the Cox et al. (1985a) type, equilibrium is not in the form
of prices, but in the form of the quantity attributed to the real production economy
with a risk-less and a risky investment opportunity. Then, Figure 3.13 implies that
a stricter regulation may increase volatility of aggregate production relative to an
unregulated economy and thereby generates an additional potential for amplifying
economic cycles.
Changes in the Underlying Structure
Figure 3.15 shows the impact of costs λ (Panel 1) and heterogeneity β (Panel 2) on
the implied risk aversion q.
In the case of an unrestricted financial intermediary i, the costs fraction λ decreases
the overall level of implied risk aversion qi, as the agent is more sensitive to tail risk,
namely dh
dλ
< 0. Obviously, the same is also valid for the restricted banking system
b. The implied relative risk aversion IRRA depends heavily on the jump size J ,
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Figure 3.15: Impact of Costs and Heterogeneity on Implied Risk Aversion
This figure shows the impact of the costs to the banking sector and the heterogeneity
on the implied risk aversion; Panel 1 illustrates the impact of a change in the costs
fraction from λ = 5.3% to λ = 15%, Panel 2 of the heterogeneity parameter β =
14.1% to β = 15%. Both panels contain four lines: (i) for the unrestricted financial
intermediary i (dotted line, S shaped) and (ii) for the restricted banking sector b (solid
line, double S shaped) with the standard parameterizations. (iii) for the unrestricted
financial intermediary i (dotted-dashed line, S shaped) and (iv) for the restricted
banking sector b (dashed line, double S shaped) with the alternative parametrization.
All other parameters are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
which is raised on the one hand due to the increase in W , whereas the jump size is
lowered by the impact on h. In relative terms, it is not clear which effect dominates.
Regarding heterogeneity β, it has no level effect in contrast to the costs λ. It shifts
the ’hump’ of the unrestricted financial intermediary into lower state prices, that
is, into better economic situations. In the numerical example, it flattens out the
second hump from the VaR restriction of the banking system. Nevertheless, one can
construct (extreme) parameter constellations, where there exists the opposite effect
of increasing IRRA coefficients.
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3.4 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.4.1 Proof of the Optimal Solution
The proof is structured into two parts. In Part 1, a similar problem is solved, where
the VaR restriction (3.8) is replaced by
P[WT ≥ W ] ≥ (1− α).
Part 1 is subdivided into three sections: Part 1.0 discusses some trivial subcases,
Part 1.1 is the main proof, Part 1.2 outlines the boundary cases, which are formally
not included in the main proof.
Finally, Part 2 reformulates the former problem back to the original one.
Since only the banking sector b is of relevance, we abstract from using the index b
in the following.
Part 1.0:
If F = 0, the solution of the problem is known to be WT = W
v
T as in equation (9) of
Basak and Shapiro (2001). Similarly, if α = 1, the VaR restriction is never binding
and we recover the unrestricted solution with debt WT = W
i
T as in equation (5) of
Basak and Shapiro (2005). Therefore, we assume in the following parts (F > 0, α ∈
[0, 1)).
Part 1.1: Assume W < β
1−βF and α ∈ (0, 1).
Define WT as in equation (3.12) on p. 71. If P[WT ≥ W ] < α, then, by definition,
ζ < ζ and, hence, the VaR restriction is not binding; the solution is WT = W
i
T ,
which is the optimal unrestricted solution, following the arguments presented in
Basak and Shapiro (2005).
Otherwise, P[WT ≥ W ] = α and thus ζ ≥ ζ holds. If ζ = ζ, the VaR restriction is
effectively not binding and the unrestricted solution W iT is obtained. Since h ∈ (0, 1),
ζ∗ = hζ∗ < ζ∗, and since W < W∗, ζ =
u′(W )
hy
> u
′(W∗)
hy
= ζ∗ holds. This case
corresponds a (mesh) structure ζ∗ < ζ∗ < ζ < ζ and is the one, where the VaR
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restriction is effectively binding.
Lemma 1: Pointwise, for all ξT , the optimal solution is
V ∗T = (I(yξT ) + F )1{ξT<ζ∗}) +
h
β
(I(hyξT ) + λF )(1{ζ∗≤ξT<ζ} + 1{ξT≥ζ})
1
1− βF1{ζ∗≤ξT<ζ∗} +
h
β
(W + λF )1{ζ≤ξT<ζ}
= arg max
V
u
(
V −D(V )− C(V ))− yξT (V −D(V ))+ y21{W (V )≥W}
= arg max
V
L(V ) , (3.30)
where
D(V ) = F 1{(1−β)V≥F} + 1{(1−β)V <F}
(
(1− β)V )
C(V ) = 0 1{(1−β)V≥F} + 1{(1−β)V <F}
(
λ(F −D(V ))
W (V ) = (V − F ) 1{(1−β)V≥F} + 1{(1−β)V <F}
(
βV + λ((1− β)V − F ))
y2 =
(
u
( h
β
(I(hyζ) + λF ) )− yζ( h
β
(I(hyζ) + λF ) ))
−
(
u
( W
1− β
)− yζ W
1− β
)
and all other variables as in equation (3.12).
Proof: The function L(V ) is not concave in V , but can exhibit two ’inner’ maxima
{i1, i2} and two ’boundary’ maxima {b1, b2} only at
Vi1 = I(yξT ) + F, if (1− β)V1 ≥ F ;
Vi2 =
h
β
(I(hyξT ) + λF ), if (1− β)V2 < F ;
Vb1 =
1
1−βF,
Vb2 =
h
β
(W + λF ) .
(3.31)
Let us define the Lagrange functions
L1(V, ξ) = u ((V − F ))− yξ(V − F ) + y21{(V−F )≥W} if (1− β)V ≥ F
L2(V, ξ) = u
(
β
h
V − λF
)
− yξβV + y21{β
h
V−λF≥W} if (1− β)V < F .
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Then the global maximimizer is
V ∗(ξT ) = arg max
V
{L1(Vi1, ξT ),L2(Vi2, ξT ),L1(Vb1, ξT ),L2(Vb2, ξT )} (3.32)
over the respective state space mesh ζ∗ < ζ∗ < ζ < ζ, corresponding to the
different regions. By assumption it is in any region true that Vi2 > Vi1 and
Vb1 > Vb2.
Region 1, ξT < ζ∗: In this region we have Vi1 > Vb1 > Vb2 and Vb1 − F > W .
By the arguments presented in Basak and Shapiro (2005) equation (A.3),
L1(Vi1, ξT ) > L1(Vb1, ξT ) = sup{V >F/(1−β)} L2(V, ξT ). Finally, we compare
L1(Vi1, ξT ) and L2(Vb2, ξT ). Let us define
a = (u(I(yξT ))− yξTI(yξT ))− (u(W )− yξTW )
> 0 if W < I(yξT )
b = (L1(Vi1, ξT )− L2(Vb2, ξT ))− a
= yξT ((h− 1)W + Fhλ)
≥ 0 if W ≤ β
1− βF.
Hence,
0 < a+ b = (L1(Vi1, ξT )− L2(Vb2, ξT ))
holds. Therefore, V ∗(ξT ) = I(yξT ) + F , respectively W ∗(ξT ) = I(yξT ), is the
optimal solution in this region.
Region 2, ζ∗ ≤ ζ < ζ∗: Following Basak and Shapiro (2005), equation (A.4),
L1(Vb1, ξT ) > L2(Vi2, ξT ) and L1(Vb1, ξT ) ≥ L1(Vi1, ξT ) is true. By the
properties of the convex conjugate, L2(Vi2, ξT ) > L2(Vb2, ξT ) holds. Thus,
V ∗(ξT ) = 1(1−β)F , respectively W
∗(ξT ) =
β
1−βF , is the optimal solution in this
region.
Region 3 : When ζ∗ ≤ ξT < ζ, then Vb1 ≥ Vi2 > Vb2 holds and the unrestricted
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order is L2(Vi2, ξT ) ≥ L2(Vb1, ξT ). Since βhVi2 − λF > W , we still have
L2(Vi2, ξT ) > L2(Vb2, ξT ). The optimal solution is V ∗(ξT ) = hβ (I(hyξT ) +λF ),
respectively W ∗(ξT ) = I(hyξT ).
Region 4 : Vb1 > Vb2 ≥ Vi2 holds, since ζ ≤ ξT < ζ. Also it is true that
L2(Vb2, ξT ) = u(I(hyζ))− hyζI(hyζ) + hyW (ζ − ξT )− hyξTλF
> u(I(hyξT ))− hyξTI(hyξT )− hyξTλF
= L2(Vi2, ξT ) ,
where the inequality follows from ξT < ζ, and, for all ξ > ζ,
∂
∂ξ
(
u(I(hyξ)− hyξI(hyξ) + hyWξ
)
= hy(W − I(hyξ) ≥ 0. (3.33)
Therefore, V ∗(ξT ) = hβ (W + λF ), respectively W
∗(ξT ) = W , is the optimal
solution in this region.
Region 5 : Finally, in region ζ ≤ ξT , the same arguments as in the previous
region apply, however, the inequality in equation (3.33) is reversed; thereby
we obtain the optimal solution V ∗(ξT ) = hβ (I(hyξT ) + λF ), respectively
W ∗(ξT ) = I(hyξT ).
y2 ≥ 0: Lastly,
y2 =
(
u(I(hyζ))−hyζI(hyζ)+hyWζ
)
−
(
u(I(hyζ))−hyζI(hyζ)+hyWζ
)
≥ 0 ,
by using equation (3.33).

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Let V (T ) be any candidate optimal solution satisfying the static budget constraint
(3.16) and the VaR restriction (3.8). Then we obtain
E[u(V ∗T −D(V ∗T )− C(V ∗T ))]− E[u(VT −D(VT )− C(VT ))]
= E[u(V ∗T −D(V ∗T )− C(V ∗T ))]− E[u(VT −D(VT )− C(VT ))]
−yξ0W0 + yξ0W0 − y2(1− α) + y2(1− α)
≥ (E[u(V ∗T −D(V ∗T )− C(V ∗T ))]− E[yξTV ∗T −D(V ∗T )] + E[y21{W (V ∗T )>W}]])
−(E[u(VT −D(VT )− C(VT ))]− E[yξTVT −D(VT )] + E[y21{W (VT )>W}]])
≥ 0 ,
where the former inequality follows from the static budget constraint and the VaR
restriction holding with equality for V ∗T , while holding with inequality for VT . The
latter inequality follows from Lemma 1. Thus, V ∗T is optimal and equivalently W
∗
T .
Finally, as the VaR constraint must hold with equality, the definition of ζ follows.
From the solution (3.12) it is clear that, except at the default retention level W∗ and
the VaR retention level W ,
∂W ∗T
∂y
< 0 holds.
Since W iT (y) = W
b(y;α = 1) ≤ W ∗T (y) and ∂W
∗
T
∂α
< 0, in order to allow the budget
constraint to hold with equality, we must have y ≥ yi ≥ yu. The last inequality is
from Basak and Shapiro (2005).
Analogously, since W v(y) = W b(y;F = 0) ≤ W ∗T (y) and ∂W
∗
T
∂F
> 0, in order to allow
the budget constraint to hold with equality, we must have y ≥ yv ≥ yu. The last
inequality is from Basak and Shapiro (2001). 
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Part 1.2: Boundary Cases
Case W < W∗ and α = 0: In this case ζ →
α→0
∞ and the last part of solution (3.12)
vanishes. It corresponds a modified portfolio insurance solution, as wealth WT ≥ W .
Also note, that this solution is continuous. The proof is analogous to the previous
one, however, by definition there is no Region 5.
Case W = W∗ and α ∈ (0, 1): In this case ζ∗ = ζ holds, hence, the unrestricted part
of the solution (3.12) between ζ∗ and ζ disappears. The default boundary is ζ, thus,
the probability of default equals the VaR probability α. The proof is analogous to
the previous one, however, by definition, there exists no Region 3.
Case W = W∗ and α = 0: This is the combined case of the former ones, ζ →
α→0
∞
and ζ∗ = ζ. In this case, there is no default, i.e. DT = F and the solution in terms
of wealth WT equals the portfolio insurance solution of Basak (1995). The proof is
analogous to the previous one, however, by definition there exits no Region 3 and
no Region 5.
There exist further cases as well. However, these are of no interest due to economic
reasons. If W > W∗, there is more insurance to equity holders than necessary to
protect debt; however, a part of the associated costs will be paid by debt holders.
As they do not benefit from this insurance, this solution cannot be sustained in a
rational equilibrium.
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Part 2:
Next we reformulate the VaR restriction of the former proof in such a way, that it
corresponds to the original problem.
P
[
WT
VT
≤ n
]
= P
[
WT
h
β
(WT + λF )
≤ n
]
if n < β
= P
[
WT ≥
(
hn(β − 1)λ
(hn− β)β
)
β
1− βF
]
if n <
β
h
= P
[
WT ≥ ψ(n) β
1− βF
]
= P [WT ≥ W ]
The condition n < β
n
is always fulfilled, since n < β in order to satisfy W < W∗.
Moreover, ψ(n) ∈ [0, 1], with ψ(0) = 0 and ψ(β) = 1.
The feasibility constraint can be derived by
D0
W0
≤ 1− β
β
,
since otherwise it is optimal to close down business as of today. Therefore, the
constraint reads, by letting y →∞,
W0 ≥ β
1− βE
[
ξT
ξ0
(
DT (W = W )1{ξT≤ζ} +DT (W = 0)1{ξT>ζ}
)]
(3.34)
=
ψ(n)β + λ(1− β)
β + λ(1− β)
β
1− βFE
[
ξT
ξ0
1{ξT≤ζ}
]
+
βλ
β + λ(1− β)FE
[
ξT
ξ0
1{ξT>ζ}
]

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3.4.2 Comparative Statics
As most variables of interest, sayH, depend on χ ∈ {α, n, λ, β, F}, but the multiplier
y as well, one can more easily determine signs by first calculating the derivatives
y′(χ), using the budget equation (3.16), B(y, χ) = ξ0W0 (under the assumption, that
we do not change the case), and afterwards the comparative static of the variable
of interest
d
dχ
H(y(χ), χ) =
∂H
∂y
y′(χ) +
∂H
∂χ
(3.35)
The standing assumptions used are:

F > 0
β ∈ (0, 1
2
)
λ ∈ (0, 1)
n < β
α ∈ (0, 1)
(3.36)
as well as
ψ(n) ∈ (0, 1)
h = β
β+λ(1−β) ∈ (0, 1) .
(3.37)
The derivation of the sign of a variable H has the following structure:
Step 1: Derive the impact of χ on the relevant variables W∗,W , ζ and h.
Step 2: If the analysis in Step 1 results in a monotone increase (monotone decrease)
of the optimal profile WT , i.e.
W ′∗ ≥ 0 ∧W ′ ≥ 0 ∧ ζ
′ ≥ 0 ∧ h′ ≤ 0 , (3.38)
(respectively all inequalities reversed), with at least one inequality holding as
equality, the budget in t = 0 is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing ) as well,
∂B(y,χ)
∂χ
> 0. If is is not possible fulfill one of the two condition, no general
conclusion about the change of the budget can be derived without further
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assumptions.
As the budget is strictly decreasing in y, ∂B(y,χ)
∂y
< 0, the sign of the derivative
y′(χ) can be determined, as the budget equation B(y, χ) = ξ0W0 must be
fulfilled as well.
Step 3: By using (3.35), the sign of the variables of interest H is (possibly)
determined.
The results are presented Table 3.3 on page 84.
Step 1 can be easily verified by checking the sign of derivatives of the respective
variables, using the stated assumptions (3.36) and (3.37). Step 2 is obtained by the
previous argument. For Step 3, the following characteristics are useful:
P[DT < F ] = P[ξT > ζ∗] with ζ∗(y, F ) =
u′( β
1−βF )
hy
P[WT < nVT ] = P[ξT > ζ]
I ′(x) = −I(x)
γx
< 0 (x > 0, γ > 0)
For further reference we need to show that y′b(F ) > y
′
i(F ) holds, if the VaR restriction
is binding:
h and ζ do not depend on F and dW
b∗
dF
= dW
i∗
dF
= β
1−β > 0. Furthermore,
dW
dF
=
ψ(n) β
1−β >
dW
i
dF
= 0 and
∂ζ
∂F
= −γζ
F
< 0 hold. Hence, region A in Figure 3.7 on
page 93 is increasing in F , while all partial effects are identical between i and b.
Consequently, y′b(F ) > y
′
i(F ).
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3.4.3 Deduction of Dynamic Wealth
This section shows how to derive the dynamic value of the optimal solution or one
of its transformations, given a constant interest rate r and a constant market price
of risk κ.
All solutions consist of two types of functional forms (i) W1 = I(yξT )1{ξT≤ζ}
(respectively I(yξT )1{ξT>ζ}) or (ii) W2 = K1{ξT>ζ} (respectively K1{ξT≤ζ}). By
knowing these, one can easily reproduce the given solutions. Note, that if W1 +W2
is continuous, it is equivalent to a portfolio insurance on the unrestricted wealth
with pay-off profile max{W u, K}.
Solutions for constant parts W = K 1{ξT>ζ}:
By arbitrage free pricing we obtain
ξtWt = Et[ξTWT ]
= Et[ξTK1{ξT>ζ}]
= KEt[ξT (1− 1{ξT≤ζ})]
= KEt[ξT1]−KEt[ξT1{ξT≤ζ})])
= Kξte
−r(T−t) −Kξte−r(T−t)Φ
(
d2(ξt, (T − t), ζ)
)
⇔
Wt = Ke−r(T−t)Φ
(− d2(ξt, (T − t), ζ)) , (3.39)
where the Φ is the standard normal distribution and d2 is given in equation (3.22)
on p. 86. The derivation of the expectation Et[ξT1{ξT≤ζ})] is similar to a Black and
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973b) framework, as
ln ξT | ln ξt ∼ N
(
ln ξt − (r + 1
2
κ2)(T − t), κ2(T − t)) .
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Solutions for unregulated-style parts W = I(yξT )1{ξT≤ζ}:
By arbitrage free pricing we obtain
ξtWt = Et[ξTWT ]
= Et[ξTI(yξT )1{ξT≤ζ}]
= I(y)Et[ξTI(ξT )1{ξT≤ζ}]
= I(y)Et[ξ(−
1
γ
+1)
T 1{ξT≤ζ})])
= I(y)ξ(−
1
γ
+1)
T a(T − t)Φ
(
d1(ξt, (T − t), ζ)
)
⇔
Wt = I(yξt)a(T − t)Φ
(
d1(ξt, (T − t), ζ)
)
. (3.40)
The derivation of the conditional expectation Et[ξ
(− 1
γ
+1)
T 1{ξT≤ζ})] is similar to a
modified Black and Scholes (1973) framework, as
ln ξcT | ln ξct ∼ N
(
c ln ξt − (r + 1
2
κ2)(T − t), c2κ2(T − t)) c ∈ (−∞, 1).
The time-dependent factor a captures the relative prudence effect on portfolios. In
case of γ = 1, a = 1 and we recover the well known Black and Scholes (1973)
formula.
The Portfolio Insurance
W1 +W2 = I(yξt)a(T − t)Φ
(
d1(ξt, (T − t), ζ)
)
+Ke−r
(T−t)Φ
(− d2(ξt, (T − t)ζ))
= I(yξt)a(T − t)
(
1− Φ(− d1(ξt, (T − t), ζ))
+Ke−r
(T−t)Φ
(− d2(ξt, (T − t)ζ)))
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Value of Debt and Total Value
Analogously, one can construct the debt value
Dt = e
−r(T−t)F (1− hΦ (−d2(ζ∗)))
+e−r(T−t) h
β
(1− β)W (Φ (−d2(ζ))− Φ (−d2(ζ)))
h
β
(1− β)a(T − t)I(hyξ0)
(
Φ (−d1(ζ∗)) + Φ
(−d1(ζ))− Φ (−d1(ζ)))
and the value of total assets
Vt = A(T − t)I(yξt) + a(T − t)I(yξt)
∗
(
(Φ(−d1(ζ∗)) + Φ(−d1(ζ))− Φ(−d1(ζ)))h
γ−1
γ
β
− Φ(−d1(ζ∗)) + 1
)
+
er(t−T )F (−Φ(−d2(ζ∗))β + β + hΦ(−d2(ζ∗))− 1)
β − 1
+
er(t−T )hW (Φ(−d2(ζ))− Φ(−d2(ζ)))
β
(3.41)
Useful Facts for Applications:
The most important partial derivatives used are
ζ∗(1,0)(y, F ) → −ζ
∗
y
ζ∗(0,1)(y, F ) → −γζ
∗
F
ζ(1,0)(y, F ) → −ζ
y
ζ(0,1)(y, F ) → −γζ
F
ζ¯ ′(α) → − e
rT
√
Tκζ¯2
ξ0φ
(−d2 (ξ0, T, ζ¯)) . (3.42)
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Lemma 2: For the function
H1(y, F ) =
e−rTFβ
1− β − C0(y, F ),
where C0 is the price of a call option on the underlying I(yξT ) with strike W ,
C0(y, F ) = I(yξ0)a(T ) (1− Φ (−d1(ζ∗))) + e
−rTFβΦ (−d2(ζ∗))
1− β ,
the following relation holds under the budget restriction
H1 < 0 , ∀(F, y(F )) . (3.43)
Proof: The function H1 is strictly increasing in F
H
(1,0)
1 (y, F )y
′(F ) +H(0,1)1 (y, F ) = (I(yξ0)a(T )(1− Φ(−d1(ζ∗))))
y′(F )
γy
+e−rT
β
1− β (1− Φ(−d2(ζ∗)))
> 0
and has the limits, as F → 0, H1(y(0), 0) = −a(T )I(yuξ0) < 0 and, as F → Fˆ ,
H1(y(Fˆ ), Fˆ ) = 0. Thus, H1 < 0 holds.

Lemma 3: For the function
H2(y, F ) = hβΦ(−d2(ζ∗))− βΦ(−d2(ζ∗)) + hβδ(Φ(−d2(ζ))− Φ(−d2(ζ)))
the following relation holds under the budget constraint
− erT (1− β)W0
F
< H2 < 0 ∀(F, y(F )) . (3.44)
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Proof: From the previous analysis, the property ∂W0(y,F )
∂F
> 0 is known. Inserting
H2 we obtain
∂W0(y, F )
∂F
= −H2 e
−rT
1− β > 0
hence, H2 < 0.
Furthermore, since y′(F ) = −∂W0(y,F )
∂F
/∂W0(y,F )
∂y
> 0, we obtain
y′(F ) = − H2yγ
H2F − erTW0(β − 1) > 0 .
Hence, H2 > − erTW0(1−β)F .

With these substitutions the partial derivatives of equity and debt value are
W0
(0,1)(y, F ) =
e−rTH2
β − 1 > 0
W0
(1,0)(y, F ) =
e−rTFH2
y(β − 1)γ −
W0
yγ
< 0 (3.45)
W0
(0,1)(y, α) =
Fhβζ¯ (ψ − ψ2)
(β − 1)ξ0 < 0
D0
(0,1)(y, F ) =
e−rT (H2 + β (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1))
β
> 0
D0
(1,0)(y, F ) =
(β − 1)H1
yβγ
− e
−rTF (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)
yγ
+
(1− β)W0(1,0)(y, F )
β
< 0
D0
(0,1)(y, α) = −Fhζ¯ (ψ − ψ2)
ξ0
< 0
y′(F ) = −W0
(0,1)(y, F )
W0(1,0)(y, F )
> 0 . (3.46)
In case D0
(1,0)(y, F ), the sign cannot be directly seen from the formula itself; it is
shown in the the derivation in equation (4.7) on p. 160. However, it can be also
easily deducted from the time T solution of the problem.
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3.4.4 Proofs of the Results in Partial Equilibrium
Restrictiveness
By evaluating the feasibility constraint (3.17), under the restriction W i0 = W
b
0 = W0,
we obtain the debt capacity
Fˆ i
(r,κ)
=
erTW0(β(1− λ) + λ)
βλ
and
Fˆ b =
W0(β − 1)(λβ − β − λ)
β(E[ ξT
ξ0
1{ξT≤ζ}]βψ(n)− βλ+ λ)
(r,κ)
= erTW0
(1− β)(β(λ− 1)− λ)
β((β − 1)λ− βψ(n)Φ(d2(ζ)))
Further properties of the debt capacity are
Fˆ b ∈ [e
rTW0(1− β)
β
, Fˆ i] ,
and
Fˆ i = Fˆ b(n = 0, α = 1)
= Fˆ b(n = 0) = Fˆ b(α = 1) = Fˆ b(λ = 0)
Fˆ ′b(n) < 0
Fˆ ′b(α) > 0
Fˆ b(n = β, α = 0) = e
rTW0(1−β)
β
,
in particular, Fˆ b < Fˆ i holds, unless n = 0 or α = 1, i.e. under no regulation.
The transition point (~F , ~y) is defined as the tuple, where the VaR starts to bind and
the budget equation is fulfilled, i.e. the solution of the system I(hyζ) = ψ(n)
β
1−βF
B(y, F ) = W0

The system can be successively solved for the solution.
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In order to show ~F < Fˆ b, we address the problem more generally. Let us define
y1 = u
′(W )/(hy); because (i) limF→0 y1 = ∞, y′1(F ) < 0, and limF→∞ y1 = 0,
and (ii) - with the previous results from the budget equation B(y, F ) = ξ0W b0 -
y(0) > 0, y′(F ) > 0, and limF→Fˆ y(F ) = ∞, there exists a unique solution to the
system (~y, ~F ). In particular, ~F < Fˆ b holds.
Capital Provisions
Because yb(F ) > yi(F ) for F > ~F ,
∂W i0
∂yi
< 0, and W i0 > Wˇ , we obtain
CP ∈ (1, 0) .
Define stricter regulation by χ ∈ {−α, n}. Then,
dCP
dχ
= −(W
i
0)
′(yb)
W i0︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
y′b(χ) > 0.
holds.
Using a simplified notation with
∂W i0
∂x
= W ix, we obtain the result for increasing
nominal debt
dCP
dF
= − 1
W i
(
W iyy
′
b(F ) +W
i
F
)
=
W iF
W i
((
−W
i
y
W iF
)
y′b(F )− 1
)
=
W iF
W i︸︷︷︸
>0
(
y′b(F )
y′i(F )
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 (F > ~F ) .
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Debt Markets
The comparative statics of the Probability of Distress is
dPDt
dα
=
dPt[DT < F ]
dα
=
dΦ (d0 (ζ
∗(y(α))))
dα
=
φ(−d0(ζ∗))√
T − tyκ y
′(α) < 0
dPDt
dn
=
dΦ (d0 (ζ
∗(y(n))))
dα
=
φ(−d0(ζ∗))√
T − tyκ y
′(n) > 0
dPDt
dF
=
dΦ (d0 (ζ
∗(y(F ), F )))
dα
=
φ(−d0(ζ∗))√
T − tyκ (yγ + Fy
′(F )) > 0
dPDt
dλ
=
dΦ (d0 (ζ
∗(y(λ))))
dα
=
φ(−d0(ζ∗))√
T − tyκ y
′(λ) < 0 .
For the spread s0, see equation (3.27), we obtain the analogous results.
ds0
dα
=
e(r+s0)Tβ(ψ − ψ2)ζ
(−H1erT (β − 1)− Fβ + FβΦ(−d2(ζ∗)))
T (H2F − erTW0(β − 1)) (β(λ− 1)− λ)ξ0 < 0
ds0
dF
=
1
F
(
1− Fβ(ψ − ψ2)ζ
(−H1erT (β − 1)− Fβ + FβΦ(−d2(ζ∗)))
(H2F − erTW0(β − 1)) (β(λ− 1)− λ)ξ0
)
> 0 .
Define the Change of Measure for the probability of distress by
∆PDt = PD
Q
t − PDPt = Φ (d2 (ζ∗(y)))− Φ (d0 (ζ∗(y))) .
The first order condition d∆PDt
dξ
= 0 shows, the maximum is attained at ξˆ(t) =
e−r(T−t)ζ∗. Furthermore,
d∆PDt|ξˆ(t)
dy
= 0 holds, i.e. the size of the (maximum) change
of measure is not changed by regulation. However, because the structural form is the
same and ξˆi(t) > ξˆb(t), the change of measure is shifted to the left due to regulation.
By calculating
d∆PDt|ξ=ξˆε
dε
d∆PDt|ξ=ξˆ/ε
dε
= −1
we additionally obtain the property that the change of measure is increasing faster
when ξt is raising from a low level, than increasing when ξt is falling from a high
level.
3.4 Appendix to Chapter 3 125
3.4.5 Deduction of the Portfolio Decision
In this section we derive the portfolio decision along the lines presented in Chapter
2. As a building block, the Portfolio Insurance example of Section 3.4.3 is revisited.
The diffusion part of any wealth dynamics follows Wtθtσtdwt. On the other hand,
by using Ito’s lemma, the same diffusion part is ∂W(ξt,t)
∂ξ
(−κξt)dwt. Thus one obtains
θt =
1
σt
·
∂W(ξt,t)
∂ξ
(−κξt)
W(ξt, t)
=
1
γσt
κ · (− γ ∂W
∂ξ
/
W
ξt
)
= θu · qWt
By this decomposition, one can easily see that the deduced portfolio policy is to
invest into a stochastic multiple of the myopic mean-variance portfolio.
The partial derivatives with respect to the state price ξ of these two functional types
are
∂W2
∂ξ
= e−r(T−t)F
φ(−d2(ξt, T − t, ζ))√
T − tκξt
∂W1
∂ξ
= −I(yξt)a(T − t)Φ(d1(ξt, T − t, ζ)) 1
γξt
− e−r(T−t)I(yζ)φ(−d2(ξt, T − t, ζ))√
T − tκξt
.
Adding both parts we obtain as the multiplier
qWt = 1− e−r(T−t)
F
WtΦ(d2(ξt, T − t, ζ)))
+(e−r(T−t)
I(yζ)
Wt
(
1− FI(yζ)
)
γφ(−d2(ξt, T − t, ζ))√
T − tκ .
If the solution is continuous, then, by definition, I(yζ) = K and thus
qWt = 1− e−r(T−t)
F
WtΦ(d2(ξt, T − t, ζ)) ∈ (0, 1)
holds. Otherwise, if there is an downward discontinuity, there exist cases depending
on the state (ξ, t), where the volatility multiplier q is even greater than 1. An
analogous derivation is applicable for more complex solutions.
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Chapter 4
The Equilibrium Impact of a
Regulated Banking Sector on
Financial Markets
In equilibrium, the aggregated decisions of agents influence market prices and thus
indirectly affect other market participants as well. In particular, the market value
of aggregate debt to the real sector is endogenous, but also equity and banks’ debt
prices and volatilities.
When all agents are fully rational, they are able to anticipate all of these effects.
However, if this endogeneity of prices cannot be properly ’predicted’ by market
participants, their decisions can be heavily biased. Prediction is not meant with
respect to the underlying economic uncertainty as represented by the Brownian
motion, but with respect to the indirect impact of the restriction on market prices.
When, as an example, a company of the real sector plans its financial decision
purely based on market prices, but is not able to anticipate the effect of the VaR
restriction correctly, its ’wrong’ state-contingent decision may lead to procyclicality
in the economy.
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4.1 Construction of the
Pure Exchange Equilibrium
The influence of the aggregate banking sector is not of a strategic nature, as all
banking institutes within the banking sector will not take the impact of their own
decision on the decision of other banks into account. Therefore, we discuss the
market in a competitive pure exchange equilibrium in the style of Lucas (1978).
First, we state the equilibrium condition and then solve for the resulting equilibrium.
We characterize the investment opportunity set in equilibrium and discuss prices and
volatility.
4.1.1 Definition and Existence
Produced by the real sector of the economy, there is an exogenously given cash flow
from the coupons, δ, which follows a geometric Brownian motion
dδt
δt
= µδdt+ σδdwt . (4.1)
The constant µδ is the instantaneous growth rate of cash-flows, and σδ its volatility.
The process starts at a known δ0 > 0.
As in the previous chapter, this cash-flow represents aggregate coupon payments of
the aggregate debt to the real economy, the risky asset in the economy. It has fair
value P , paying coupon stream δ. Additionally, there exists a riskless investment
opportunity, the money market account, which is in zero net supply.
The unrestricted agent u is endowed with a fraction ω ∈ [0, 1] of aggregate debt.
Remark. Specifying the cash-flows exogenously implies that there are no feed back
effects between the evolvements on the financial side of the economy, such as asset
prices, and the real one, as expressed by the amount of cash-flows. If this attitude
is supported, the following model constitutes a general equilibrium.
This independency might not be a realistic setting, especially when considering times
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of economic distress. With this argumentative viewpoint, the model is still a partial
equilibrium, since a feedback of a possibly occurring credit crunch in the real economy
will not affect asset prices on the financial market. Yet, this modeling technique
permits the analysis in equilibrium where, at least, the direct effect of regulation on
the financial markets can be studied.
Definition of Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium in this pure exchange economy is a collection of optimal
consumption, optimal terminal wealth, and optimal total assets of the banking sector
(cu, cb,W u, V ) and the investment opportunity set (r, µ, σ), such that the markets
for consumption, for the risky asset, and for the money market account clear any
time t, i.e. recalling the market clearing conditions (2.33) on p. 38,
cut + c
b
t = δt
θutW
u
t + θ
b
tVt = Pt
(1− θut )W ut + (1− θbt )Vt = 0 ,
where θb is the optimal portfolio decision of the banking sector b and where P is the
total (financial) value of the cash-flow-producing real economy, see (2.10) on p. 18,
ξtPt = Et
[∫ T
t
ξsδsds+ ξTPT
]
.
Analogously, equilibrium in an unregulated economy is defined by replacing the
banking sector b with the unregulated financial system i.
Existence
By the arguments presented in Chapter 2, if there exists a state price process ξ,
satisfying
δt = I(yuξt) + I(ybξt), ∀t ,
where {yb > 0, yu > 0} solve the static budget equations with the optimal solutions
(cu,W u) (equation (3.10) on p. 71) and (cb,W b) (equation (3.12) on p. 71)
130 4 Equilibrium Impact of a Regulated Banking Sector on Markets
substituted,
E
[∫ T
0
ξsc
u
s (y
u)ds+ ξTW
u
T (y
u)
]
= ωξ0E0[
∫ T
0
ξsδsds+ ξTPT ]
E
[∫ T
0
ξsc
b
s(y
b)ds+ ξT (W
b
T (y
b) + C(W bT (y
b))
]
= (1− ω)ξ0E0[
∫ T
0
ξsδsds+ ξTPT ] ,
(4.2)
then all equilibrium conditions (2.33) on p. 38 are satisfied.
Inverting the unique alternative equilibrium representation, the state prices are given
by
ξt =
u′(δt)
u′(I(yu) + I(yb)) . (4.3)
Normalizing u′(I(yu) + I(yb)) = 1, substituting into optimal consumption and
terminal wealth, the expectations in the static budget equations (4.2) are well defined
for all (yb > 0, yu > 0).
There exists a solution (yb, yu) to the static budget equations (4.2), if the endogenous
equity value of the aggregate banking sector W b0 is sufficient to support the nominal
debt level F ; formulated as a restriction on the exogenous parameters, there exists
an equilibrium ω ∈ [0, ωˆ), where
1
ωˆ
= 1 +
e−rThF
(
− βλ+ λ+ βψ(n)Φ (d2 (ζ¯)) )
(a(T ) + A(T ))δ0
(
(1− β)β) .
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Remark. We introduce some notation to facilitate comparisons. The letter B or B
in super/subscripts refers to a regulated economy. It comprises the regulated banking
system b and the unrestricted representative investor u. I or I denotes an economy
with an unrestricted investor u and the unregulated financial intermediary i. Pure
exchange equilibria are calligraphic B or I. If one takes the equity value W u0 and
W b0 , resp. W
i
0, in the static budget equations (3.11) and (3.16) as exogenously fixed,
then we refer to this case as a partial equilibrium B, resp. I, in standard typeface.
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4.1.2 The Investment Opportunity Set in Equilibrium
The endogenous interest rate rt and the market price of risk κt =
µt−rt
σt
can be
recovered by applying Ito’s lemma to the inverted state price in equation (4.3) and
comparing coefficients with the dynamics in (2.6) on p. 16, to obtain
r = γµδ − 12γ(1 + γ)σ2δ
κ = γ|σδ|
(4.4)
which shows that both the interest rate and market price of risk are constants. The
stochastic discount factor ξ is independent of the aggregate behaviour of agents and
initial endowments. It only depends on risk aversion as well as the growth and
volatility of the aggregate coupon payments in the economy.
Consequently, the same endogenous riskless interest rate and market price of risk
will prevail, if there is only an unrestricted investor, or some unregulated financial
intermediaries, or a regulated banking system. Neither the introduction nor a change
in the weight of the banking system hence induces a ’valuation risk’ in the sense
that there is a change in the state price process. All the observed effects can be
attributed to a ’cash-flow risk’. This separation is on the one hand convenient and
enables us, to solve in closed form; on the other hand, there will be no additional
ambiguous effects resulting from distortion due to valuation.
This valuation invariance is the implication of the specific exogenously given
aggregate cash flows, of the aggregation property of the utility functions, and of
complete markets.
By evaluating Pt explicitly and applying Ito’s lemma, one can derive from the
dynamics
dPt + δtdt = µtPtdt+ σtPtdwt
the instantaneous expected return µt of the market in equilibrium
µt = r + σt · κ
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and the volatility σt of the market in equilibrium
σt = σδ − σδ e−r(T−t)h
β
W∗
Pt
((1− β)
β
+ Φ (−d2(δ∗))− hΦ (−d2(δ∗))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+σδ
h
β
e−r(T−t)
W
Pt
(
Φ (−d2(δ))− Φ
(−d2(δ)) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
(4.5)
+e−r(T−t)
h
β
J
Pt
√
T − t φ(−d2(δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
.
The transformation of the boundaries on the level of state prices
{ζ∗, ζ∗, ζ, ζ}
into the corresponding boundaries on the level of coupon payments
{δ∗, δ∗, δ, δ}
are given in the Appendix.
The solution to the unregulated economy I is identical to the first term (i) of
equation (4.5). It can be shown to be strictly less than σδ. In a world without any
financial intermediary, regulated or not, the volatility of the market is σt = σδ.
Remark. As the banking systems needs enough equity capital to support the debt,
see equation ((3.23) on p. 90), the case ω = 1 is in general not nested. However,
the solution of an economy without any financial intermediation can be found in
equation (2.50) on p. 47.
The market volatility of the regulated economy σt in equation (4.5) retains the
same structure as the implied risk aversion qbt in (3.29) on p. 101 of the regulated
banking system. Hence, if the VaR restriction is binding, volatility inherits the same
properties. Therefore the arguments made in partial equilibrium are qualitatively
still valid; VaR regulation induces in some states of the economy higher volatility
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relative to an unregulated banking sector.The effects, however, are smoothed by
the presence of the unrestricted investor. The main difference to the formula of the
implied risk aversion is that Vt is replaced by Pt = W
u
t +Vt > Vt. Thus, the impact of
the banking sector on volatility is diluted due to the additional unrestricted capital
W u.
Remark. Given that the underlying economy is not influenced by the financial
market, i.e. σδ remains constant, this derivation formalizes the ’market wisdom’
that volatility is an indicator of how ’nervous’ the market is. Buraschi and Jiltsov
(2006) derive a similar result from a differences in beliefs aproach and empirically
finds that volatility is increasing in heterogeneity. In our model framework, volatility
is mainly driven by implied risk aversion of the banking sector qb, which can be,
loosely speaking, seen as another measure of how ’nervous’ the banking sector is.
Remark. Relating to equation (2.55) on p. 51, the equilibrium investment
opportunity set is stochastic. When discussing the effects of regulation, some authors
assume a constant opportunity set for total assets. This assumptions only sustains
a discussion in a partial equilibrium, see Dangl and Lehar (2004), Kupiec (2007) or
Bodie et al. (2007) as examples.
4.1.3 Asset Prices and Volatility in Equilibrium
After deriving the equilibrium prices of aggregate debt to the real sector P , market
prices for total assets, equity, and debt as well as their volatilities can be analyzed
as well.
The Banking Sector’s Balance Sheet in Equilibrium: Value
Figure 4.1 shows the balance sheet of the banking sector, where dotted lines show
the comparison with the case of an unregulated economy. Note that the scaled
cash-flows δt/δ0 are proportional to the value of the underlying ’mutual’ fund of the
decomposition (3.20) on p. 76.
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Panel 1: Total Assets Panel 2: Equity
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector: Value
This figure shows the banking sector’s balance sheet in value at time t = 4 in
equilibrium. The dotted lines represents the unregulated financial intermediary i,
whereas the solid lines the one of the regulated banking system b. The parameters
are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
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In both economies, the regulated and the unregulated one, there is a minimum value
if the economy almost breaks down, δt → 0. If the economic situation turns out to
be very favorable, equity profits one-to-one from increases in the total asset, whereas
debt is almost riskless.
In the unregulated economy I, the equity value is almost linear in between and
the debt title behaves as in a Merton (1974) type of economy. In contrast to the
unregulated balance sheets, the VaR restriction introduces a dent in the total assets,
which distributes to equity and debts as well.
In consequence, the equity position (or equivalently total assets) is higher under
regulation in economically worse times, whereas it is less in good times, as can
be seen by the small difference in the slopes of the total assets or equity in very
good economic situations. This transfer of wealth between states of the economy in
equilibrium can be seen as evidence that the regulation of the banking sector renders
the economy in fact less prone to a credit crunch relative to the corresponding
unregulated economy.
The Banking Sector’s Balance Sheet in Equilibrium: Volatilities
Figure 4.2 shows the balance sheet from the perspective of volatilities; the ’budget’
equation in volatility terms is σVt Vt = σ
W
t Wt + σ
D
t Dt.
The reasoning regarding the structural form of volatility again follows a similar
argument as in the discussion of the implied risk aversion. In very adverse economic
situations, the portfolio decision resembles that of a portfolio insurance. This
behaviour transmits through the balance sheet, as all volatilities approach zero.
In favorable economic devolvements, equity volatility is approximately σδ, whereas
debt, as it is now almost risk-free, has no volatility any more. The volatility of the
total assets in this part is approximately σVt ' WtVt σδ.
In the unregulated economy I, there is a hump in volatility in between those
extremes which transmits mainly into the debt title; this also applies to the volatility
effect of the VaR restriction.
This results in a situation, where - in the numerical example - debt holders face
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector: Volatility
This figure shows the banking sector’s balance sheet in volatility terms at time t = 4
in equilibrium. The dotted lines represent the unregulated financial intermediary i,
whereas the solid lines the one of the regulated banking system b. The parameters are
as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
4.1 Construction of the Pure Exchange Equilibrium 137
in some states of the economy, namely around the VaR boundary δ, a volatility of
almost 20%, which is not only substantially higher than in an unregulated economy
I, but is in fact comparable to the volatility in a totally un-intermediated economy
or to the volatility of equity in a regulated economy. If regulation is also intended
to protect debt holders, regulation fails at this point.
Remark. Note that the volatility of equity (or any other part of the balance sheet)
seen as a function of equity value is non-linear and also non-invertible, as there are
multiple equity values, which result in the same volatility. Both, volatility and the
volatility of volatility, are stochastic.
Another notable feature of the model is that decreasing prices correspond to
increasing volatilities, when the financial system reaches a region where distress
becomes probable, i.e. where leverage is quickly increasing. Thus, the
model reproduces the well-documented empirical fact that deteriorating economic
development leads to higher volatilities as expressed for example by the VIX.
Moreover, volatility of volatility is countercyclical as well, see Jones (2003) and
Corsi et al. (2008).
When crisis is actually almost inevitable, the banking system substantially reduces
risky investments in order to stabilize the asset side of its balance sheet. Not even in
this simple economy is a decreasing volatility after some time of distress with high
volatility an unmistakable sign of a recovering economy.
Remark. This remark briefly discusses the impact of the fraction of intermediated
capital ω on volatility.
When, as an example, the banking system is the dominant factor, ω → 0, the risky
asset only comprises the total assets of the banking system, P = V , and the implied
risk aversion of the banking system translates one-to-one into market volatility.
However, the specific form of volatility is dependent on whether the VaR restriction is
binding or not. When increasing the initial endowment ω of the unrestricted investor
u, the endogenously determined equity capital of the banking sector W b decreases;
thus, the typical VaR behaviour becomes more pronounced when seen relative to the
unregulated economy I. The bigger the share of the banking sector, the smaller the
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effect of VaR. This possibly counterintuitive fact is generated by keeping nominal debt
F constant, while at the same time increasing equity capital that supports this debt,
thereby effectively reducing the leverage. A higher share of intermediated capital,
regulated or not, benefits financial stability, if not combined at the same time with a
higher leverage of the economy.
4.2 Comparing
Partial and Pure Exchange Equilibria
In this section, the impact of regulation on prices and their implicit impact through
wealth transfers is discussed. For comparison, there are two equilibria of interest: the
pure exchange equilibrium B with a regulated banking system and the pure exchange
equilibrium I with an unregulated financial intermediary. When comparing the
benchmark case I with B, differences resulting from regulation are of interest, taking
all endogenous price impacts into account.
In addition, a specific partial equilibrium is of special interest: B is defined by
keeping equity prices fixed to the benchmark case I, i.e.
W u0 |B = W u0 |I
W b0 |B = W i0|I .
Using this equilibrium, the differences in equilibria I and B can be decomposed into
two parts: when comparing I with B, the introduction of regulation is of interest,
while keeping equity prices fixed. The comparison of economy B with economy B
isolates the effects of regulation on prices since, in both economies, regulation does
not change.
First we discuss in which way equilibrium effects the demand for the risky asset.
Afterwards, it is argued that the endogeneity of prices effectively results in a transfer
of wealth between the participating members of the economy.
Finally, reflecting the discussion under partial equilibrium, differences attributable
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to the endogenous price reaction with respect to the restrictiveness of regulation,
capital provisions and the banks’ debt markets are briefly discussed.
Aggregate Demand
Equilibrium does not directly change the agents’ decisions. This is an implication
of (i) competitive markets, because agents take prices in their decision as given,
as well as (ii) the valuation invariance characteristic, because the VaR boundary
itself is independent of prices. Hence, the demand for the risky asset is only affected
indirectly through the endogeneity of prices. Equilibrium modifies financing costs,
as expressed by the Lagrange multiplier yb.
Remark. The normalization I(yb) + I(yu) = 1 allows us to reduce the system of
equations (4.2) to a single equation. Only the Lagrange multiplier of the banking
system yb needs to be solved for; the one of the unrestricted agent follows from the
normalization. In the following, we simplify notation by using y instead of yb.
It is shown in the Appendix that y|B ≥ y|B ≥ yi|I , where equality holds only for an
effectively unregulated economy. Consequently, the risky asset is in equilibrium less
valuable than in the corresponding equilibrium with fixed prices, P0|B ≤ P0|B, as
dP
dy
< 0. This result demonstrates that there is an increased aggregate demand due
to regulation as well as due to the endogeneity of prices. Furthermore, as
dW b0
dy
< 0,
the equity value of the banking sector is less in equilibrium, while at the same time
the wealth of the unrestricted agent increases
dWu0
dy
> 0. Hence, equilibrium shifts
wealth between agents.
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I → B I → B
∆W u0 /∆P0 0 ω > 0
∆W b0/∆P0 0 − < 0
∆D0/∆P0 1 0 < 1− ω +  < 1∑
1 1
Table 4.1: Wealth Transfers due to Endogenous Prices
This table reports the wealth transfers’ effect that arise if regulation becomes stricter,
i.e. ∆P0 > 0, assuming VaR is effectively restricting . I → B denotes the case where
regulation is introduced, yet, prices are fixed, whereas I → B denotes the case, where
regulation is introduced and prices adapt. Furthermore,  > 0.
Wealth Transfers
Table 4.1 reports who profits and who looses from stricter regulation, in the case with
fixed prices in economy, i.e. I → B, and in the case where prices are endogenous in
economy, i.e. I → B.
With a change from the unregulated economy in equilibrium I to the partial
equilibrium B, the total surplus generated by a stricter regulation policy ∆P0 > 0
is completely attributed to debt D0; as prices are fixed, W
u
0 and W
b
0 do not react to
a change in regulatory environment.
The endogeneity of prices in equilibrium B results in an indirect wealth transfer.
The equilibrium condition W u0 = ωP implies ∆W
u
0 |B = ω∆P0 > 0, meaning
that the unrestricted investor shares ω of the surplus. The additional value is
∆V0|B = (1− ω)∆P0 > 0.
Prices move against the interest of the banking sector ∆W b0 |B < 0, while at the same
time debt still profits from the additional value, 0 < ∆D0/∆P0|B < 1. Accordingly,
debt is only relatively worse off in equilibrium B, as it does not profit from the total
regulatory surplus. The banking system is losing even on an absolute basis, since
it indirectly subsidizes the unrestricted investor u. This distributional impact of
regulation on other market participants has not been discussed in the literature.
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Figure 4.3: Comparing Equilibria: Debt Capacity and Capital Provisions
This figure shows the differences in the restrictiveness of regulation by comparing
partial and pure exchange equilibrium. In region A in Panel 1 the banking sector
is effectively unregulated, whereas in region B the VaR restriction is binding. The
additional region C, encompassed by the dashed line, illustrates the reduction in debt
capacity due to endogenous prices. Panel 2 plots the differences in capital provisions
CP due to the endogeneity of prices. All other parameters are defined as in the
standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
Restrictiveness of Regulation and Capital Provision
The fact that endogenous prices increase financing costs can also be seen by
comparing the debt capacity Fˆ under fixed prices B and with endogenous prices
B. It can be shown that that the debt capacity is less, Fˆ |B ≤ Fˆ |B, as can be seen
in Panel 1 of Figure 4.3, Region C.
Aggregate excess demand due to regulation reduces prices, not only as of today,
but there will be also a price impact in the future as the economy evolves. In this
light, the difference in capital provisions ∆CP = CP |B − CP |B can be interpreted
as (net) premium, which is necessary to cover the future price impact of regulation.
This premium constitutes an essential part of the total capital provisions due to
VaR in equilibrium. As it is intuitive, this premium increases with higher leverage
or stricter regulation.
Let us flip the side: if regulatory policy is not aware of its own effect on prices,
capital provisions may turn out to be too low. If the banking sector uses the wrong
CP |B instead of CP |B, they will not be able to keep the necessary positions as to
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Figure 4.4: Comparing Equilibria: Probability of Distress and Spreads
This figure shows the effect of endogenous prices on the probability of distress PD0
and the yield spread s0. In Panel 1, PD0 is graphed over the Cooke ratio n, whereas
in Panel 2, the yield spread s0 is displayed. All other parameters are defined as in the
standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
comply with the VaR when times turn ’bad’ and prices move against them.
Even worse, in this case, regulation generates a problem that wasn’t there before.
The Banking Sector’s Debt Market
Relative to the case without an endogenous price effect, the probability of distress
in the banking system is increasing in equilibrium, while the spread s0 is also higher
in equilibrium. Notwithstanding, the overall effect on the spread is still lowered
by regulation. The qualitatively same effects arise by an analysis of the impact of
regulation via the Cooke ratio n.
Remark. Changing the initial value δ0 is equivalent to an economy where the initial
distribution is adequately adapted. It is therefore not discussed.
4.3 Beyond Full Rationality
The question we ask in this section is what happens on the individual level, if not
all the agents within the economy have the necessary information (informational
asymmetries) and/or are able (the problem is too complex) or willing (bounded
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rationality, sparse time) to base their decision on full information and/or full
rationality. We do not to discuss the impact of such agents on equilibrium for
technical reasons. Hence, two further assumption are needed in order to derive
consistently the results in this section.
1. Some agents neglect parts of the impact of endogenous prices for some
exogenous reason not modeled explicitly. This assumption generates the
results.
2. These agents have a measure of zero. This assumption in fact removes the
price impact of these agents; it is needed in order to avoid an inconsistency
when equilibrium is calculated the same way as before.
When abstracting from this assumption, equilibrium prices are affected in
a complex way, as there arise feedback effects. Sircar and Papanicolaou
(1998) for example analyze an equilibrium where some participants apply for
exogenous reasons a ∆-hedging strategy.
Alternatively, one can also interpret the results as an ’as if’ study to give first insights
into the first-order effects in an economy with a ’true’ general equilibrium.
Remark. In contrast to most other results presented throughout this thesis, the
conclusions in this section are only based on numerical evidence and are not proved
in a formal way.
4.3.1 Realized vs. Expected Shocks
The question under consideration in this subsection is whether the equity capital of
the banking system evolves better under the same economic development (i) when
unexpected or (ii) when expected. We demonstrate the differences by using the
same underlying development δ0 → δT , but under two extreme assumptions, namely
case (i) with only realized shocks, where the whole movement is solely due to
the realization of the Brownian motion wT − w0 and thus not expected, i.e.
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µδ = 0. The contrary extreme is
case (ii) with only expected shocks, where there is no unexpected movement,
that is, wT = 0, but δT is only explained by µδ. Note that in between t = 0
and t = T the economy evolves along the same path as before, as expressed
by aggregate coupon payments δt.
Remark. The source of ’incomplete’ rationality is that agents do not take the
assumed dynamics into account in their decisions in advance. Otherwise, there
will be arbitrage, since δ then follows a Brownian Bridge; see e.g. the discussion in
Loewenstein and Willard (2000) or Liu and Longstaff (2004)
Figure 4.5 shows terminal wealth WT over a range of possible
δT
δ0
, in Panel 1 for the
unregulated economy I and in Panel 2 for the regulated economy B. The ordinates
are in
case (i) with only realized shocks (dotted lines in Figure 4.5; constant zero
expectation µδ = 0)
terminal wealth WT
(
y(µδ = 0), µδ = 0, δT (µδ = 0, wT )
)
over δT
δ0
(
µδ = 0↑
no expectations
, wT
)
= e
(
0−σ
2
δ
2
)
T+σδ
√
TwT
,
whereas in
case (ii) with only expected shocks (solid lines; no unexpected shock wT = 0)
terminal wealth WT
(
y(µδ), µδ, δT (µδ, wT = 0)
)
over δT
δ0
(
µδ, wT = 0↑
pure expectations
)
= e
(
µδ−σ
2
δ
2
)
T+σδ
√
T0
.
δT
δ0
(µδ = 0, wT = 0) is approximately 0.90.
Remark 6. The analysis is evaluated at time t = T for simplicity. Although similar,
’smoother’ results can be obtained when using some arbitrarily time in between (0, T ).
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Figure 4.5: Expected vs. Realized Shocks
This figure shows terminal equity wealth WT for a range of paths δT /δ0. Solid lines
represent the case where the path was perfectly expected, i.e. δT /δ0(µδ), whereas dotted
lines, if the realization was purely unexpected, δT /δ0(wT ). Panel 1 plots the results
for the unregulated economy I and Panel 2 for the regulated banking system B. All
other parameters are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
In the economy without regulation, terminal equity wealth W iT is not identical for the
same economic development, that is for the same path δ0 → δT . With a successful
development of the economy, e.g. (δT/δ0) ≥ (δT/δ0)(µδ = 0, wT = 0), the equity
value is larger, when the boom was expected, wT = 0 (solid line in Panel 1 in Figure
4.5) than when it just happened, µδ = 0 (dotted line in Panel 1), where, ex post,
the banking system behaved in too precautionary a manner. The analogous result
turns out to be true on the opposite side: equity value is larger when recession is a
surprise, rather than when it was expected.
When one imagines an additional period, where the model is restarted again, the
equity wealth at time t = T constrains the ability to give credit to the real sector
in the next period. Extrapolating the above-mentioned result, where equity wealth
was higher in ’good’ times and lower in ’bad’ times, procyclicality in t = T due to
(common) expectations of the unregulated banking sector at time t = 0 can arise.
Within a regulated economy, the same argument for equity wealth W bT as before
holds, at least in booms. Yet, regulation eliminates the analogous effect in
recessionary times. Expectations do not affect equity wealth any more.
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With this result at hand, regulation eliminates the procyclical effect of expectations,
at least in the numerical example, for both cases, realized recessions (µδ = 0, wT ≤ 0;
solid line in Panel 2) and expected ones, (µδ ≤ 0, wT = 0; dotted line in Panel 2).
It comes at the cost of lower equity levels in ’good’ times.
This is true for moderate parameterization. When using extreme parameterization,
one will still find the procyclical effect mentioned in the unregulated case.
Nevertheless, procyclicality occurs only for much more extreme economic
developments δ0 → δT and terminal wealth is still larger under regulation than
without.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that regulation feeds additional procyclicality into
the real sector, neither when recession is just occurring nor when it is expected; on
the contrary, it might have a dampening effect.
4.3.2 Endogeneity of Volatility and VaR Estimations
VaR regulation superimposes additional effects on market volatility, as argued e.g.
by Danielsson et al. (2001) and Danielsson (2002). To illustrate the impact of
endogenous market volatility, we study the impact of regulation with VaR on the
VaR estimates of the market itself. One agents is able to incorporate fully all the
endogenous effects into his VaR calculation; the other one uses only market data as
of today for his VaR estimate.
If all the effects of endogeneity of prices are incorporated, that is, considering all
the agent’s aggregate influence on prices by market clearing, the true probability
distribution of any price in the future Pt+τ , τ ∈ [T − t, 0) is known. The endogenous
VaR, E-VaR, of an investment in the market portfolio measured over a period τ is
therefore
E-VaR[t;τ ] := inf{x ≥ 0 : P[Pt − Pt+τ ≥ x|Ft] < 1%}
⇒ E-VaR[t,τ ] = P (t, δt)− P (t+ τ, δ[t;τ ])
δ[t;τ ] = e
(µδ−1/2σ2δ)τ+σδΦ(−1)[0.01]
√
τδt.
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However, since some market participants on the aggregate market may not anticipate
the behaviour of other market participants and the resulting effects on prices and
volatility, they will report a VaR estimate that can only depend on past market data
and actual market data. Since our economy is Markovian, including past data will
not render any systematical enhancement of the VaR. By using only market data as
of today,(µt, r, σt), the estimate of the VaR based on market data, M-VaR, is
M-VaR[t;τ ] := inf{x ≥ 0 : P[Pt − Pt+τ ≥ x|Ft] < 1%}
Pt+τ = Pt +
∫ t+τ
s=t
µtPsds+
∫ t+τ
s=t
σtPsdws
⇒ M-VaR[t;τ ] = P (t, δt)− P (t, δt)e(µt−1/2σ2t )τ+σtΦ(−1)[0.01]
√
τ
Table 4.2 on p. 153 reports the market value Pt and the two VaR numbers as
negative annualized percentage returns
E-VaR% = −
ln
(
P (t+τ,δ)
P (t,δt)
)
τ
M-VaR% = −(µt − 1/2σ
2
t )τ + σtΦ
(−1)[0.01]
√
τ)
τ
,
at which the endogenous VaR and, analogously, the market VaR are situated in the
distribution. The fourth number shows the difference between the two different VaR
calculations. The states of the world are chosen in such a way as to represent ’bad’
states in economic development; the values of the aggregate payments δt correspond
to the {0.1%, 1%, 2.5%, 10%} quantiles of the δ-distribution.
The maximum underestimation in percentage returns is 32.35%, whereas the
maximum overestimation is 12.77%, both in the same case (F = 11, α = 1%).
With higher nominal debt, estimates seem to be more biased, both in mean and
maxima. Increasing the nominal debt results in a market behaviour that is more
determined by the financial intermediary than by the unrestricted agent. It seems
to be plausible that increased debt worsens the approximation quality.
The relation between states of the world δt and the endogenous VaR turns out to
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be non-monotonous in the states of the world; neither does market data in ’bad’
times imply higher VaR estimations. They may go even in adverse directions, as in
the case of (F = 7, α = 1%; δt = 0.27 vs. 0.21) the endogenous E-VaR decreases by
7.8%, whereas the market M-VaR estimate increases by 3.4%.
Given the data in Table 4.2, regulation does not systematically reduce
underestimation. Moreover, it seems more likely that it worsens the problem at
hand, as the mean over the four states increases with regulation in both cases F = 7
and F = 11.
The results in this model of financial intermediation shows that the endogeneity of
volatility due to VaR regulation poses a substantial problem in the use of VaR as a
regulatory tool itself. Not only there seems to be a tendency to underestimate VaR
in ’bad’ times, but also there is no clear systematic effect that could be captured by a
’simple’ multiplier to the VaR calculations. In ’good’ times, regulation has almost no
influence on the VaR estimates (not shown). It underpins the arguments put forward
by Danielsson (2002) and references therein that VaR approaches are misleading
or even break down in crisis, as markets do not behave ’regularly’ any more and
exhibit very different statistical properties. Lehar (2005) (indirectly) illustrates the
argument in his empirical study.
4.3.3 Procyclicality and Credit Crunch
In this section, we discuss whether regulation introduces procyclicality effects on the
real side of the economy and whether regulation contributes to a credit crunch.
In order to illustrate this topic we imagine a single (atomic) corporation, whose
strategy is to invest only in the market portfolio P . The corporation is equipped with
equity capital W. In addition, the corporation leverages the investment with nominal
debt F and maturity of one year from the banking system. For an exogenous reason,
the corporation is willing to pay at most a (constant) credit spread of s = 55bp.
There are no frictions due to bankruptcy, so banks use a Merton (1974) option-style
framework for valuing the debt claim D and the equity claim of this company W. In
4.3 Beyond Full Rationality 149
contrast to the standard Merton case, the task of valuing the options has to be done
numerically, as the market volatility σP (δt, t) is stochastic. Note that in an economy
without any financial intermediation, the volatility of the market is constant and
the standard Merton case emerges. Consequently, given that the equity position is
equal over time, the nominal debt level F will also be constant.
Remark. The notation for the corporate is analogous to the banking sector, yet with
gothic letters. Note further that the corporation has no impact on the equilibrium.
The underlying economy is not changing due to the existence of this additional
market participant.
Dynamic View
First, we take a picture at time t = 4; nevertheless, the qualitative structure remains
stable over time. Figure 4.6 shows in Panel 1 the maximum leverage ratio Dt/Wt
the corporation is able to maintain for adverse states of the economy, given the
previous assumptions. Panel 2 shows the corresponding conditional volatility σP for
this time instant.
When comparing Panel 1 and Panel 2 in Figure 4.6 one immediately notes the
(inverse) relation between the volatility and the leverage over the different states
δt. Since we used the Merton model for valuing the claim to the company, the debt
claim is the combination of a riskless asset and a put short. At a low volatility, debt
is worth more. As we keep the equity wealth W and the spread s constant, the debt
volume D consequently is higher with lower volatility.
The mapping is not as ’perfect’ as described above, because volatility is, in contrast
to the Merton model, time- and state-dependent and thus evolving over time.
When trying to measure the procyclicality effects of the banking system in our
dynamic economy, there are two components of interest. The
level impact should prevent a possible shortage of the availability of credit to good
creditors. It is desirable to have a higher nominal debt level in economically
hard times,
FB > FI .
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Figure 4.6: Procyclicality
This figure shows in Panel 1 the leverage ratio Dt/Wt and in Panel 2 the volatility
σP over adverse states δ at time t = 4.
However, if the economic situation is doing well, we may accept the case, where
debt is lower than in an unregulated economy. The
relative impact is more in the spirit of a cyclical development in an economy.
Here, the question is, whether the impact of regulation dampen both ups
and downs in the economy by reducing leverage in good times and increasing
leverage in (temporarily) bad situations,
dFB
dδ
dFI
dδ
≤ 1 .
By this definition of procyclicality, nominal debt levels increase relative to
an unregulated economy, if the economy is in recession. However, when the
economy recovers, leverage is less and the company will profit less from the
upturn.
The common pattern is as follows:
When the state of the economy is very good, volatilities almost coincide and thus
there is no significant impact on the availability of credit due to regulation, neither
on the debt level nor on the relative effect.
When the economic state worsens, under regulation the corporation is able to obtain
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a higher credit volume than in an unregulated economy; regulation is also first not
procyclical in relative terms. As there is a second, downward hump in volatility in
the proximity of δ4 = 0.4, it even translates into an anticyclical (relative) behavior,
as the company can borrow more since even sign of the relative measure changes.
However, as the recession worsens, regulation has a large procyclical effect in relative
terms.
In the third part, beyond some threshold, regulation affects credit volume in such
a way that the corporation is given less by banks than in an unregulated economy.
However, on a relative basis, procyclicality vanishes again. If the economy is well
in crisis, the impact of regulation is almost non-existent, as both economies behave
identically.
With these results at hand, there is no clear-cut answer to the question of
procyclicality, neither on a relative nor on an absolute level. As a recession emerges,
debt capacity is less scarce and even may increase slightly; nevertheless, when
recession deepens further, the possibility for the real economy to obtain credit from
the regulated banking system is reduced even more than in an unregulated economy.
The discussion above relies on a one point in time perspective and is heavily reliant
on the volatility.
Dynamic and Path-Dependent View
Up to now, the analysis has been dynamic, but not path dependent, since the value
of equity was reset to a constant each time. When the economy evolves, not only
does the availability of credit change, but also the equity position itself is influenced.
In Table 4.3 the combined effects are exemplified in the style of a binomial tree.
For each time-state-path combination there is a panel of the following structure:
the time-state pair (t, δt) is given in the upper left corner of each panel, and the
respective paths are encoded underneath by the possible up (u) and down (d)
combinations. In the first two rows, the value of the equity position Wt and the debt
level Ft = Ft(Wt) at the constant spread of s = 55bp of the company is displayed,
for both the economy with a regulated banking sector B as well as with unregulated
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financial intermediaries I. The small numbers set underneath the numbers in the
unregulated case I represent the difference from the regulated case B in percentage
terms, 100Wt|B−Wt|I
Wt|I for the two underlying economies I and B.
The third row is the availability of debt, when the shock to the equity position in
the last period is neglected, F−1 = Ft(Wt−1), that is, without the path dependency
in the last period. Underset are the percentage differences to the case with a shock
to the equity capital, 100Ft(Wt)−Ft(Wt−1)
Ft(Wt−1)
for the two underlying economies I and B.
The corporation starts with the same initial equity W0 = 1.35; yet, under regulation,
the nominal debt level F is less by 1.8%.
When comparing the extreme paths uuu and ddd, the equity position Wt is less
extreme, i.e. higher in bad times and lower in good ones, which is also true for
the debt level Ft. One might argue that this is simply the result of the reduced
initial debt level in case of regulation. Although, when comparing the debt capacity
without the equity increase or decrease in the last period F−1 with the respective
debt level Ft, the absolute difference in percentage terms (i.e. comparing the
absolute percentage terms beneath F−1) is higher throughout the whole table. This
is evidence that the dampening effect of regulation cannot be attributed to the initial
conditions alone.
The path dependency of this dynamic approach can be best seen in t = 3. The results
with two ups δ3 = 0.57 or two downs δ3 = 0.48 are very dispersed; however, when
the boom was first (u at front position) and the bust late (d on last position), the
equity position is more depressed. At the same time, regulation again ameliorated
the situation.
This dynamic and path dependent study is evidence that regulation does not
introduce additional procyclicality; it is even more reasonable to assume that
regulation in fact has anticyclical effects in dynamic and path-dependent framework.
Hence, the anticyclical property of the valuation as shown in Section 2.1 of this
chapter dominates the partially procyclical effects of volatility as illustrated in the
above discussed perspective.
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4.4 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.4.1 Proofs for the General Equilibrium Section
Proof of Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In order to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, all we need to
show is, that there exists a unique solution (yb, yu) to the system of equations (2.33)
under the state price density (4.3).
First, the normalization (1 degree of freedom) is used
u′
(I(yu) + I(yb)) = 1 . (4.6)
Thus y′u(y
b) < 0 holds.
In the following the notation is shortened, namely yb → y, W u0 → Wu,W b0 →
Wb, V0 → V, and P0 → P . Furthermore, Wb,Wu, V , and P are seen as functions of
y alone. Because
d
dy
(
Wu
P
)
=
W ′nP −WnP ′
P 2
=
W ′nP −Wn(W ′n + V ′)
P 2
=
W ′n(P −Wn)−WnV ′
P 2
=
W ′nV −WnV ′
P 2
> 0 ,
i.e. Wu
P
is strictly increasing and
Wu
P
y→∞→
(yu→1)
Wu(1)
e−rT (VT (W = W )Φ(d2(ζ)) + VT (W = 0)Φ(−d2(ζ))) +Wu(1)
=: ωˆ
Wu
P
y→1→
(yu→∞)
0,
we obtain that there exists a unique equilibrium, if the unrestricted investor holds
a share of the market ω ∈ [0, ωˆ. Results from the partial analysis, namely V ′ < 0
and W ′u = W
′
u(y
u)y′u(y) > 0, were used.
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Transformations: Using the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition
and the following list of transformations
ξt → u′(δt)
I(ξt) → δt
r → γµδ − 1
2
γ(1 + γ)σ2δ
κ → γσδ
ζ∗ → δ∗ = W∗I(yb)
ζ∗ → δ∗ = W∗I(hyb)
ζ → δ = WI(hyb)
ζ → δ = e(µδ−1/2σ2δ)τ+σδΦ(−1)[0.01]
√
τδ0
on the formulas in the partial equilibrium section, one can recover all relevant
equilibrium values W ut ((2.19) on p. 28), W
b
t ((3.22) on p. 86), Dt ((3.41) on
p. 119), Vt ((3.41) on p. 119), and Pt = Vt + W
u
t . Applying the same techniques
as presented in Section 2.3.2 and Section 3.4.5 of the Appendix to Chapter 3 the
corresponding volatilities σt = σ
P
t as well as σ
W
t , σ
D
t , σ
V
t can be recovered.
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4.4.2 Comparison of Equilibria
The goal is to show the relations yb|B ≥ yb|B ≥ yiI , which hold as strict inequalities,
if the VaR restriction is binding, F > ~F . This is approached by a constructive proof
with the following steps:
Step 1: Set α = 1 and all other parameters to the identical ones for B and I;
match the exogenous (r, κ;W b0 = W
i
0,W
u
0 ) for B, such that they match the
endogenous (r, κ;W b0 = W
i
0,W
u
0 ) of the economies B and I.
By construction
Lb0(α = 1)|B = Lb0(α = 1)|B = Li0|I
yb(α = 1)|B = yb(α = 1)|B = yi|I
where Lb0 =
Db0
W b0
and analogously for i.
Step 2 Decrease α up to the transition point ~α < 1:
(i) yi(α)|I = yi|I , as the economy with agent i is not regulated, thus nothing
changes, in particular, (W u0 |I ,W i0|I) as well as Li0|I is constant.
(ii) Up to the point, where the VaR restriction becomes binding, neither
(W u0 |B,W b0 |B) nor (W u0 |B,W b0 |B) (and the corresponding leverage ratios) react.
The VaR restriction starts to bind at the same point ~α|B = ~α|B = ~α.
Step 3 Decrease α further beyond ~α < 1:
(i) It is irrelevant to the economy I.
(ii) In economy B the prices are exogenous, but y′b(α)|B < 0 still applies, by
the results from the previous sections. Hence Lb0(α)|B > Li0|Iyb(α)|B > yi|I .
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Step 4: Construct a general equilibrium B(F (α)) relative to B:
As the VaR restriction starts to be binding at the same point ~α, we will fulfill
L′b(α)|B(F (α)) = L′b(α)|B
y′b(α)|B(F (α)) = y′b(α)|B

in order to obtain yb(α)|B(F (α)) = yb(α)|B and Lb0(α)|B(F (α)) = Lb0(α)|B.
The result is, that F ′(α) < 0, ∀α < ~α, and, hence, F (α) < F , if the VaR
restriction is binding.
Step 5: Finally, we obtain the original equilibrium B by adjusting F (α) back to F
within the equilibrium economy. Because y′b(F )|B > 0, the final result follows,
yb|B > yb|B > yiI , if the VaR restriction is binding, and yb|B = yb|B = yiI
otherwise.
Proof of Step 2: The VaR restriction starts to bind at the same
point
Inverting the transition point F = ~F (W b0 , ζ(α)) on obtains (a unique) ~α(W
b
0 , F ).
The only variable, which might be different in equilibrium B, relative to economy
B, where W b0 is exogenously given, is W
b
0 itself, since it is an endogenous variable.
However, the endogenous variable W b0 will only react to regulation, if the VaR
restriction first becomes binding. Consequently, the VaR restriction starts to bind
at ~α, irrespective of the type of economy.

Proof of Step 3: yb(α)|B > yi|I
As economy I is equivalent to an economy I, when varying regulation, it follows
from the previous result that (i) yb(α)|B ≥ yi|I , and (ii) dD0dα > 0, where a strict
inequality holds, if the VaR restriction is binding. Furthermore, dW0
dα
= 0 holds in
any partial equilibrium.

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Proof Step 4: F ′(α) < 0 ∀α < ~α
In the following the notation is shortened, namely yb → y, W u0 → Wu, and D0,→ D.
f (0,1,0) denotes the partial derivative with respect to the second argument, other
derivatives are defined analogously.
Totally differentiating the equilibrium condition
Wu(y) = ω (D(y, F, α) +Wb(y, F, α) +Wu(y))
and inserting
y′(α)|B(α,F (α)) = −Wb
(0,0,1)(y, F, α)
Wb(1,0,0)(y, F, α)
one can solve for
dF
dα
=
−(1− ω)W ′uWb(0,0,1) + ω
(
Wb
(0,0,1)D(1,0,0) −Db(0,0,1)Wb(1,0,0)
)
ω (D(0,1,0) +Wb(0,1,0))Wb(1,0,0)
where the arguments were omitted.
The sign of partial derivatives can be found in Table 3.3.
The denominator is
ω
(
D(0,1,0) +Wb
(0,1,0)
)
Wb
(1,0,0) < 0
since ω > 0 ∧Wb(0,1,0) > 0 ∧D(0,1,0) > 0 ∧Wb(1,0,0) < 0.
The first part of the numerator is
− (1− ω)W ′uWb(0,0,1) > 0
since 0 < ω < 1 ∧W ′u > 0 ∧Wb(0,0,1) < 0.
The second part of the numerator is
ω
(
Wb
(0,0,1)D(1,0,0) −D(0,0,1)Wb(1,0,0)
)
> 0
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since D(0,0,1) < 0 ∧W (0,0,1)b < 0 ∧D(1,0,0) and because
W
(1,0,0)
b (y, F, α)
W
(0,0,1)
b (y, F, α)
−D
(1,0,0)(y, F, α)
D(0,0,1)(y, F, α)
=
e−rT ξ0
(
erT (β − 1)H1 − Fβ (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)
)
Fhyβγζ¯ (ψ − ψ2)
> 0,
(4.7)
where Lemma 2, equation (3.43) on p. 120, was used. Hence, F ′(α) < 0 must hold.

Proof Step 5: y′(F )|B > 0
The equilibrium condition is
Wu(y) = ωP (y, F ) = ω(Wu(y) + V (y, F )) .
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the sign of the derivative
y′(F ) = − −V
(0,1)
W ′u(1− ω)− V (1,0)
> 0 ,
together with the assumption/results from the previous sections, namely V (0,1) >
0,W ′u > 0, V
(1,0) < 0, and 0 < ω < 1.

Chapter 5
A Two-Sided Equilibrium Model
In all the previous chapters and in most parts of the relevant literature, the liability
side, i.e. the nominal debt level F of the economy, is fixed. In the following, we argue
that the overall debt level of the economy is, at least partly, under the control of
the supervising authorities; for ease of reference, we call this part of the supervising
authorities the central bank. In principle, the central bank is willing to disburse
any nominal debt level F at the fair price of the modeled economy. To demonstrate
the implications, we propose two different goals of the central bank, which constrain
their willingness to disburse debt, namely (i) keeping the leverage ratio in present
value terms under control; or (ii) keeping the probability of distress under control.
With this approach, a first step into a combined asset-liability management of
regulated banks is undertaken. The intention of this chapter is to give a first
insight to the question of how banks may use this additional degree of freedom
in their decision. However, it is only a first step, as it incorporates only a market
for debt once, namely at time t = 0. However, when advancing this road further to
a completely dynamic and double-sided model, technical complexity substantially
increases.
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5.1 The Structure of the Two-Sided Equilibrium
We propose a two sided market which endogenizes the previously exogenous nominal
debt level F . The structure of the economy is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Dynamic Market for Financial Assets
On the left-hand side in Figure 5.1, there is the dynamic economy as described
in the previous chapters with an aggregate banking sector b (or alternatively as a
benchmark the unregulated investors i) and the unrestricted investor u. Together
they form a continuous competitive market for loans P , which is a claim to the
coupon payment stream δ.
The banking sector takes nominal debt F as a given its optimal decision. The
Lagrange multiplier yB(F ) is the shadow price of the static budget equation in
utility terms. Thus, if the price for a marginal unit of nominal debt F is low, i.e.
yB is small, the banking sector has a large incentive to take on more debt, et vice
versa. By inverting yB(F ), we therefore deduct a demand curve for nominal debt,
given the willingness to add debt, as expressed by the (shadow) price of debt yB,
F (yB).
Static Market for Nominal Debt
The ’central bank’ uses its instrument, namely setting the ’price’ for the supply of
nominal debt by the choice of interest rate it charges to banks, which refinance their
capital needs in order to control the supply. Within our model, the central bank
uses its market power to set the shadow price y given the optimal answer of the
banking system.
We do not consider other possibilities of central banks to control the money supply,
like e.g. minimum reserve requirement, open market operations, or buying covered
bonds.
Note that the central bank is not a price-taking economic agent and is leading
the market. We define the residual supply/demand −FC , which the central bank
supplies, by the demand/supply of the total market FM less the demand of the
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banking system FB,
− FC = FM − FB .
For simplicity, we assume that the central bank has discretionary power over the
debt volume and there exists no additional demand/supply, i.e. a credit multiplier
of 1, then FM = 0, and in equilibrium
FC = FB .
Hence, the optimization problem resulting in the nominal debt volume in equilibrium
F¯ is
F¯ = arg max
F≥0
F (5.1)
s.t.

D0(y,F )
W b0 (y,F )
≤ L0 or P[DT (y, F ) < F ] ≤ p CB goals
W u(y, F ) = ωP (y, F ) FM equilibrium
The optimal solution to the optimization problem reduces to solving two equations,
the demand function of the banking system F (yB) from the Financial Market
equilibrium, and the supply function of the central bank FC(y) from the Central
Bank’s goal, to obtain the equilibrium (y¯, F¯ ).
Since the budget equations of the unrestricted investor u and the banking system b
hold with equality, all markets clear any time in the two-sided equilibrium.
Remark. Since, for simplicity, the central bank holds all debt, it is naturally exposed
to all the credit risk. Alternatively one could model FM > 0 as capital market debt,
whereas the central bank only holds with its share FC senior debt of the banking
system. The resulting spread will be substantially reduced.
Nevertheless, the central bank (better supervisory authorities) charges a yield spread
relative to the riskless instrument, which can also be interpreted as a fair deposit
insurance premium.
Remark. In the following, we denote both F (yB) and the inverted function yB(F )
a supply function and FC(y) and the inverted function y(FC) a demand function.
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5.2 Constant Leverage Ratio
Let η0 = W
b
0/W
u
0 measure the capital distribution (of equity wealth) and L0 =
D0/W
b
0 the leverage ratio in present value terms. Then initial endowment can be
rewritten as
η0(1 + L0) =
1− ω
ω
.
In partial equilibrium B, where prices are fixed, the behavior of the banking sector,
as expressed in L0, is independent of the capital distribution η0. In the pure exchange
equilibrium prices adjust in such a way as to ensure that this functional relation
between leverage and capital distribution holds.
If there is a change in an economic fundamental, say χ, and if the central bank
reacts to this change by choosing a new money supply F (χ), such that the leverage
ratio L0 does not change, i.e. dL0 = 0 by intervention, then the new pure
exchange equilibrium B with endogenous prices is identical to the respective partial
equilibrium B with fixed prices, because the capital distribution η0 will not change
in a pure exchange equilibrium, i.e. dη0 = 0 by equilibrium mechanism. With this
assumed reaction of the central bank, prices of equity W b0 , debt D0 and the wealth of
the investor W u0 do not change in the pure exchange equilibrium, only the nominal
debt level F¯ (χ).
We illustrate consequences by using the probability of distress PD0, see Panel 1
of Figure 5.2. From comparative static analysis of Chapter 3 stricter regulation
affected probability of distress negatively, i.e. dPD0/dα < 0. However, when
banks are forced to react (or react themselves) in the assumed way, regulation does
in fact generate more stability when it is measured through distress probability,
dPD0/dα|L0 > 0. The difference is as follows: the debt title D0 is more valuable
due to the regulation and banking system is thereby more levered. Thus, regulation
forces banks to maintain a constant leverage, F¯ ′(α) < 0. This reduction implies a
decline in the probability of distress, which turns out to outweigh the first effect.
At the same time, debt gains twofold, as both stricter regulation and the reduction
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Figure 5.2: Probability of Distress and Spread: Constant Leverage Ratio
This figure shows probability of distress in the financial system PD0 and yield
spread s0, dependent on the leverage ratio in present value terms L = D0/W0.
Panel 1 plots the probability of distress PD0 for different levels of VaR probabilities
α ∈ {10%, 1%, 0.1%}. Panel 2 graphs the yield spread s0 alike. All other parameters
are as defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
of the nominal debt level reduce the risk, as can be seen inspecting the spreads in
Panel 2 of Figure 5.2. In our numerical example, there is a substantial reduction
due to regulation in this case.
The key difference is the reaction of the nominal debt level in equilibrium F¯ . We
assumed that the central bank keeps the leverage ratio in present value terms
constant. This simple assumption reversed the destabilizing impact of regulation
into a stabilizing one.
Remark. The experience of the years between the introduction of banking regulation
and the financial crisis seems to suggest that the reaction to regulation was in
fact to increase nominal leverage and risk exposures, as is empirically documented
in Adrian and Shin (2008b). This behaviour may be attributed to a sense of
better control over risk which in turn entrapped banking institutions into enhancing
their return on equity by leveraging up with new financial products that had low
regulatory capital requirements; see Peltzman (1975) for a similar case. With this
behavioural assumption in mind, regulation is doubly adverse to financial stability
in our framework.
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Hellwig (1995) already mentions the concern that financial innovations - partly
driven due to regulatory arbitrage - undermine the effectiveness of regulation;
thereby, regulation may in fact induce an increased systemic risk.
Additionally, regulation will indirectly support a higher degree of homogeneity in the
banking portfolios. For a detailed analysis of the homogenization impact of regulation
see Freixas et al. (2007) and Wagner (2008).
5.3 Controlling the Probability of Distress
In this part, we consider as the target of the central bank to control the probability
of distress
p = P[DT < F ] = Φ (−d0(ζ∗(y, F ))) . (5.2)
The central bank (supervising authorities) uses the price the banking sector is
willing to pay to derives a supply of debt. If the price for debt y is low, banks
are more aggressive in taking on higher debt levels. This comes at the cost of a
higher probability of distress. Banks increase the debt level up to the point where
it matches the fixed probability p of the supervising authorities.
Panel 1 of Figure 5.3 shows the two (inverted) supply and demand functions. The
downward-sloping (inverted) supply function y(FC) can be derived analytically and
is identical in both cases of an unregulated or restricted economy. The second dashed
line represents the supply function at the lower distress probability p/2. It is shown
in the Appendix that a decline in the distress probability results in a downward shift
of y(FC).
The upward-sloping solid line shows the (inverted) demand yB(F ) for the regulated
banking system, whereas the dotted-dashed line represents the unregulated demand
yI(F ). Due to the properties of these supply and demand curves, there exists a
unique equilibrium (y¯, F¯ ), which is shown in the Appendix. As the demand does not
change with respect to central bank’s policy p in both cases B or I, any equilibrium
(y¯(p), F¯ (p)) is along the demand curve yB(F ).
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Figure 5.3: Varying the Probability of Distress
This figure shows the equilibrium (y¯, F¯ ) and its dependence on the control variable
p of the central bank. Panel 1 reflects demand (downward-sloping lines) and supply
(upward-sloping lines). The dashed line graphs the supply for p/2, whereas the dotted
line the demand in the unrestricted economy. Panel 2 plots the equilibrium debt volume
F¯ as a function of the underlying control p. All other parameters are as defined in
the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
Panel 2 of Figure 5.3 shows the impact of the policy p of the central bank on the
nominal debt volume in equilibrium F¯ (p) for both cases, the regulated economy B
(solid line) and the unregulated economy I (dotted-dashed line).
If the probability of distress is effectively unrestricted, p = 100%, the banks chooses
the maximum debt capacity FˆB and Fˆ I , respectively. On the other hand, if p = 0 is
required, the banking sector is unable to take on any debt. At the transition point
y¯ = ~y, in our numerical example, at p ≤ 3.2%, the restricted economy B changes
to the unrestricted solution, i.e. behaves as if being effectively unrestricted. As the
equilibrium (y¯(p), F¯ (p)) is along yB(F ) and increasing p shifts y(FC) upwards, the
equilibrium inherits the properties (dy¯
dp
> 0, dF¯
dp
> 0) as well.
Consequently, we recover in equilibrium the standard result that a declining leverage
results in less probability of distress (or the probability of default of the first
individual bank).
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Figure 5.4: Varying the Probability of Crisis
This figure shows the equilibrium (y¯, F¯ ) and its dependence on the control variable α of
the regulator. Panel 1 reflects demand (downward-sloping line) and supply (upward-
sloping lines). The dotted line represents the demand of the unrestricted financial
intermediary (α = 100%), whereas the dot-dashed line the the demand of a restricted
banking system with a VaR probability of 10%. Panel 2 plots the equilibrium debt
volume F¯ as a function of the regulatory control α. All other parameters are as
defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
When discussing the effects of regulation on the equilibrium, first note that
the downward-sloping supply y(FC) does not rely on the regulation parameters
(α, n). On the demand side, we know from the previous analysis that yB(F )
will (increasingly) shift upwards with stricter regulation. The equilibrium (y¯, F¯ )
therefore evolves upwards along the supply curve y(FC) with stricter regulation,
that is, ( dy¯
dα
< 0, dF¯
dα
> 0) and ( dy¯
dn
> 0, dF¯
dn
< 0). Panel 1 of Figure 5.4 shows the
unrestricted case α = 100% as a dotted-dashed line, a case with α = 10% as a
dashed line, and the standard case with α = 1% as a solid line. Panel 2 of Figure
5.4 shows the nominal debt level in equilibrium F¯ over a range of VaR probabilities.
The notable result of the analysis is that under regulation lower debt levels are
needed than in an equivalent unregulated economy, if the same probability of distress
in the banking system should be maintained. Even keeping the nominal debt level
constant increases the probability of distress in fact.
The economic intuition behind the result is as follows: if there is regulation, debt
is better secured and thus more valuable. This wealth increase of debt investors is
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Figure 5.5: Varying Costs
This figure shows the equilibrium (y¯, F¯ ) and its dependence on the cost share λ. Panel
1 reflects demand (downward-sloping lines) and supply (upward-sloping linea). The
dotted-dashed line displays the demand with increased costs of λ = 10%, whereas the
dashed line graphs the change of supply due to the the same change in costs. Panel
2 plots the resulting equilibrium debt volume F¯ as a function of the costs fraction λ,
the solid line illustrates the solution for the restricted banking sector b, whereas the
dotted line for the unrestricted financial intermediary i. All other parameters are as
defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
financed by adding some risk to the asset side, when risk is measured by the distress
probability. To keep the probability of distress constant, the nominal debt level
must be declining to compensate the former effect.
In an economy without any regulation, I or I, a high fraction of costs prevent agents
from using excessive tail risk in their portfolio choices, as dWT
dλ
|WT<W > 0, see Table
3.3. From the viewpoint of the supervising authorities, h is a measure of punishment
of tail risks. Consequently, with rising costs, the central bank is willing to provide
more credit, F ′C(λ)|I > 0, while still keeping the probability of distress constant.
Regulation needs financing of the retention level W , in addition. Panel 1 of Figure
5.6 measures these costs by the necessary capital provisions. However, this financing
effect increases the probability of distress. Thus, within a regulated economy, the
equilibrium outcome may result in a case where there is a decrease in the nominal
volume, i.e. F ′C(λ)|B < 0, as one can see in Panel 2 of Figure 5.5. This side
effect is even more pronounced when regulation itself is very efficient, that is, when
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Figure 5.6: Constant Probability of Distress: The Impact of Cost
This figure shows the dependence of capital provisions CP (Panel 1) and the yield
spread s0 (Panel 2) on the cost share λ. The dotted line in Panel displays the
corresponding yield spread in an unregulated economy. All other parameters are as
defined in the standard parameter set in Table 3.2.
there are large capital provisions due to the VaR restriction with moderate systemic
costs. This can be seen by comparing F¯ (λ) in Figure 5.5, Panel 2, with CP (λ) in
Figure 5.6, Panel 1 in the region λ ' 5%. Even though the difference in capital
provisions is small, the impact an the yield spread is substantial when compared to
the corresponding unregulated financial system, see Figure 5.6, Panel 2.
When the combined approach is relevant for systemic stability, namely keeping
the probability of crisis and the one of distress constant, regulation introduces
interferences that need a different behaviour of the central bank, depending on
the (expected) level of systemic costs. Furthermore, internalizing more costs into
the banking sector, has the secondary impact that the jump size J (as well as the
relative jump size J/F ) increases.
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5.4 Appendix to Chapter 5
5.4.1 Constant Leverage
From the equilibrium condition we obtain
η0
dL0
dF
+ (L0 + 1)
dη0
dF
= 0 .
Consequently, if dL0 = 0, then dη0 = 0 holds in equilibrium. Therefore, when neither
L0 nor η0 change in equilibrium, it is equivalent, but more convenient, to use the
budget equation together with the restriction on the leverage than the equilibrium
condition itself.
In order to evaluate the impact of the VaR restriction under a constant leverage
ratio L0, the system of equations D0(yb, F, α) = L0W b0 (yb, F, α)W b0 (yb, F, α) = W b0

is totally differentiated with respect to the VaR probability α.
In the following the notation is shortened, namely yb → y, W b0 → Wb, and D0,→ D.
The resulting reaction functions are
dF
dα
= − D
(0,0,1)(y, F, α)W
(1,0,0)
b (y, F, α)−W (0,0,1)b (y, F, α)D(1,0,0)(y, F, α)
W
(0,1,0)
b (y, F, α)D
(1,0,0)(y, F, α)−D(0,1,0)(y, F, α)W (1,0,0)b (y, F, α)
= −Fhβζ¯ (ψ − ψ2)
(
Fβ (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)− erT (β − 1)H1
)
(β − 1)ξ0 (βWb (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)−H1H2)
> 0
.
dy
dα
=
D(0,0,1)(y, F, α)W
(0,1,0)
b (y, F, α)−W (0,0,1)b (y, F, α)D(0,1,0)(y, F, α)
D(0,1,0)(y, F, α)W
(1,0,0)
b (y, F, α)−W (0,1,0)b (y, F, α)D(1,0,0)(y, F, α)
=
Fhyβ2γζ¯ (ψ − ψ2) (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)
(β − 1)ξ0 (βWb (Φ (−d2 (ζ∗))− 1)−H1H2)
< 0
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where ψ2 is defined by the identity
ψ2
β
1− βF = I(hyζ) ,
hence, ψ2 < ψ for F > ~F .
To determine signs, Lemma 2, equation (3.43) on p. 120, and Lemma 3, equation
(3.44) on p. 120, are used.
Finally, the change of the probability of distress under constant leverage is
d
dα
PD0(F, y, α)
∣∣∣∣
L0
=
φ(−d0(ζ∗)) (yγF ′(α) + Fy′(α))
Fyκ
√
T
.
One can easily determine the sign of
yγF ′(α) + Fy′(α) = − e
rTFhyβγζ¯H1 (ψ − ψ2)
ξ0 (H1H2 + βW0 − βW0Φ (−d2 (ζ∗)))
> 0 (F > ~F )
by the use of Lemma 2, equation (3.43) on p. 120, and Lemma 3, equation (3.44)
on p. 120. The result follows, namely that
dPD0|L0
dα
> 0 holds, i.e. stricter regulation
decreases the probability of default.
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5.4.2 Constant Probability of Distress
From the previous analysis we know that the Lagrange multiplier, yB(F ) ∈ [1,∞)
for F ∈ [0, Fˆ ). Furthermore, y′B(F ) > 0, y′′B(F ) < 0, and yB(F → Fˆ )→ +∞.
As
Φ
(−d0(ζ∗(y, FC))) = p
is solvable to a continuous supply function FC(y), or directly to the inverted supply
function
y(FC) =
e(r+
κ2
2
)T+κΦ(−1)[p]
√
Tu′( β
1−βF
C)
hξ0
(5.3)
with the properties
y′(FC) = − yγ
FC
< 0
y′′(FC) =
yγ(γ + 1)
(FC)2
> 0
y(FC → 0) → +∞ ,
there exists a unique fixpoint (y¯, F¯ ) to the system of equations in partial equilibrium
{W b0 (y, F ) = W b ,Φ (−d0(ζ∗(y, F ))) = p}
and in pure exchange equilibrium
{W b0 (y, F ) = ωP0(y, F ) , Φ (−d0(ζ∗(y, F ))) = p} .
Moreover, the system is also solvable in closed form, for both types of economies,
by first inserting the supply y(FC) in (5.3) into the budget equation (partial
equilibrium) or the initial endowment equation (pure exchange equilibrium), then
solving for F¯ , and finally substituting back into the supply function (5.3).
By totally differentiating the system with respect to some parameter, say χ, one can
also recover the derivatives (y¯′(χ), F¯ ′(χ)).
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Central Banks Policy p:
Since the control for the probability of distress p shifts only the supply function
upwards,
dy(FC , p)
dp
=
√
Tyκ
φ(−d0(ζ∗)) > 0 , ∀F
C
the result in equilibrium is (y¯′(θ) > 0, F¯ ′(θ) > 0) (together with the remaining
properties of the demand and supply function). As the supply function of the
unrestricted investor is less increasing, yI(F ) ≤ yB(F ), the nominal debt level will
be higher (equal if not binding) in economy I than in economy B.
Regulation:
y(FC) is independent of regulation χ ∈ {−α, n}; thus the supply does not shift. On
the other hand, from the previous analysis we know, that the demand shift upwards
with tighter regulation, y′B(χ) > 0. Consequently, (y¯
′(θ) > 0, F¯ ′(θ) < 0) holds.
Analogously to the previous argument, nominal debt level will be higher (equal if
not binding) in economy I than in economy B.
Cost Share λ:
Costs shift the supply upwards,
dy(FC , λ)
dλ
= y
1− β
β + λ(1− β) > 0 , ∀F
C > 0 , (5.4)
as well as the demand side, y′B(λ) > 0. Analogously to the previous argument,
nominal debt level will be higher (equal if not binding) in economy I than in economy
B, since yB(λ) ≥ yI(λ).
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Results
What are the consequences of regulation, which can be deduced from the previous
model framework? We summarize the results by answering a set of questions.
Does the banking system (in general, rationally) respond to regulation? Does
regulation impair the ability of the aggregate banking sector to load on debt?
If the banking system has a low leverage, the capital requirements are automatically
fulfilled and banks do not respond to regulation in their risk management.
Otherwise, both regulation instruments, the VaR probability and the (average)
capital requirement, effectively reduce debt capacity.
How much equity capital does the banking system in fact provide in order to sustain
the regulation requirement (not the capital requirement)?
Both regulatory instruments, the VaR probability and the (average) capital
requirement, effectively increase capital provisions. Furthermore, capital
provisioning increases in the overall riskiness of the banking system as expressed
by the leverage. Our model framework enables us to separate different parts of
capital provisioning. As banks already rationally provide some equity capital for
debt without any regulation, capital provisioning that is solely attributable to VaR
regulation is different from the (total) capital requirements demanded by regulation.
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It can be greater or less than the Cooke ratio n, depending on the parameter set.
Without control over leverage, managing capital provisions is ineffective.
What are the distortions of regulation on the portfolio decision?
In this model framework, the (risky) portfolio decision does not change in its relative
proportions: holding the growth optimal/myopic portfolio is still optimal. However,
regulation alters the amount held in the myopic portfolio. This property enables us
to relate the portfolio decision to an implied risk aversion coefficient, which captures
the incentives induced by the VaR regulation.
In most economic circumstances, the banking system behaves in a more risk-averse
manner than an unregulated one. Nevertheless, as the economic situation worsens,
the banking system may (rapidly) convert to a much more risky strategy.
Does regulation accentuate the sensitivity of the aggregate banking sector and/or the
market to an economic change?
Especially when the VaR horizon is short and the economy development turns out
to be in the proximity of the VaR quantile, the optimal portfolio decision is very
sensitive to the fundamental economic dynamics.
Does regulation reduce the probability of the banking system being in distress? If so,
how does regulation affect aggregate losses?
Regulation raises the probability of distress; this implication is not directly caused
by regulation, but through the increased risk provisions. The effect on losses in
distress is ambiguous: while regulation reduces losses in some sates, refinancing the
charge for regulation increases losses in some other states.
What is the impact of regulation on the value and volatility of the (total asset)
market?
Regulation has a positive effect on the total asset value. In the pure exchange
equilibrium, price adjustments further improve the (initial) value of the market.
Relative to an unregulated economy, the properties of the implied risk aversion of the
aggregate banking system are transformed in equilibrium into similar characteristics
in the volatility. Namely, as the economic situation worsens, the volatility may
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increase significantly. The situation further escalates due to the high sensitivity of
portfolio decisions.
Are debt holders impaired by regulation?
At maturity, debt holders profit on the one hand from regulation, as they gain a
higher recovery rate in the states that are affected by VaR; on the other hand,
the losses are higher in the non-affected states. In terms of the initial spread on
(aggregate) banks’ debt, regulation increases the value of debt.
With prices fixed, debt holders gain the whole share of the increased asset value of
the economy. In equilibrium, the debt value still increases due to regulation, but
there is an indirect wealth transfer to the unrestricted investors due to adjusting
prices. Furthermore, by virtue of the banking sector’s balance sheet, the specific
properties of market volatility are also transmitted into debt.
How is banks’ equity affected?
By definition, regulation does not affect the initial equity value in partial equilibrium.
In equilibrium, price adjustments result in a loss of value. Effectively, there is an
indirect transfer via prices to the un-intermediated sector.
Does the estimation of VaR with market data pose a significant problem if the
estimation neglects the endogeneity of volatility?
Standard VaR calculations depend on past and current data. When comparing
these calculations with the VaR which fully incorporates the endogenous nature of
volatility the calculated VaR underestimates, in most cases substantially, the true
VaR by neglecting the endogenous behaviour of market participants.
What happens in the real sector in response to regulation?
If the aggregate dividend is below a threshold, the real sector will be affected in
a procyclical way due to regulation, meaning that a given corporation will gain
less credit volume at the same contractual specifications relative to an unregulated
economy. Above this threshold, the credit volume will be anticyclical with respect
to an unregulated economy; in some instances, the credit volume will be expanded
in equilibrium, hence being anticyclical in absolute terms.
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The presented dynamic and path-dependent example is evidence that regulation can
be even anticyclical.
6.2 Robustness of the Results
This section qualitatively discusses how the results will change when the essential
assumptions for the derivation of the results are altered.
Linear Approximations for Redemption Payments at the Terminal Date:
The solution (3.12) on p. 71, as displayed in Figure 3.3, may look artificial at
first sight, but it is robust to changes in the underlying economic modelling.
The retention level at the distress boundary is clearly attributable to the
simple β-linearization in equation (3.3) on p. 59. If one instead imagines a
more general piecewise linear function, the sequence of kinks in the (VT ,WT )
space (Figure 3.2 on p. 58) induces a sequence of resistance levels in the
(WT , ξT ) space (Figure 3.3 on p. 74), each of them continuously connected
by parts of the type I(·ξT ). Thus, a more general, progressively increasing
function WT (VT ), as displayed in Figure 3.2 as dotted line, still generates
a region where wealth is much slower decaying in state prices ξT than the
unrestricted profile.
An analogous argument can be constructed with regard to the cost structure
CT .
With the first approach (piecewise defined approximation) one obtains a more
complex solution without rendering substantial further insights, whereas in
the second approach (continuous function) analytical solvability is in general
lost and a numerical procedure is needed. However, the main arguments and
conclusions put forward in this paper will not be affected, as this smoother
model only lessens the quantitative impacts, but not their sign.
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VaR boundary:
The VaR boundary itself is independent of an individual bank’s characteristics;
it is the same state of the world ζ, irrespective of any individual bank that
comprises the banking system. Consequently, there is a jump in aggregate
terms as well, if there is at least one effectively regulated bank of positive
measure. This argument is valid under the assumption that regulation and
risk management is homogeneous in the sense that every single bank uses the
same probability α. Multiple regulatory probabilities will soften the single
jump event by dispersing it to multiple jumps over a small part of state space.
Consequently, a regulation regime that brings different risk management
systems of banks more in line with each other inherently increases systemic
risk in the sense that a small change in the economic underlying may cause a
rapid movement in endogenous variables such as total assets. Even worse, this
happens exactly when the world turned ’bad’, i.e. for high state prices ξT .
Generalizing the model framework with respect to some of these features
does not render new insights. Their main consequence lies in smoothing
out the ’extreme’ behaviour due to the replication of a binary option needed
to generate the jump in the optimal profile. As the main interest is in the
regulated banking sector with the unregulated banking system as a reference,
the main implications remain true as long as there is only smoothing but no
adverse effects due to a modification in the model framework.
Other Measures of Risk:
In this study the Value-at-Risk is used as a way to regulate risk in the banking
sector. There are other measures of risk proposed in literature with ’better’
properties to determine risk-sensitive weights. When comparing the portfolio
decisions of Basak and Shapiro (2001) (expected loss under Q), Gabih et al.
(2005) (expected loss under P, utility-weighted loss), or Gundel and Weber
(2008) (utility-based shortfall risk), one obtains that the ’tail’ effects from the
VaR measure (jump) are not existent. Still, there are ways to ’game’ the risk
measure which result in a more risky portfolio choice of the regulated banking
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sector relative to an unregulated financial system.
When expected shortfall is used, as example, the terminal wealth profile is
continuous (see Basak and Shapiro (2001), Equation (14) on p. 386 or Figure
6 on p. 387), i.e. the resulting portfolio is less risky than the corresponding
unregulated one, however, there is still a ’hump’ (see Basak and Shapiro (2001),
Proposition 5 on p. 387 or Figure 8(b) on p. 390) due to the kink in the
optimal wealth profile. Consequently, the substitution of the VaR based capital
requirement with a one based on expected loss will still render a more risky
portfolio behaviour than in the analogous unregulated economy.
The results can be viewed as an example of the Corollary 1 to Goodhart’s Law
(Goodhart (1974))
‘A risk model breaks down when used for regulatory purposes.’ See
Danielsson (2002) p. 1276.
Consumption:
In our model framework, the banking system is a consuming one. This
assumption is essential in deriving analytical results. When using instead only
the terminal wealth objective, the interest rate and the market price of risk
are stochastic. Optimal portfolio decision are altered in order to form hedge
portfolios to account for the changes in the stochastic investment set. Some
results can still be deduced, when recovering the optimal portfolio decision
by the use of Malliavin calculus. For examples of how to recover a portfolio
decision in a framework with a complete market see Detemple et al. (2003)
or Stefanova (2008); for a technique to derive the equilibrium see e.g. Serrat
(2001).
However, the optimal terminal wealth solution is unaffected, since the markets
are still complete.
Incomplete Markets:
The single most important assumption we need is a complete (financial)
market; without it, the derivation of the feasible optimal profile(s) is drastically
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aggravated. The assumption of continuous processes substantially reduces
the complexity of the problem, but is not essential as long as the financial
market remains complete; see e.g. Liu and Pan (2003) for the question of
how to recover the portfolio profile in such a case. However, when discussing
systemic risk, non-diversifiable jump events (macroeconomic shocks) should,
in particular, not be excluded from a further analysis, since these systemic
jumps will have a significant influence on the portfolio decisions, see e.g. Das
and Uppal (2004); in the banking context; Koziol and Lawrenz (2009) highlight
the importance of considering jump events with regard to banking regulation.
Reaction of Banks:
Besides Chapter 5, the standing assumption was that banks do not respond
to changes in the economic environment by adapting their nominal debt level.
However, we also showed in Chapter 5 within a two-sided equilibrium that this
point turns out to be crucial if one wants to assess the problem at hand from
a holistic viewpoint, as ’pure’ comparative static results may reverse.
Furthermore, the strand of literature analyzing the liability side of banks,
e.g. Blum (1999) or Koziol and Lawrenz (2009), suggests that a deeper
understanding will be reached if a continuous adjustment of the passive side
is possible. For a first approach of how to technically tackle the problem of
continuous changes in the deposit volume, see Kaniel and Hugonnier (2008)
and Breton et al. (2008).
6.3 Conclusion
We conclude that the debt capacity is reduced under regulation, capital provisions
are increased, and spreads are lowered. These ’static’ indictors show that the
banking system benefits from regulation. However, the detriment of regulation is
intrinsic to dynamics. As the VaR measure is indifferent to the extent of losses within
the VaR quantile, there is an incentive to enter into contracts or portfolio strategies
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that contain tail risks. When (part of) these risks realize due to an unfavourable
economic development, the banking sector rapidly changes between two extreme
positions: first, the banking sector excessively adds new business by buying in new
risks, and then, in a flight-to-quality type of reaction, it sells the risky portfolio
and invests (almost) all in the risk-less security. Neither investment positions are in
the interest of financial stability. Adding risk in ’bad’ times is obviously not to the
benefit of financial stability; but a massive flight to quality depresses prices of the
risky investments.
The arguments made above hinge on the notion of a ’bad’ economic development.
The recent financial crisis did not happen in economically ’bad’ times, when seen
from the viewpoint of the real sector. From the position of standard commercial
banks, the last years before the crisis were, in fact, ’bad’ times, as credit spreads
were, historically seen, very low and, in addition, there existed little ’standard’
banking business to expand into. At the same time, however, there was a boom in
other banking activities shortly before the crisis, where banks loaded on tail risk
while keeping capital requirements almost stable. Especially these markets are now
illiquid in crisis, while at the same time risk-less investments soar.
Banking regulation should not be considered as a matter of risk-sensitive ex ante
capital requirements alone: the combination of the Value-at-Risk - not as a measure
of risk, but as a tool to manage risks actively - and limited liability - possibly
enhanced by implicitly too-big-to-fail guarantees - creates externality effects, since
tail risks become attractive under VaR. Other measures such as expected shortfall
may reduce the problem of tail risks; still, gambling the risk measure on limited
liability remains attractive (regulatory arbitrage). Finally, even if a bank does not
use tail risk, systemic risk can be only in parts accommodated by individual risk
management systems.
An equally important regulatory aspect is the distribution of costs ex post, arising
if the banking system is in distress. Letting the costs of distress that are shared
by the banking sector be zero, capital regulation with VaR is effectively useless.
On the other hand, if banks are burdened with all costs due to a distress in the
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financial system, no regulation is needed, as there are no defaults. This extreme
case is obviously not a realistic one, but illustrates the impact.
Thus, moderate parts of total costs due to a distress in the banking sector should
be existent, if they are seen as a purely exogenous parameter, or needed, if they
are under the control of a regulatory authority. Only under moderate costs, capital
requirements are working well.
Finally, even if those two effects interact well, a leverage restriction is still necessary,
since the usual risk-increasing incentive of limited liability may still work.
There are three reasons to consider:
1. Banks circumvent regulation by directly or indirectly (financial innovation)
increasing leverage.
2. The regulating authority is unable to detect risky portfolios (transparency) or
is unable to charge fines (political pressure).
3. Bank mangers expect in advance that limited liability is not strictly adhered
to in times of crisis, as individual banks might be too-big-to-fail.
Hence, a cap on the leverage ratio increases the equity capital in crisis (at the
horizon), thereby enabling an efficient regulation.
Theoretically Bichsel and Blum (2005) and Blum (2008) propose a similar approach,
although, founded on a model with informational asymmetries and externality
effects. The empirical studies from Avery and Berger (1990), Estrella et al. (2000),
and Hovakimian and Kane (2000) suggest that the combination of risk-sensitive
capital requirements and an additional leverage constraint indeed serves financial
stability better than either one alone.
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